welfare_economics   12

Leo E. Strine - A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications :: SSRN - Journal of Corporation Law, 2015, Forthcoming (rev'd March 2015)
Supreme Court of Delaware; Harvard Law School; University of Pennsylvania Law School -- This article connects the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby to the history of “corporate paternalism.” It details the history of employer efforts to restrict the freedom of employees, and legislative attempts to ensure worker freedom. It also highlights the role of employment in healthcare coverage, and situates the Affordable Care Act’s “minimum essential guarantees” in a historical and global context. The article also discusses how Hobby Lobby combines with the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions in Citizens United and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius to constrain the government’s ability to extend the social safety net, and shows how those decisions put pressure on corporate law itself. -- Note: The article was the subject of lectures to the Securities Regulation Institute of Northwestern University School of Law and the American Constitution Society Student Chapter at Harvard Law School. -- PDF File: 76 -- Keywords: Hobby Lobby; corporate law; corporate paternalism -- right on Leo! -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  US_constitution  US_legal_system  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  corporate_governance  shareholders  freedom_of_conscience  SCOTUS  labor  labor_standards  employers  employee_benefits  welfare_economics  welfare_state  health_care  campaign_finance  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Lee Anne Fennell, Richard H. McAdams, eds. - Fairness in Law and Economics: Introduction :: SSRN - (Edward Elgar 2013)
Lee Anne Fennell and Richard H. McAdams, both University of Chicago Law School -- University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 704 -- This introduction, prepared for an edited volume, offers some observations on the importance — indeed, inescapability — of fairness concerns in law and economics. The relationship between fairness and the economic concept of efficiency is usually cast as an adversarial one. Rational choice economics typically describes human behavior as motivated by simple self-interest, rather than by concerns of morality, justice, or fairness. But we have found that the connections between concepts of fairness and the economic analysis of law are robust and diverse. After discussing some of these linkages, we describe the organization and content of the volume we have compiled. In it, economics engages with fairness, challenging the idea that the two concepts are alien to each other. -- PDF File: 18 -- Keywords: fairness, law and economics -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  books  SSRN  law-and-economics  behavioral_economics  game_theory  rational_choice  rationality-economics  fairness  efficiency  welfare_economics  self-interest  altruism  microeconomics  policymaking  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  utility  status_quo_bias  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Lee Anne Fennell, Richard H. McAdams - The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics :: SSRN - Minnesota Law Review, Forthcoming (April 2015)
Lee Anne Fennell, Richard H. McAdams, both University of Chicago Law School -- University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 713 -- Welfarist law and economics ignores the distributive consequences of legal rules to focus solely on efficiency, even though distribution unambiguously affects welfare, the normative maximand. The now-conventional justification for disregarding distribution is the claim of tax superiority: that the best means of influencing or correcting distribution is via tax-and-transfer. Critics have observed that optimal redistribution through tax may be politically infeasible, but have generally overlooked the rejoinder that the same political impediments to redistribution through tax will block redistribution through legal rules. This “invariance hypothesis,” as we label it, holds that there is only one distributive equilibrium and that Congress will offset through tax any deviations from it. We highlight the centrality of invariance to the conventional economic wisdom and assert that it is just as relevantly false as the zero transaction cost assumption. In contexts where political impediments to tax-based redistribution exceed the impediments to doctrinal redistribution, it may be possible to increase welfare by redistributing outside of tax. Welfarists should, therefore, devote as much scholarly attention to the “political action costs” of redistribution as they do to transaction costs.-- PDF File: 65. -- Keywords: redistribution, tax-and-transfer, legal rules, law and economics, welfare economics -- saved to briefcase
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  welfare_economics  behavioral_economics  law-and-economics  redistribution  tax_policy  transaction_costs  inequality  inequality-wealth  policymaking  US_politics 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Tom Walker - EconoSpeak: The Hours of Labour and the Problem of Social Cost - Jan 2015
Coase argued that the suggested courses of action in the Pigovian tradition – liability, taxation or regulation – were inappropriate and often undesirable.(..) However, Coase didn't consider the full range of Pigou's examples and analysis. While Coase’s restatement of the problem may have been appropriate to the specific externality problems discussed by Pigou in part II, it entirely overlooked the radically different labour market problem encountered in part III, in which competitive pressure compels an employing firm to inflict harm on both itself and its employees and thus regulatory restraint of the firm (and competing employers) may benefit both. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  economic_theory  economic_sociology  intellectual_history  welfare_economics  institutional_economics  Coase  markets  markets-structure  property_rights  transaction_costs  externalities  competition  Labor_markets  social_costs  cost-benefit  regulation-costs  collective_action  common_good  efficiency  labor_law  wages  labor_standards  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
What is the contribution of the financial sector?
Good piece from Andrew Haldane of the BOE on the impact of counting risk bearing activities in the financial sector as "output."
financial_crisis  rent_seeking  GDP  welfare_economics 
december 2011 by prolearts
The Provision of Goods and Farm Policy in Canada
"The remainder of Chapter 1 employs a welfare economics framework to describe how the attributes of rivalry and excludability can be to used to classify goods into four categories – private, public, common pool and toll goods. Chapter 2 provides a review the policies that are often used in the economy to address the market failures associated with each type of good. This framework is then used in Chapter 3 to analyze Canadian agricultural policy. Goods and services important for agriculture are classified; this classification is then followed by a description of how policy has evolved to manage each of them. Chapter 4 concludes the paper by contemplating how changes in policies used to address public goods, toll goods and common pool goods has affected the competitiveness, the income levels, and the structure of the Canadian agricultural sector."
agricultural_policy  welfare_economics  Fulton.Murray  Gray.Richard  Furtan.Hartley  excludability  subtractability 
december 2011 by edanielson
"Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics"
"We propose a broad generalization of standard choice-theoretic welfare economics that encompasses a wide variety of nonstandard behavioral models. Our approach exploits the coherent aspects of choice that those positive models typically attempt to capture. It replaces the standard revealed preference relation with an unambiguous choice relation: roughly, x is (strictly) unambiguously chosen over y (written xP*y) iff y is never chosen when x is available. Under weak assumptions, P* is acyclic and therefore suitable for welfare analysis; it is also the most discerning welfare criterion that never overrules choice. The resulting framework generates natural counterparts for the standard tools of applied welfare economics and is easily applied in the context of specific behavioral theories, with novel implications. Though not universally discerning, it lends itself to principled refinements."
economics  decision_theory  welfare_economics  to_be_shot_after_a_fair_trial 
december 2009 by cshalizi

related tags

agricultural_policy  altruism  article  behavioral_economics  books  campaign_finance  chapter  coase  collective_action  common_good  competition  corporate_citizenship  corporate_governance  corporate_law  cost-benefit  decision_theory  downloaded  economic_sociology  economic_theory  economics  ef-add  efficiency  employee_benefits  employers  entitlement_and_deprivation  excludability  externalities  fairness  financial_crisis  freedom_of_conscience  fulton.murray  furtan.hartley  game_theory  gdp  gray.richard  have_read  health_care  inequality-wealth  inequality  institutional_economics  intellectual_history  labor  labor_law  labor_markets  labor_standards  law-and-economics  legal_reasoning  legal_system  legal_theory  markets-structure  markets  microeconomics  moral_philosophy  paper  paradox  pareto_optimality  peter_dorman  philosophy  philosophy_of_law  policymaking  property_rights  rational_choice  rationality-economics  redistribution  regulation-costs  rent_seeking  scotus  self-interest  shalizi.cosma  shalizi  shareholders  social_costs  ssrn  status_quo_bias  subtractability  tax_policy  to_be_shot_after_a_fair_trial  transaction_costs  tyler_cowen  us_constitution  us_legal_system  us_politics  utility  uwe_reinhardt  value_of_life  wages  welfare_state 

Copy this bookmark: