risk-systemic   49

Gary Gorton
Mobile Collateral versus Immobile Collateral
Gary Gorton, Tyler Muir
NBER Working Paper No. 22619
Issued in September 2016
NBER Program(s):   AP   CF   DAE   EFG   ME
In the face of the Lucas Critique, economic history can be used to evaluate policy. We use the experience of the U.S. National Banking Era to evaluate the most important bank regulation to emerge from the financial crisis, the Bank for International Settlement's liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) which requires that (net) short-term (uninsured) bank debt (e.g. repo) be backed one-for-one with U.S. Treasuries (or other high quality bonds). The rule is narrow banking. The experience of the U.S. National Banking Era, which also required that bank short-term debt be backed by Treasury debt one-for-one, suggests that the LCR is unlikely to reduce financial fragility and may increase it.
NBFI  NBER  financial_stability  risk_management  collateral  financial_economics  capital_markets  bad_regulation  leverage  financial_system  risk-systemic  paywall  money_market  banking  paper  financial_regulation  BIS 
october 2016 by dunnettreader
Centre for the Study of Existential Risk - Cambridge
The Centre for Study of Existential Risk is an interdisciplinary research centre focused on the study of human extinction-level risks that may emerge from technological advances. We aim to combine key insights from the best minds across disciplines to tackle the greatest challenge of the coming century: safely harnessing our rapidly-developing technological power. Our current major research projects include Managing Extreme Technological Risk (supported by the Templeton World Charity Foundation) and Extreme Risks and the Global Environment (supported by the Grantham Foundation), as well as our Blavatnik Public Lecture series and the Hauser-Raspe workshop series
website  risk  risk-systemic  risk_assessment  risk_management  risk-mitigation  environment  climate  technology  innovation-risk_management  Innovation  robotics  AI  video 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Hanson, Shleifer, Stein & Vishny - Banks as patient fixed-income investors (2015) | Andrei Shleifer - J of Fin Econ
Hanson, Samuel, Andrei Shleifer, Jeremy C Stein, and Robert W Vishny. 2015. “Banks as patient fixed-income investors.” Journal of Financial Economics 117 (3): 449-469.
We examine the business model of traditional commercial banks when they compete with shadow banks. While both types of intermediaries create safe “money-like” claims, they go about this in different ways. Traditional banks create money-like claims by holding illiquid fixed-income assets to maturity, and they rely on deposit insurance and costly equity capital to support this strategy. This strategy allows bank depositors to remain “sleepy”: they do not have to pay attention to transient fluctuations in the market value of bank assets. In contrast, shadow banks create money-like claims by giving their investors an early exit option requiring the rapid liquidation of assets. Thus, traditional banks have a stable source of funding, while shadow banks are subject to runs and fire-sale losses. In equilibrium, traditional banks have a comparative advantage at holding fixed-income assets that have only modest fundamental risk but are illiquid and have substantial transitory price volatility, whereas shadow banks tend to hold relatively liquid assets. -- downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
article  institutional_investors  banking  shadow_banking  NBFI  long-term  equity  liquidity  bond_markets  money_market  deposits  risk-systemic  investment  downloaded  asset_prices  insolvency  risk_management  capital_adequacy 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - Liquidity Runs - April 2016
"We do not want to face Bear." Email from a Goldman employee to a hedge fund manager, March 11, 2008 ( Financial Crisis Inquiry Report , p. 288) Despite mixed…
Instapaper  financial_system  financial_crisis  liquidity  insolvency  financial_system-government_back-stop  contagion  clearing_&_settlement  risk_assessment  risk_management  risk-systemic  from instapaper
may 2016 by dunnettreader
Coppola Comment: Debt hysteria - September 30, 2014
The global debt glut described in the Geneva 16 report, and the global saving glut described by Bernanke, are the same thing. The authors note that growth has been slowing in developed countries since 1980. Indeed it has - and during that time capital ownership and indebtedness have been increasing in tandem, as we might expect since they are opposite sides of the same coin. The report cites numerous analyses that show high debt levels - public AND private - tending to impede growth as resources that could have been turned to productive investment are spent on debt service. Secular stagnation is as much a consequence of over-indebtedness as it is of excess capital. -- When the private sector is highly indebted, saving can take the form of paying off debt. If the government runs a surplus, therefore, it impedes deleveraging in the private sector, and may even force some sectors (typically the poor) to increase debt. Reducing the sovereign debt not only reduces saving in the private sector, it comes at the price of continued and possibly rising indebtedness. The report rightly notes that transferring debt from the private to the public sector, as the US has done, isn't deleveraging. But transferring it back again isn't deleveraging either. And as transferring it back again is likely only to be possible with extensive sovereign guarantees (the UK's Help to Buy, for example), whose debt is it really, anyway? Reports such as this, that look on debt as a problem and ignore the associated savings, fail to address the real issue. The fact is that households, corporations and governments like to have savings and are terrified of loss. Writing down the debt in which people invest their savings means that people must lose their savings. THIS is the real "shock, horror". This is what people fear when they worry about a catastrophic debt default. This is what the world went to great lengths to prevent in 2008. The problem is not the debt, it is the savings.
OECD_economies  Evernote  global_economy  risk-systemic  creditors  deleverage  international_political_economy  credit  debtors  debt  risk  leverage  investment  economic_growth  institutional_investors  equity  capital_adequacy  capital_markets  international_finance  equity-corporate  banking  default  pensions  inflation  government_finance  global_imbalance  debt-restructuring  sovereign_debt  emerging_markets  stagnation  savings  property_rights  austerity  interest_rates 
april 2016 by Werderbach
Avinash Persaud - A blueprint for overcoming systemic risk | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 20 November 2015
As the recent Financial Stability Board decision on loss-absorbing capital shows, repairing the financial system is still a work in progress. This column reviews the author’s new book on the matter, Reinventing Financial Regulation: A Blueprint for Overcoming Systemic Risks. It argues that financial institutions should be required to put up capital against the mismatch between each type of risk they hold and their natural capacity to hold that type of risk. -- downloaded as pdf to Note
books  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  risk-systemic  risk_shifting  risk_management  risk_assessment  leverage  hedging  capital_adequacy  shadow_banking  liquidity  risk_premiums  firesales  banking  banking-universal  credit_ratings  balance_sheet  international_finance  maturity_transformation  downloaded 
november 2015 by dunnettreader
Charles A.E. Goodhart, Enrico Perotti - Containing maturity mismatch | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 10 September 2015
In the last century, real estate funding by banks grew steadily. This column argues that the unprecedented expansion of banking in mortgage lending resulted in a high degree of maturity mismatch. The solution to this problem should focus on greater maturity matching, and not using insured deposits. One avenue to do so is by securitising mortgages with little maturity transformation. Another is to create intermediaries providing mortgage loans where the lender shares in the appreciation, while assuming some risk against the occasional bust. -- downloaded as pdf to Note
paper  banking  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  risk-systemic  markets-structure  real_estate  mortgages  liquidity  money_market  deposit_insurance  disintermediation  maturity_transformation  securitization  institutional_investors  bubbles  Minsky  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - Bond market liquidity: should we be worried? — Money, Banking and Financial Markets
Our bottom line is this: resilience of intermediaries and resilience of markets are mutually reinforcing. With more resilient institutions, someone is more likely to stand ready to make a market in bonds – both Treasuries and corporates – so long as the rewards are adequate. Since the less liquid a market is, the higher the return to market making will be, the more likely it is that someone will step up to trade when price moves are large. Put another way, better regulation has removed the public subsidy to trading activity that banks and others were able to capture prior to the crisis, so making markets has become more expensive and prices may have to move more than before to attract stabilizing traders. But during those periods when liquidity is particularly valuable, the rewards should exceed these higher capital and liquidity costs. We worry less, not more, because enhanced capital and liquidity requirements are making intermediaries more resilient. Tags: Corporate bonds, Bond market, Liquidity, U.S. Treasury bonds, High-frequency trading, Contagion, Systemic risk -- really good on corporate bonds and links to recent studies on the Treasury market, especially after the flash crash in October 2014 -- downloaded pdf to Note
financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  risk-systemic  markets-structure  HFT  liquidity  capital_adequacy  banking  broker-dealers  intermediation  corporate_finance  Dodd-Frank  downloaded 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Financial Market Trends - OECD Journal - Home page | OECD
‌The articles in Financial Market Trends focus on trends and prospects in the international and major domestic financial markets and structural issues and developments in financial markets and the financial sector. This includes financial market regulation, bond markets and public debt management, insurance and private pensions, as well as financial statistics. -- links to the contents of each issue of the journal
journal  website  paper  financial_system  global_economy  global_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  risk-systemic  international_finance  banking  NBFI  insurance  markets-structure  risk_assessment  risk_management  sovereign_debt  corporate_finance  corporate_governance  institutional_investors  pensions  consumer_protection  equity-corporate  equity_markets  debt  debt-overhang  leverage  capital_flows  capital_adequacy  financial_economics  financial_innovation  financial_system-government_back-stop  bailouts  too-big-to-fail  cross-border  regulation-harmonization  regulation-costs  statistics 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Christian Thimann - The economics of insurance and its borders with general finance | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal 07/17/2015
What is insurance and where does insurance end?’, is a pressing question in international finance as global regulators are still pondering whether there can be systemic risk in insurance. This column argues that the challenge faced by regulators partly stems from terminological confusion between insurance activities and more general financial activities. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  financial_system  insurance  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  risk-systemic  international_finance  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Erlend W Nier, Tahsin Saadi Sedik - Capital flows, emerging markets and the global financial cycle | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 04 January 2015
Large and volatile capital flows into emerging economies since the Global Financial Crisis have re-invigorated efforts to unearth the determinants of these flows. This column investigates the interplay between global risk aversion (captured by the VIX) and countries’ characteristics. The authors also explore what policies countries should employ to protect themselves against the volatility of capital flows. The findings indicate that capital flows to emerging markets cannot be controlled without incurring substantial costs.
paper  emerging_markets  capital_flows  capital_markets  global_system  international_finance  global_financial_cycle  financial_crisis  Great_Recession  capital_controls  volatility  contagion  risk-systemic 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Anton Korinek - Going against the flow: Dealing with capital flows to emerging markets | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 22 December 2010
Capital flows to emerging markets are controversial territory. This column argues that they create externalities that make the recipient economies more vulnerable to financial fragility and crises. It adds that policymakers can make their economies better off by regulating and discouraging the use of risky forms of external finance – in particular short-term dollar-denominated debts
paper  emerging_markets  capital_flows  capital_markets  global_system  international_finance  global_financial_cycle  financial_crisis  Great_Recession  capital_controls  volatility  contagion  risk-systemic  risk-mitigation 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - Dodd-Frank: Five Years After — Money, Banking and Financial Markets - June 2015
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereafter, DF), the most sweeping financial regulatory… Very good roundup of the holes that are left, the inability to force a coherent inter-agency approach to key risk regulation areas (e.g. the Financial Stability Oversight couldn't force the SEC to write adequate Money Market Funds reg, making it even worse than before the crisis), and the areas where regs are excessively complex, costly etc -- so they either won't do the job (and regulators will wind up making ad hoc exceptions because they're not workable) or their going to get gamed. Basically comes down to the age-old problem of regulation by institutional form rather than by function. The financial crisis was the best chance we had to rationalize the system, and Paulson had Treasury working on a proposal to do just that, but it got trashed when the financial system blew up and everybody was battling for narrow interests in a crisis atmosphere with inflamed populist politics -- only thing positive was finally getting rid of OCC. I do think they're unnecessarily suspicious of the new consumer protection agency -- given that a full overhaul wasn't possible, somebody needs to be responsible for looking out for consumers, since the main regulators are focused on financial risk issues at the institutional or system level.
Instapaper  US_economy  US_politics  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  Fed  SEC  banking  capital_markets  government_agencies  risk  risk-systemic  risk_management  NBFI  shadow_banking  money_market  institutional_investors  consumer_protection  leverage  capital_adequacy  inter-agency  liquidity  arbitrage  markets-structure  intermediation  financial_instiutions  financial_system-government_back-stop  from instapaper
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - An Open Letter to Bill McNabb, CEO of Vanguard Group - May 2015
Dear Mr. McNabb, We find your WSJ op-ed (Wednesday, May 6) misleading, short-sighted, self-serving, and very disappointing. Vanguard has been in the forefront… No kidding! Appaling that the money market fund industry has been allowed to reach such insane size while providing money-equivalents for all investors/savers that can't hold up in an incipient panic. If the government is going to be forced to, effectively, provide deposit insurance, at least the amounts should be capped and transparent and the risks properly priced. That the SEC couldn't get its act together on NNFs is the most glaring evidence of regulatory capture in the whole sorry mess.
financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  shadow_banking  NBFI  money_market  financial_system-government_back-stop  SEC  regulatory_capture  risk-systemic  liquidity  asset_management  asset_prices  from instapaper
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Video - Robert C. Merton (2014) : Measuring the Connectedness of the Financial System: Implications for Systemic Risk Measurement and Management
Abstract -- Macrofinancial systemic risk is an enormous issue for both governments and large asset pools. The increasing globalization of the financial system, while surely a positive for economic development and growth, does increase the potential impact of systemic risk propagation across geopolitical borders, making its control and repairing the damage caused a more complex and longer process. (..) . The Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 and the subsequent European Debt Crisis were centered around credit risk, particularly credit risk of financial institutions and sovereigns, and the interplay of the two. The propagation of credit risk among financial institutions and sovereigns is related to the degree of “connectedness” among them. The effective measurement of potential systemic risk exposures from credit risk may allow the realization of that risk to be avoided through policy actions. Even if it is not feasible to avoid the systemic effects, the impact of those effects on the economy may be reduced by dissemination of that information and subsequent actions to protect against those effects and to subsequently repair the damage more rapidly. This paper applies the structural credit models of finance to develop a model of systemic risk propagation among financial institutions and sovereigns. Tools for applying the model for measuring connectedness and its dynamic changes are presented using network theory and econometric techniques. Unlike other methods that require accounting or institutional positions data as inputs for determining connectedness, the approach taken here develops a reduced-form model applying only capital market data to implement it. Thus, this model can be refreshed almost continuously with “forward-looking” data at low cost and therefore, may be more effective in identifying dynamic changes in connectedness more rapidly than the traditional models. This new research is still in progress. (..) In particular, it holds promise for creating endogenously specified stress test formulations. The talk closes with some discussion of the importance of a more integrated approach to monetary, fiscal and stability policies so as to better recognize the unintended consequences of policy actions in one of these on the others.
video  financial_system  financial_economics  financial_crisis  risk-systemic  networks-financial  networks-information  macroprudential_policies  macroprudential_regulation 
may 2015 by dunnettreader

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