rationality-bounded   11

Stefan Linder, Nicolai J. Foss - Agency Theory :: SSRN April 23, 2013
Stefan Linder, ESSEC Business School -- Nicolai J. Foss, Copenhagen Business School - Department of Strategic Management and Globalization *--* Agency theory studies the problems and solutions linked to delegation of tasks from principals to agents in the context of conflicting interests between the parties. Beginning from clear assumptions about rationality, contracting and informational conditions, the theory addresses problems of ex ante (“hidden characteristics”) as well as ex post information asymmetry (“hidden action”), and examines conditions under which various kinds of incentive instruments and monitoring arrangements can be deployed to minimize the welfare loss. Its clear predictions and broad applicability have allowed agency theory to enjoy considerable scientific impact on social science; however, it has also attracted considerable criticism. -- PDF File: 35 -- Keywords: adverse selection, agency costs, compensation, conflict of interest, contracting, corporate governance, delegation, hidden action, hidden characteristics, incentive intensity, information asymmetry, informativeness, monitoring, moral hazard, motivation, nexus of contracts, pay-for-performance -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  economic_theory  social_sciences-post-WWII  microeconomics  microfoundations  behavioral_economics  incentives  incentives-distortions  agency  agents  game_theory  rational_choice  rationality-economics  rationality-bounded  information-asymmetric  adverse_selection  delegation  moral_psychology  moral_hazard  contracts  principal-agent  downloaded 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Raymond BOUDON - LA RATIONALITÉ DU RELIGIEUX SELON MAX WEBER | JSTOR - L'Année sociologique - Vol. 51, No. 1 (2001), pp. 9-50
LA RATIONALITÉ DU RELIGIEUX SELON MAX WEBER - L'Année sociologique (1940/1948-), Troisième série, Vol. 51, No. 1 (2001), pp. 9-50 -- One of the most striking features of Weber's writings on religion is the frequency with which he uses the word rationality. This derives from the metatheory grounding in his mind the interpretative method. This metatheory asserts that the meaning to an individual of his beliefs should be seen as the main cause explaining why he endorses them. Weber's religion sociology owes its strength to this theoretical framework. His « rational » conception of religious beliefs does not imply that these beliefs derive from deliberation. They are rather transmitted to the social subject in the course of his socialisation. But they are accepted only if they are perceived by the subject as grounded. These principles inspire Weber's pages on magical beliefs, on animism, on the great religions, on the diffusion of monotheism, on theodicy or the world disenchantment. He shows that religious thinking cares on coherence, tends to verify and falsify religious dogmas by confronting them with observable facts. He develops a complex version of evolutionism, explaining the cases of irreversibility registered by the history of religions, but avoiding any fatalism. He rejects any depth psychology and any causalist psychology in his sociology of religion, the common rational psychology being the only one that can be easily made compatible with the notion of "Verstehende Soziologie", i.e. of « interpretative sociology ». Weber analyses the evolution of religious ideas supposing that they follow the same mechanisms as the evolution of ideas in other domains, as law, economics or science. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  sociology_of_religion  Weber  Boudon  rationality  causation  causation-social  religious_history  religious_belief  religious_culture  hermeneutics  social_theory  socialization  social_process  rationality-bounded  disenchantment  causation-evolutionary  psychology  mechanisms-social_theory  downloaded 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Raymond Boudon - Utilité ou Rationalité (2002) | Scribd
21 page article -- Explains why "rational choice" fails as explanatory theory in lots of collective action, public opinion, game theory, etc. -- domains where decisions to act aren't based exclusively on instrumental, consequentialist, cost-benefit calculative, and egoistic (directly concerned with impact on self) forms of, and context for, reasoning. Boudon finds "rational choice" superior to hand-wavy explanations that are speculative "black boxes" -- e.g. (1) sociobiology or evo-devo that we're hardwired, (2) Kahneman and Tversky heuristics and biases -- fascinating observations but aren't explanatory, (3) social/cultural explanations such as "socialization" which are tautological or a black box that provide no mechanisms that can differentiate situations or variations in outcomes. E.g. in Roman Empire peasants were more likely to remain pagan and soldiers were more likely to be attracted to the new religion. "Socialization" doesn't explain why soldiers raised in the traditional religious milieu and belief system were more likely to change their beliefs. Great examples of how rationality includes cognitive processes dealing with (1) non-instrumental contexts - e.g. identification with communitarian concerns ranging from voting to immigration policies, (2) aligning actions with one's judgment of what's more likely "true" based on core beliefs and how one has learned to evaluate "evidence" [e.g. Swedes are even more likely to reject "lump of labor" than Americans!] (3) axiological reasoning, including norms of fairness that may be fairly universal (e.g. reaction to Antigone, ultimatum game) or specific to a culture (e.g. due process in political application of "rule of law") -- see article for his tripartite classification of rationality and types of cognition that "rational choice" rejects in its definition. He thinks Weber and Adam Smith got there before, and better than, Becker.
article  Scribd  social_theory  mechanisms-social_theory  evolutionary_biology  evo_psych  rational_choice  rationality-economics  rationality-bounded  rationality  reasons  Weber  Smith  Becker_Gary  Simon_Herbert  fairness  community  identity  norms  epistemology-social  game_theory  altruism  cognitive_bias  cognition  cognition-social  democracy  citizens  voting  political_participation  collective_action  political_culture  public_choice  public_opinion  common_good  socialization  social_psychology  cost-benefit  self-interest  self-interest-cultural_basis  self-and-other  EF-add 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Herbert A. Simon - Altruism and Economics (May, 1993) | JSTOR - The American Economic Review
Herbert A. Simon,The American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1993), pp. 156-161 -- overview of how he models "utility" to handle bounded rationality, and how groups need to be included in utility behavior models to get at "altruism" or preferences for other-regarding behavior -- basic message is public choice and rational choice have such an impoverished concept of "rationality" they will never be able to get their axiomatic models to work with what requires rich empirical observations -- doesn't say it, but their limited concept of rationality is less an empirically verified theory re how the world works, but rather a bundle of normative assumptions -- and when they try to extend what's really prescriptive to areas like the family, they've gotten way outside their lane -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  jstor  economic_theory  economic_sociology  microeconomics  behavioral_economics  rational_choice  rationality-economics  rationality-bounded  rationality-adaptive  Darwinism  evolution-as-model  evolution-social  evolution-group_selection  self-interest  altruism  utility  public_choice  Simon_Herbert  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Paul A. Lewis - An Analytical Core for Sociolgy: A Complex, Hayekian Analysis (2014, Review of Behavioral Economics, Forthcoming) :: SSRN
Lewis, Paul A., An Analytical Core for Sociolgy: A Complex, Hayekian Analysis (November 11, 2014). Review of Behavioral Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2522810 -- King's College London - Department of Political Economy -- This paper develops a Hayekian perspective on Herbert Gintis, and Dirk Helbing's, attempts to develop a unified analytical approach to the social sciences. Like Hayek, Gintis and Helbing view both the economy, and also the human mind, as a complex adaptive system. Their emphasis on emergence, on group selection, on the social relations that structure people’s interactions, and on the importance of motivations stemming from so-called 'social preferences', sees them develop themes present in Hayek's own work, often in ways that build on and strengthen Hayek's own analysis. However, Gintis and Helbing's continued commitment to a model of people as maximising their expected utility, and to general equilibrium theory, arguably leaves them less able than Hayek to do justice to the importance of innovation, novelty and radical uncertainty in the economic process. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 24 -- Keywords: Gintis, complexity, evolution, emergence, Hayek, reductionism, behavioral economics, equilibrium, order, uncertainty. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  social_theory  Hayek  Gintis  complexity  complex_adaptive_systems  evolution-as-model  evolution-social  evolutionary_biology  evolution  emergence  behavioral_economics  behavioralism  evolution-group_seledtion  rationality-economics  rational_choice  rationality-bounded  utility  social_order  uncertainty  reductionism  equilibrium  Innovation  economic_theory  economic_sociology  downloaded  EF-add 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Seamus Bradley Imprecise Probabilities (Dec 2014) | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
It has been argued that imprecise probabilities are a natural and intuitive way of overcoming some of the issues with orthodox precise probabilities. Models of this type have a long pedigree, and interest in such models has been growing in recent years. This article introduces the theory of imprecise probabilities, discusses the motivations for their use and their possible advantages over the standard precise model. It then discusses some philosophical issues raised by this model. There is also a historical appendix which provides an overview of some important thinkers who appear sympathetic to imprecise probabilities. *-* Related Entries -- belief, formal representations of | epistemic utility arguments for probabilism | epistemology: Bayesian | probability, interpretations of | rational choice, normative: expected utility | statistics, philosophy of | vagueness
epistemology  philosophy_of_science  technology  probability  risk  uncertainty  rational_choice  rationality-economics  rationality  rationality-bounded  statistics  Bayesian  linguistics  causation  causation-social  causation-evolutionary  complexity  complex_adaptive_systems  utility  behavioral_economics  behavioralism  neuroscience  vagueness 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Pei Wang - A General Theory of Intelligence [an e-book under development] | Home
This eBook is an attempt to establish a theory that identifies the commonality within various forms intelligence, including human intelligence, computer intelligence, animal intelligence, alien intelligence, group intelligence, etc. -- NARS (Non-Axiomatic Reasoning System) - Most of the existing AI inference works with semi-axiomatic systems, which attempt to make partial extension or revision of mathematical logic, while keeping the other parts. What AI really needs are non-axiomatic systems, which do not assume the sufficiency of knowledge and resources in any aspect of the system. NARS is a concrete example of non-axiomatic system which uses a formal language "Narsese" to represent goals, actions, and beliefs.The basic unit of the language is term, which can be thought of as the name or label of a concept in the system. (..) The meaning of a term is determined by its extension and intension, which are the collection of the inheritance relations between this term and other terms, obtained from the experience of the system. NARS includes three variants of the inheritance relation: similarity (symmetric inheritance), implication (derivability), and equivalence (symmetric implication). (..)The meaning of a compound term is partially determined by its logical relations with its components, and partially by the system's experience on the compound term as a whole. Event is a special type of statement that have a time-dependent truth-value. Operation is a special type of event that can occur by the system's decision. Goal is a special type of event, that the system is attempting to realize, by carrying out certain operations. Beside goals to be achieved, NARS can accept tasks that are knowledge to be absorbed and questions to be answered. (..)If a event is judged to imply the achieving of a goal, then the desirability of the event is increased, and the system will also evaluate its plausibility(..). When an event is both desirable and plausible, the system will make the decision to turn the event into a goal to be actually pursued. The basic function of inference rules in NARS is to derive new beliefs from current beliefs.
etexts  books  intelligence  artificial_intelligence  mind  systems-complex_adaptive  systems-reflexive  systems_theory  epistemology-social  cognition  cognition-social  agent-based_models  logic  inference  decision_theory  rationality  rationality-bounded  learning  website  EF-add 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
ECONOMICS AS SOCIAL THEORY - Routledge Series edited by Tony Lawson - Titles List
Social theory is experiencing something of a revival within economics. Critical analyses of the particular nature of the subject matter of social studies and of the types of method, categories and modes of explanation that can legitimately be endorsed for the scientific study of social objects, are re-emerging. Economists are again addressing such issues as the relationship between agency and structure, between the economy and the rest of society, and between inquirer and the object of inquiry. There is renewed interest in elaborating basic categories such as causation, competition, culture, discrimination,evolution, money, need, order, organisation, power, probability, process, rationality, technology, time, truth, uncertainty and value, etc. The objective for this series is to facilitate this revival further. In contemporary economics the label `theory' has been appropriated by a group that confines itself to largely a-social, a-historical, mathematical `modelling'. Economics as Social Theory thus reclaims the `theory' label, offering a platform for alternative, rigorous, but broader and more critical conceptions of theorising.
books  social_theory  economic_theory  social_sciences  intellectual_history  political_economy  causation-social  economic_sociology  economic_culture  rationality-economics  rational_choice  rationality-bounded  rational_expectations  critical_realism  evolution-social  history_of_science  historical_sociology  agency-structure  power  power-asymmetric  business-and-politics  capitalism  capital_as_power  Marxist  Post-Keynesian  epistemology  epistemology-social  conventions  social_order  civil_society  public_policy  public_goods  anarchism  competition  financialization  development  economic_growth 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Lance Taylor - Maynard's Revenge: The Collapse of Free Market Macroeconomics (2011) | Harvard University Press
Taylor argues that the ideas of J.M. Keynes and others provide a more useful framework both for understanding the crisis and for dealing with it effectively. Keynes’s basic points were fundamental uncertainty and the absence of Say’s Law. He set up machinery to analyze the macro economy under such circumstances, including the principle of effective demand, liquidity preference, different rules for determining commodity and asset prices, distinct behavioral patterns of different collective actors, and the importance of thinking in terms of complete macro accounting schemes. Economists working in this tradition also worked out growth and cycle models. Employing these ideas throughout Maynard’s Revenge, Taylor provides an analytical narrative about the causes of the crisis, and suggestions for dealing with it. 1. Macroeconomics. 2. Macroeconomic Thought during the Long 19thC. 3. Gold Standard, Reparations, Mania, Crash, and Depression. 4. Maynard Ascendant. 5. Keynesian Growth, Cycles, and Crisis. 6. The Counterrevolution. 7. Finance. 8. The International Dimension. 9. Keynesianism and the
books  intellectual_history  economic_theory  economic_history  economic_models  18thC  19thC  20thC  social_sciences-post-WWII  entre_deux_guerres  political_economy  macroeconomics  classical_economics  neoclassical_economics  Keynes  Keynesianism  Post-Keynesian  finance_capital  financial_economics  microfoundations  EMH  rational_expectations  rationality-economics  rationality-bounded  behavioral_economics  business_cycles  Great_Depression  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  gold_standard  economic_growth  international_monetary_system  balance_of_payments  FX  uncertainty  liquidity  savings  Labor_markets  wages 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Consent in Contract Law (revised 2011) :: SSRN
Chapter in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE, Alan Wertheimer, Franklin G. Miller, eds., Oxford University Press, 2010 -- Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-36 -- Consent, in terms of voluntary choice, is - or, at least, appears to be or purports to be - at the essence of contract law. Contract law, both in principle and in practice, is about allowing parties to enter arrangements on terms they choose - each party imposing obligations on itself in return for obligations another party has placed upon itself. This freedom of contract- an ideal by which there are obligations to the extent, but only to the extent, freely chosen by the parties - is contrasted to the duties of criminal law and tort law, which bind all parties regardless of consent. At the same time, consent, in the robust sense expressed by the ideal of freedom of contract, is arguably absent in the vast majority of the contracts we enter these days, but its absence does little to affect the enforceability of those agreements. Consent to contractual terms often looks like consent to government: present, if at all, only under a fictional (as if) or attenuated rubric. The article begins by a brief examination of the nature of consent, then turns to contract doctrines that turn on the alleged absence of consent (e.g., duress and undue influence); contract rules and principles (e.g., implied terms) that turn on hypothetical consent; the challenges to consent that arise from electronic contracting and bounded rationality, and theories of contract law that emphasize consent. -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  political_philosophy  contracts  social_contract  consent  rational_choice  rationality-bounded  power-asymmetric  e-commerce  commercial_law  libertarianism  freedom_of_contract  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader

related tags

18thc  19thc  20thc  adverse_selection  agency-structure  agency  agent-based_models  agents  altruism  anarchism  article  artificial_intelligence  balance_of_payments  bayesian  becker_gary  behavioral_economics  behavioralism  books  boudon  business-and-politics  business_cycles  capital_as_power  capitalism  causation-evolutionary  causation-social  causation  chapter  citizens  civil_society  classical_economics  cognition-social  cognition  cognitive_bias  collective_action  commercial_law  common_good  community  competition  complex_adaptive_systems  complexity  consent  contracts  conventions  cost-benefit  critical_realism  darwinism  decision_theory  delegation  democracy  development  disenchantment  downloaded  e-commerce  economic_culture  economic_growth  economic_history  economic_models  economic_sociology  economic_theory  ef-add  emergence  emh  entre_deux_guerres  epistemology-social  epistemology  equilibrium  etexts  evo_psych  evolution-as-model  evolution-group_selection  evolution-group_seledtion  evolution-social  evolution  evolutionary_biology  expertise  fairness  finance_capital  financial_crisis  financial_economics  financialization  freedom_of_contract  fx  game_theory  gintis  gold_standard  great_depression  great_recession  hayek  hermeneutics  historical_sociology  history_of_science  identity  incentives-distortions  incentives  inference  information-asymmetric  innovation  instapaper  instrumentalist  intellectual_history  intelligence  international_monetary_system  jstor  keynes  keynesianism  labor_markets  learning  libertarianism  linguistics  liquidity  logic  macroeconomics  marxist  mechanisms-social_theory  metaphysics  microeconomics  microfoundations  mind  moral_hazard  moral_psychology  neoclassical_economics  neuroscience  niche_construction  norms  paper  philosophy  philosophy_of_law  philosophy_of_science  political_culture  political_economy  political_participation  political_philosophy  post-keynesian  power-asymmetric  power  principal-agent  probability  psychology  public_choice  public_goods  public_opinion  public_policy  rational_choice  rational_expectations  rationality-adaptive  rationality-economics  rationality  reasons  reductionism  religious_belief  religious_culture  religious_history  risk  savings  scribd  self-and-other  self-interest-cultural_basis  self-interest  simon_herbert  smith  social_contract  social_order  social_process  social_psychology  social_sciences-post-wwii  social_sciences  social_theory  socialization  sociology_of_religion  specialization  ssrn  statistics  systems-complex_adaptive  systems-reflexive  systems_theory  technology  uncertainty  utility  vagueness  voting  wages  weber  website 

Copy this bookmark: