pseudoe   114

« earlier    

The Falling Price of Fat | Pseudoerasmus
Summary : There are too many baroque explanations for the increased prevalence of obesity. I suggest a simple mechanism : falling food prices, rising incomes.
econotariat  broad-econ  pseudoE  economics  supply-demand  food  obesity  trends  explanans  cynicism-idealism  money  compensation  cost-benefit  backup  epidemiology  public-health  roots 
february 2018 by nhaliday
Muscle, steam and combustion
Vaclav Smil’s Energy and Civilization is a monumental history of how humanity has harnessed muscle, steam and combustion to build palaces and skyscrapers, light the night and land on the Moon. Want to learn about the number of labourers needed to build Egypt’s pyramids of Giza, or US inventor Thomas Edison’s battles with Nikola Tesla and George Westinghouse to electrify homes and cities, or the upscaling of power stations and blast furnaces in the twentieth century? Look no further.
pdf  books  review  vaclav-smil  pseudoE  deep-materialism  energy-resources  biophysical-econ  the-world-is-just-atoms  big-picture  history  antiquity  iron-age  medieval  early-modern  farmers-and-foragers  civilization  technology  industrial-revolution  heavy-industry  🔬  phys-energy  the-bones  environment  scale  economics  growth-econ  broad-econ  efficiency  chart  dirty-hands  fluid  input-output 
august 2017 by nhaliday
Does European development have Roman roots? Evidence from the German Limes
The results indicate that economic development—as mea-sured by luminosity—is indeed significantly and robustly larger in the formerly Roman part of Germany. The study identifies the persistence of the Roman road network until the present an important factor causing this developmental advantage of the formerly Roman part ofGermany both by fostering city growth and by allowing for a denser road network.

https://twitter.com/GarettJones/status/888521595416793089
https://archive.is/ozKku
CC: @GarettJones this puts a new spin on deep history! Hard to explain...
I've got a theory, have a partial model but need some time to formalize it. I've called it the Radio Brain Hypothesis...
pdf  study  economics  growth-econ  cliometrics  broad-econ  history  iron-age  medieval  mostly-modern  europe  germanic  path-dependence  divergence  shift  transportation  network-structure  urban  pseudoE  within-group  wealth-of-nations  natural-experiment  microfoundations  mediterranean  the-classics  conquest-empire  the-great-west-whale  geography  infrastructure  multi  twitter  social  commentary  backup  spearhead  econotariat  garett-jones  aphorism  ideas  branches  urban-rural  hari-seldon 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Does Management Matter? Evidence from India
We have shown that management matters, with improvements in management practices improving plant-level outcomes. One response from economists might then be to argue that poor management can at most be a short-run problem, since in the long run better managed firms should take over the market. Yet many of our firms have been in business for 20 years and more.

One reason why better run firms do not dominate the market is constraints on growth derived from limited managerial span of control. In every firm in our sample only members of the owning family have positions with major decision-making power over finance, purchasing, operations or employment. Non-family members are given only lower-level managerial positions with authority only over basic day-to-day activities. The principal reason is that family members do not trust non-family members. For example, they are concerned if they let their plant managers procure yarn they may do so at inflated rates from friends and receive kick-backs.

A key reason for this inability to decentralize is the poor rule of law in India. Even if directors found managers stealing, their ability to successfully prosecute them and recover the assets is minimal because of the inefficiency of Indian civil courts. A compounding reason for the inability to decentralize in Indian firms is bad management practices, as this means the owners cannot keep good track of materials and finance, so may not even able to identify mismanagement or theft within their firms.30

As a result of this inability to delegate, firms can expand beyond the size that can be managed by a single director only if other family members are available to share directorial duties. Thus, an important predictor of firm size was the number of male family members of the owners. In particular, the number of brothers and sons of the leading director has a correlation of 0.689 with the total employment of the firm, compared to a correlation between employment and the average management score of 0.223. In fact the best managed firm in our sample had only one (large) production plant, in large part because the owner had no brothers or sons to help run a larger organization. This matches the ideas of the Lucas (1978) span of control model, that there are diminishing returns to how much additional productivity better management technology can generate from a single manager. In the Lucas model, the limits to firm growth restrict the ability of highly productive firms to drive lower productivity ones from the market. In our Indian firms, this span of control restriction is definitely binding, so unproductive firms are able to survive because more productive firms cannot expand.

https://twitter.com/pseudoerasmus/status/885915088951095296

http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2017/03/india-much-entrepreneurial-society-united-states-thats-problem.html
However, when we reverse the employment statistic–only ~15% of Indians work for a firm compared to approximately 90% of US workers we see the problem. Entrepreneurship in India isn’t a choice, it’s a requirement. Indian entrepreneurship is a consequence of India’s failed economy. As a I wrote in my Cato paper with Goldschlag, less developed countries in general, not just India, have more entrepreneurs.

...

The modal size of an Indian firm is 1 employee and the mean is just over 2. The mean number of employees in a US firm is closer to 20 but even though that is ten times the Indian number it obscures the real difference. The US has many small firms but what makes it different is that it also has large firms that employ lots of people. In fact, over half of all US workers are employed by the tiny minority (0.3%) of firms with over 500 employees.

blames colonialism, idk, might have contributed

Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20150029
Students in India who cheat on a simple laboratory task are more likely to prefer public sector jobs. This paper shows that cheating on this task predicts corrupt behavior by civil servants, implying that it is a meaningful predictor of future corruption. Students who demonstrate pro-social preferences are less likely to prefer government jobs, while outcomes on an explicit game and attitudinal measures to measure corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. _A screening process that chooses high-ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption._ The findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption.

Where Does the Good Shepherd Go? Civic Virtue and Sorting into Public Sector Employment: http://repec.business.uzh.ch/RePEc/iso/leadinghouse/0134_lhwpaper.pdf
Our study extends the understanding of the motivational basis of public sector employment by considering civic virtue in addition to altruism and risk aversion and by investigating selection and socialization. Using a largely representative, longitudinal data set of employees in Germany including 63,101 observations of 13,673 different individuals, we find that civic virtue relates positively to public sector employment beyond altruism and risk aversion. We find evidence on selection and no evidence on socialization as an explanation for this result.

http://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21716019-penchant-criminality-electoral-asset-india-worlds-biggest
Sadly, this is not a book about some small, shady corner of Indian politics: 34% of the members of parliament (MPs) in the Lok Sabha (lower house) have criminal charges filed against them; and the figure is rising (see chart). Some of the raps are peccadillos, such as rioting or unlawful assembly—par for the course in India’s raucous local politics. But over a fifth of MPs are in the dock for serious crimes, often facing reams of charges for anything from theft to intimidation and worse. (Because the Indian judicial system has a backlog of 31m cases, even serious crimes can take a decade or more to try, so few politicians have been convicted.) One can walk just about the whole way from Mumbai to Kolkata without stepping foot outside a constituency whose MP isn’t facing a charge.

...

What is more surprising is that the supply of willing criminals-cum-politicians was met with eager demand from voters. Over the past three general elections, a candidate with a rap sheet of serious charges has had an 18% chance of winning his or her race, compared with 6% for a “clean” rival. Mr Vaishnav dispels the conventional wisdom that crooks win because they can get voters to focus on caste or some other sectarian allegiance, thus overlooking their criminality. If anything, the more serious the charge, the bigger the electoral boost, as politicians well know.

As so often happens in India, poverty plays a part. India is almost unique in having adopted universal suffrage while it was still very poor. The upshot has been that underdeveloped institutions fail to deliver what citizens vote for. Getting the state to perform its most basic functions—building a school, disbursing a subsidy, repaving a road—is a job that can require banging a few heads together. Sometimes literally. Who better to represent needy constituents in these tricky situations than someone who “knows how to get things done”? If the system doesn’t work for you, a thuggish MP can be a powerful ally.

http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36446652
study  economics  broad-econ  growth-econ  econometrics  field-study  india  asia  pseudoE  management  industrial-org  cultural-dynamics  institutions  trust  intervention  coordination  cohesion  n-factor  kinship  orient  multi  twitter  social  commentary  econotariat  spearhead  wealth-of-nations  pop-diff  pdf  scale  gender  leviathan  econ-productivity  marginal-rev  world  developing-world  comparison  usa  business  network-structure  labor  social-structure  lived-experience  entrepreneurialism  hmm  microfoundations  culture  corruption  anomie  crooked  human-capital  technocracy  government  data  crime  criminology  north-weingast-like  news  org:rec  org:biz  org:anglo  politics  populism  incentives  transportation  society  GT-101  integrity  🎩  endo-exo  cooperate-defect  ethics  attaq  selection  europe  the-great-west-whale  germanic  correlation  altruism  outcome-risk  uncertainty  impetus  longitudinal  civic  public-goodish  organizing  endogenous-exogenous 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Economics empiricism - Wikipedia
Economics empiricism[1] (sometimes economic imperialism) in contemporary economics refers to economic analysis of seemingly non-economic aspects of life,[2] such as crime,[3] law,[4] the family,[5] prejudice,[6] tastes,[7] irrational behavior,[8] politics,[9] sociology,[10] culture,[11] religion,[12] war,[13] science,[14] and research.[14] Related usage of the term predates recent decades.[15]

The emergence of such analysis has been attributed to a method that, like that of the physical sciences, permits refutable implications[16] testable by standard statistical techniques.[17] Central to that approach are "[t]he combined postulates of maximizing behavior, stable preferences and market equilibrium, applied relentlessly and unflinchingly."[18] It has been asserted that these and a focus on economic efficiency have been ignored in other social sciences and "allowed economics to invade intellectual territory that was previously deemed to be outside the discipline’s realm."[17][19]

The Fluidity of Race: https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2015/01/26/the-fluidity-of-race/
So: what can we conclude about this paper? It’s a classic case of economic imperialism, informed by what ‘intellectuals’ [ those that have never been introduced to Punnet squares, Old Blue Light, the Dirac equation, or Melungeons] would like to hear.

It is wrong, not close to right.

Breadth-first search: https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2015/05/24/breadth-first-search/
When I complain about some egregious piece of research, particularly those that are in some sense cross-disciplinary, I often feel that that just knowing more would solve the problem. If Roland Fryer or Oded Galor understood genetics, they wouldn’t make these silly mistakes. If Qian and Nix understood genetics or American post-Civil War history, they would never have written that awful paper about massive passing. Or if paleoanthropologists and population geneticists had learned about mammalian hybrids, they would have been open to the idea of Neanderthal introgression.

But that really amounts to a demand that people learn about five times as much in college and grad school as they actually do. It’s not going to happen. Or, perhaps, find a systematic and effective way of collaborating with people outside their discipline without having their heads shaved. That doesn’t sound too likely either.

Hot enough for you?: https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2015/10/22/hot-enough-for-you/
There’s a new study out in Nature, claiming that economic productivity peaks at 13 degrees Centigrade and that global warming will therefore drastically decrease world GDP.

Singapore. Phoenix. Queensland. Air-conditioners!

Now that I’ve made my point, just how stupid are these people? Do they actually believe this shit? I keep seeing papers by economists – in prominent places – that rely heavily on not knowing jack shit about anything on Earth, papers that could only have been written by someone that didn’t know a damn thing about the subject they were addressing, from the influence of genetic diversity on civilization achievement (zilch) to the massive race-switching that happened after the Civil War (not). Let me tell you, there’s a difference between ‘economic imperialism’ and old-fashioned real imperialism: people like Clive of India or Raffles bothered to learn something about the territory they were conquering. They knew enough to run divide et impera in their sleep: while economists never say peccavi, no matter how badly they screw up.
economics  social-science  thinking  lens  things  conceptual-vocab  concept  academia  wiki  reference  sociology  multi  west-hunter  scitariat  rant  critique  race  usa  history  mostly-modern  methodology  conquest-empire  ideology  optimization  equilibrium  values  pseudoE  science  frontier  thick-thin  interdisciplinary  galor-like  broad-econ  info-dynamics  alt-inst  environment  climate-change  temperature  india  asia  britain  expansionism  diversity  knowledge  ability-competence  commentary  study  summary  org:nat 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Kinship Systems, Cooperation and the Evolution of Culture
In the data, societies with loose ancestral kinship ties cooperate and trust broadly, which is apparently sustained through a belief in moralizing gods, universally applicable moral principles, feelings of guilt, and large-scale institutions. Societies with a historically tightly knit kinship structure, on the other hand, exhibit strong in-group favoritism: they cheat on and are distrusting of out-group members, but readily support in-group members in need. This cooperation scheme is enforced by moral values of in-group loyalty, conformity to tight social norms, emotions of shame, and strong local institutions.

Henrich, Joseph, The Secret of Our Success: How Culture is Driving Human Evolution,
Domesticating Our Species, and Making Us Smarter, Princeton University Press, 2015.
—, W.E.I.R.D People: How Westerners became Individualistic, Self-Obsessed, Guilt-Ridden,
Analytic, Patient, Principled and Prosperous, Princeton University Press, n.d.
—, Jean Ensminger, Richard McElreath, Abigail Barr, Clark Barrett, Alexander Bolyanatz, Juan Camilo Cardenas, Michael Gurven, Edwins Gwako, Natalie Hen- rich et al., “Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment,” Science, 2010, 327 (5972), 1480–1484.

...

—, —, Will M. Gervais, Aiyana K. Willard, Rita A. McNamara, Edward Slingerland, and Joseph Henrich, “The Cultural Evolution of Prosocial Religions,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2016, 39, e1.

...

Purzycki, Benjamin Grant, Coren Apicella, Quentin D. Atkinson, Emma Cohen, Rita Anne McNamara, Aiyana K. Willard, Dimitris Xygalatas, Ara Norenzayan, and Joseph Henrich, “Moralistic Gods, Supernatural Punishment and the Expansion of Human Sociality,” Nature, 2016.

Table 1 summarizes
Figure 1 has map of kinship tightness
Figure 2 has cheating and in-group vs. out-group
Table 2 has regression
Figure 3 has univeralism and shame-guilt
Figure 4 has individualism-collectivism/conformity
Table 4 has radius of trust, Table 5 same for within-country variation (ethnic)
Tables 7 and 8 do universalism

Haidt moral foundations:
In line with the research hypothesis discussed in Section 3, the analysis employs two dependent variables, i.e., (i) the measure of in-group loyalty, and (ii) an index of the importance of communal values relative to the more universal (individualizing) ones. That is, the hypothesis is explicitly not about some societies being more or less moral than others, but merely about heterogeneity in the relative importance that people attach to structurally different types of values. To construct the index, I compute the first principal component of fairness / reciprocity, harm / care, in-group / loyalty, and respect /authority. The resulting score endogenously has the appealing property that – in line with the research hypothesis – it loads positively on the first two values and negatively on the latter two, with roughly equal weights, see Appendix F for details.²⁴I compute country-level scores by averaging responses by country of residence of respondents. Importantly, in Enke (2017) I document that – in a nationally representative sample of Americans – this same index of moral communalism is strongly correlated with individuals’ propensity to favor their local community over society as a whole in issues ranging from taxation and redistribution to donations and volunteering. Thus, there is evidence that the index of communal moral values captures economically meaningful behavioral heterogeneity.

The coevolution of kinship systems, cooperation, and culture: http://voxeu.org/article/kinship-cooperation-and-culture
- Benjamin Enke

pretty short

Joe Henrich presentation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f-unD4ZzWB4

relevant video:
Johnny Cash - God's Gonna Cut You Down: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eJlN9jdQFSc

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guilt_society
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shame_society
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guilt-Shame-Fear_spectrum_of_cultures
this says Dems more guilt-driven but Peter Frost says opposite here (and matches my perception of the contemporary breakdown both including minorities and focusing only on whites): https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:9b75881f6861
http://honorshame.com/global-map-of-culture-types/

https://twitter.com/turrible_tao/status/1007742628128051201
https://archive.is/cRnKP
https://archive.is/uTl0Y
Faction who overused shame shocked they created shame resistant super bug
The dems have no shame they just don't have anyone on the opposite end who can ever shame them, GOP deep down wishes they had approval of dems
"Can't we agree to disagree? Can't I think diff policies are true without being accused of evil?"
"EVIL EVIL EVIL EVIL EVIL IF YOUR NOT VOTING FOR US ITS BECAUSE YOUR EVIL"
--
too shame someone you need to get the mob out
and you can only create the mob if you control the media
unfortunately conservatives dont have media and havent for a while
--
weaponized shame's been since the era of lippmann & bernays. this is the death of guilt, which only became possible when 24/7 media scrutiny (both through social media channels & tv) pressurized narcissism into a super power

The Origins of WEIRD Psychology: https://psyarxiv.com/d6qhu/
Recent research not only confirms the existence of substantial psychological variation around the globe but also highlights the peculiarity of populations that are Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD). We propose that much of this variation arose as people psychologically adapted to differing kin-based institutions—the set of social norms governing descent, marriage, residence and related domains. We further propose that part of the variation in these institutions arose historically from the Catholic Church’s marriage and family policies, which contributed to the dissolution of Europe’s traditional kin-based institutions, leading eventually to the predominance of nuclear families and impersonal institutions. By combining data on 20 psychological outcomes with historical measures of both kinship and Church exposure, we find support for these ideas in a comprehensive array of analyses across countries, among European regions and between individuals with different cultural backgrounds.

--

A growing body of research suggests that populations around the globe vary substantially along several important psychological dimensions, and that people from societies characterized as Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD) are particularly unusual (1–6). Often at the extremes of global distributions, people from WEIRD populations tend to be more individualistic, independent, analytically-minded and impersonally prosocial (e.g., trusting strangers) while revealing less conformity, obedience, in-group loyalty and nepotism (3, 5–13). While these patterns are now well documented, efforts to explain this variation from a cultural evolutionary and historical perspective have just begun (13–20). Here, we develop and test a cultural evolutionary theory that aims to explain a substantial portion of this psychological variation, both within and across nations. Not only does our approach contribute to explaining global variation and address why WEIRD societies so often occupy the tail ends of global distributions, but it also helps explain the psychological variation within Europe—among countries, across regions within countries and between individuals with different cultural backgrounds within the same country and region.
Our approach integrates three insights. The first, drawing on anthropology, reveals that the institutions built around kinship and marriage vary greatly across societies (21–23) and that much of this variation developed as societies scaled up in size and complexity, especially after the origins of food production 12,000 years ago (22, 24–29). In forging the tightly-knit communities needed to defend agricultural fields and pastures, cultural evolution gradually wove together social norms governing marriage, post-marital residence and in- group identity (descent), leading to a diversity of kin-based institutions, including the organizational forms known as clans, lineages and kindreds (21, 27, 30). The second insight, based on work in psychology, is that people’s motivations, emotions, perceptions, thinking styles and other aspects of cognition are heavily influenced by the social norms, social networks, technologies and linguistic worlds they encounter while growing up (31–38). In particular, with intensive kin-based institutions, people’s psychological processes adapt to the collectivistic demands and the dense social networks that they interweave (39–43). Intensive kinship norms reward greater conformity, obedience, holistic/relational awareness and in-group loyalty but discourage individualism, independence and analytical thinking (41, 44). Since the sociality of intensive kinship is based on people’s interpersonal embeddedness, adapting to these institutions tends to reduce people’s inclinations towards impartiality, universal (non-relational) moral principles and impersonal trust, fairness and cooperation. Finally, based on historical evidence, the third insight suggests that the branch of Western Christianity that eventually evolved into the Roman Catholic Church—hereafter, ‘the Western Church’ or simply ‘the Church’—systematically undermined the intensive kin-based institutions of Europe during the Middle Ages (45–52). The Church’s marriage policies and prohibitions, which we will call the Marriage and Family Program (MFP), meant that by 1500 CE, and likely centuries earlier in some regions, Europe lacked strong kin-based institutions, and was instead dominated by relatively weak, independent and isolated nuclear or stem families (49–51, 53–56). This made people exposed to Western Christendom rather unlike nearly all other populations.

...

Substantial debates persist about why the Church adopted the MFP, which we summarize in Supplementary S2. Support for the full … [more]
study  economics  broad-econ  pseudoE  roots  anthropology  sociology  culture  cultural-dynamics  society  civilization  religion  theos  kinship  individualism-collectivism  universalism-particularism  europe  the-great-west-whale  orient  integrity  morality  ethics  trust  institutions  things  pdf  piracy  social-norms  cooperate-defect  patho-altruism  race  world  developing-world  pop-diff  n-factor  ethnography  ethnocentrism  🎩  🌞  s:*  us-them  occident  political-econ  altruism  self-interest  books  todo  multi  old-anglo  big-peeps  poetry  aristos  homo-hetero  north-weingast-like  maps  data  modernity  tumblr  social  ratty  gender  history  iron-age  mediterranean  the-classics  christianity  speculation  law  public-goodish  tribalism  urban  china  asia  sinosphere  decision-making  polanyi-marx  microfoundations  open-closed  alien-character  axelrod  eden  growth-econ  social-capital  values  phalanges  usa  within-group  group-level  regional-scatter-plots  comparison  psychology  social-psych  behavioral-eco 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Economic Growth in Ancient Greece | pseudoerasmus
Maybe land-and-dung expansion does not really require a fancy institutional explanation. Territory expanded, land yields rose, and people have always traded their surpluses. Why invoke “inclusive institutions”, as Ober effectively does, for something so mundane ? Perhaps the seminal cultural accomplishments of classical Greece bias some of us to look for “special” causes of the expansion.

Note, this is not an argument that political economy or “institutions” play no role in the rise and decline of economies. But in this particular case, so little seems established about the descriptive statistics, let alone the “growth accounting”, of Greek economic expansion in 800-300 BCE that it’s premature to be speculating about its institutional causes.
econotariat  pseudoE  broad-econ  commentary  books  review  economics  growth-econ  history  iron-age  mediterranean  the-classics  critique  institutions  egalitarianism-hierarchy  malthus  demographics  population  density  wealth  wealth-of-nations  political-econ  divergence  europe  the-great-west-whale  data  archaeology  measurement  scale  agriculture  econ-productivity  efficiency  article  gregory-clark  galor-like  long-short-run  medieval  nordic  technology  north-weingast-like  democracy  roots  summary  endo-exo  input-output  walter-scheidel  endogenous-exogenous  uncertainty 
june 2017 by nhaliday
The Data We Have vs. the Data We Need: A Comment on the State of the “Divergence” Debate (Part I) | The NEP-HIS Blog
https://nephist.wordpress.com/2017/06/06/the-data-we-have-vs-the-data-we-need-a-comment-on-the-state-of-the-divergence-debate-part-ii/
https://twitter.com/pseudoerasmus/status/832260704690434048
Maybe as reaction to Pomeranz, the Great Divergence gets dated earlier & earlier & earlier on the slimmest evidence. Next: Pangaea breakup
https://twitter.com/pseudoerasmus/status/876088100774174720
I think it's a bit out of control, the urge to keep bringing the roots of the great divergence earlier and earlier and earlier
https://twitter.com/pseudoerasmus/status/628527390453538816
@s8mb @antonhowes I am impatient w explanations which do not start w origination/adoption/diffusion technology as proximate cause
@s8mb @antonhowes in respect of which finance, market integration, & formal institutions all dead ends for divergence of West with the Rest
https://twitter.com/pseudoerasmus/status/847054219790159879
Are you more with Pomeranz that there's not major difference until c. 1750 or 1800, or do you put departure much earlier?
it's now beyond doubt established there was a major diff in living standards, state capacity, market integr+
between the most advanced regions of China and the most advanced regions of Europe, no doubt
https://twitter.com/pseudoerasmus/status/534328741754048512
@bswud +broadberry estimates evidence groupthink on matter (i.e., everyone wants to locate precursor to IR earlier and earlier) @antonhowes

The Little Divergence: https://pseudoerasmus.com/2014/06/12/the-little-divergence/
http://voxeu.org/article/european-and-asian-incomes-1914-new-take-great-divergence
The Early Transformation of Britain's Economy: https://growthecon.com/blog/Britain-Shares/
There’s a nice working paper out by Patrick Wallis, Justin Colson, and David Chilosi called “Puncturing the Malthus Delusion: Structural Change in the British Economy before the Industrial Revolution, 1500-1800”. The big project they undertake here is to mine the probate inventories (along with several other sources) from Britain in this period to build up a picture of the rough allocation of workers across sectors. They do a very nice job of walking through their data sources, and the limitations, in the paper, so let me leave those details aside. In short, they use the reported occupations in wills to back out a picture of the sectoral structure, finding it consistent with other sources based on apprentice records, as well as prior estimates from specific years.

http://scholars-stage.blogspot.com/2013/11/another-look-at-rise-of-west-but-with.html
econotariat  commentary  broad-econ  growth-econ  divergence  history  early-modern  world  europe  the-great-west-whale  china  asia  sinosphere  comparison  chart  critique  measurement  debate  pseudoE  multi  wealth-of-nations  econ-metrics  twitter  social  discussion  lol  troll  rant  org:ngo  🎩  s:*  unaffiliated  occident  orient  article  cliometrics  economics  data  mostly-modern  japan  usa  india  anglo  pre-ww2  medieval  roots  path-dependence  revolution  stylized-facts  industrial-revolution  time-series  wealth  visualization  malthus  econ-productivity  technology  ideas  marginal  hari-seldon  flux-stasis  questions  agriculture  heavy-industry  labor  distribution 
june 2017 by nhaliday

« earlier    

related tags

2015  2016-election  2016  2017  :/  ability-competence  absolute-relative  academia  acemoglu  adversarial  advertising  africa  age-generation  age-of-discovery  aging  agri-mindset  agriculture  albion  alesina  alien-character  alignment  allodium  alt-inst  altruism  analogy  analysis  analytical-holistic  anglo  anglosphere  anomie  anthropology  antidemos  antiquity  aphorism  apollonian-dionysian  arbitrage  archaeology  aristos  article  asia  assimilation  assortative-mating  attaq  audio  authoritarianism  autism  automation  axelrod  axioms  backup  behavioral-econ  behavioral-gen  big-peeps  big-picture  biodet  biophysical-econ  biotech  blowhards  books  bounded-cognition  branches  britain  broad-econ  business  c:***  c:**  canada  capital  capitalism  causation  charity  chart  chicago  china  christianity  civic  civil-liberty  civilization  cjones-like  clarity  class-warfare  class  climate-change  cliometrics  coalitions  cocktail  cohesion  cold-war  coming-apart  commentary  communism  community  comparison  compensation  competition  concept  conceptual-vocab  confluence  conquest-empire  consumerism  context  contracts  contradiction  contrarianism  convergence  convexity-curvature  cooperate-defect  coordination  corporation  correlation  corruption  cost-benefit  cost-disease  counter-revolution  counterfactual  courage  cracker-econ  creative  crime  criminal-justice  criminology  critique  crooked  crosstab  cultural-dynamics  culture-war  culture  curiosity  current-events  curvature  cybernetics  cycles  cynicism-idealism  darwinian  data  database  death  debate  debt  decentralized  decision-making  deep-materialism  defense  definite-planning  democracy  demographic-transition  demographics  density  descriptive  developing-world  developmental  dignity  dirty-hands  discipline  discrimination  discussion  disease  distribution  divergence  diversity  domestication  dominant-minority  douthatish  drama  duty  dysgenics  early-modern  easterly  eastern-europe  ecology  econ-metrics  econ-productivity  econometrics  economics  econotariat  eden  education  efficiency  egalitarianism-hierarchy  elections  elite  embodied  emergent  emotion  empirical  endo-exo  endogenous-exogenous  energy-resources  enlightenment-renaissance-restoration-reformation  entrepreneurialism  environment  envy  epidemiology  equilibrium  error  essay  essence-existence  estimate  ethics  ethnocentrism  ethnography  eu  europe  events  evidence-based  evolution  evopsych  expansionism  explanans  explanation  expression-survival  externalities  faq  farmers-and-foragers  fermi  fertility  feudal  fiction  field-study  finance  fitness  flexibility  fluid  flux-stasis  food  foreign-lang  foreign-policy  formal-values  frontier  fungibility-liquidity  futurism  gallic  galor-like  garett-jones  gavisti  gender-diff  gender  general-survey  genetics  genomics  geography  geopolitics  germanic  giants  gibbon  gilens-page  gnon  gnosis-logos  gnxp  good-evil  google  gotchas  government  grad-school  gray-econ  great-powers  gregory-clark  group-level  group-selection  growth-econ  gt-101  guilt-shame  gwas  gwern  gxe  haidt  hanson  hanushek  hard-tech  hari-seldon  harvard  health  healthcare  heavy-industry  henrich  heterodox  heuristic  higher-ed  history  hive-mind  hmm  homo-hetero  honor  housing  hsu  human-capital  humility  ideas  identity-politics  ideology  idk  iidness  illusion  impact  impetus  incentives  india  individualism-collectivism  industrial-org  industrial-revolution  inequality  info-dynamics  info-econ  infrastructure  innovation  input-output  insight  institutions  integrity  intelligence  interdisciplinary  interests  internet  intervention  interview  intricacy  investing  iq  iran  iron-age  islam  japan  jargon  journos-pundits  judaism  justice  kinship  knowledge  korea  kumbaya-kult  labor  language  larry-summers  latin-america  law  learning  left-wing  legacy  legibility  len:long  lens  letters  leviathan  life-history  links  list  literature  lived-experience  local-global  lol  long-short-run  longevity  longitudinal  low-hanging  macro  madisonian  magnitude  malaise  malthus  management  managerial-state  manifolds  maps  marginal-rev  marginal  market-failure  market-power  markets  martial  math  meaningness  measurement  media  medicine  medieval  mediterranean  mena  mena4  meta:medicine  meta:rhetoric  meta:war  metabuch  methodology  metrics  micro  microfoundations  migration  military  mobility  models  modernity  mokyr-allen-mccloskey  monetary-fiscal  money  morality  mostly-modern  multi  murray  music  mystic  n-factor  nascent-state  nationalism-globalism  natural-experiment  nature  network-structure  new-religion  news  nibble  nietzschean  nihil  nl-and-so-can-you  noahpinion  noble-lie  noblesse-oblige  nonlinearity  nordic  north-weingast-like  northeast  null-result  obesity  objective-measure  objektbuch  occident  oceans  old-anglo  open-closed  operational  opioids  optimate  optimism  optimization  order-disorder  org:anglo  org:biz  org:bv  org:davos  org:econlib  org:edu  org:foreign  org:mag  org:med  org:nat  org:ngo  org:popup  org:rec  org:sci  organizing  orient  orwellian  outcome-risk  outliers  parable  paradox  parasites-microbiome  parenting  path-dependence  patho-altruism  patience  pdf  peace-violence  people  personality  pessimism  phalanges  philosophy  phys-energy  pic  piketty  piracy  planning  plots  poast  podcast  poetry  polanyi-marx  polarization  policy  polisci  political-econ  politics  pop-diff  pop-structure  population-genetics  population  populism  postmortem  pragmatic  pre-2013  pre-ww2  prediction  preference-falsification  prepping  presentation  privacy  pro-rata  problem-solving  profile  propaganda  property-rights  proposal  protestant-catholic  prudence  psychology  public-goodish  public-health  putnam-like  q-n-a  qra  quantitative-qualitative  questions  quotes  race  random  randy-ayndy  ranking  rant  rationality  ratty  reading  realness  realpolitik  recent-selection  recommendations  recruiting  redistribution  reference  reflection  regional-scatter-plots  regularizer  regulation  reinforcement  religion  rent-seeking  retention  review  revolution  rhetoric  right-wing  rigidity  rindermann-thompson  risk  robust  roots  rot  russia  s-factor  s:*  sapiens  scale  science  scifi-fantasy  scitariat  selection  self-control  self-interest  selfish-gene  shift  sib-study  signal-noise  signaling  sinosphere  skeleton  skunkworks  social-capital  social-choice  social-norms  social-psych  social-science  social-structure  social  sociality  society  sociology  solid-study  spatial  spearhead  speculation  spock  sports  spreading  ssc  stagnation  stamina  stat-power  state-of-art  statesmen  stats  status  stereotypes  stories  strategy  stream  street-fighting  structure  study  studying  stylized-facts  sulla  summary  supply-demand  survey  systematic-ad-hoc  szabo  tactics  tails  tainter  talks  tapes  taxes  technocracy  technology  temperance  temperature  the-basilisk  the-bones  the-classics  the-great-west-whale  the-watchers  the-world-is-just-atoms  theos  thick-thin  things  thinking  time-preference  time-series  time  todo  toolkit  top-n  track-record  trade  tradeoffs  tradition  transportation  trends  tribalism  trivia  troll  trump  trust  truth  tumblr  turchin  tv  twitter  unaffiliated  uncertainty  unintended-consequences  unit  universalism-particularism  urban-rural  urban  us-them  usa  vaclav-smil  values  vampire-squid  variance-components  video  visualization  visuo  vitality  volo-avolo  walter-scheidel  war  wealth-of-nations  wealth  welfare-state  west-hunter  westminster  whiggish-hegelian  wiki  winner-take-all  wisdom  within-group  within-without  wonkish  world-war  world  writing  x-not-about-y  yvain  zeitgeist  zero-positive-sum  🌞  🎩  🐸  👽  🔬 

Copy this bookmark:



description:


tags: