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Divergent Paths — Richard A. Posner | Harvard University Press
Judges and legal scholars talk past one another, if they have any conversation at all. Academics couch their criticisms of judicial decisions in theoretical terms, which leads many judges—at the risk of intellectual stagnation—to dismiss most academic discourse as opaque and divorced from reality. In Divergent Paths, Richard Posner turns his attention to this widening gap within the legal profession, reflecting on its causes and consequences and asking what can be done to close or at least narrow it.

The shortcomings of academic legal analysis are real, but they cannot disguise the fact that the modern judiciary has several serious deficiencies that academic research and teaching could help to solve or alleviate. In U.S. federal courts, which is the focus of Posner’s analysis of the judicial path, judges confront ever more difficult cases, many involving complex and arcane scientific and technological distinctions, yet continue to be wedded to legal traditions sometimes centuries old. Posner asks how legal education can be made less theory-driven and more compatible with the present and future demands of judging and lawyering.

Law schools, he points out, have great potential to promote much-needed improvements in the judiciary, but doing so will require significant changes in curriculum, hiring policy, and methods of educating future judges. If law schools start to focus more on practical problems facing the American legal system rather than on debating its theoretical failures, the gulf separating the academy and the judiciary will narrow.

-- It is interesting that similar problems arise in all of social science, between science and engineering, theory and practice.

-- create a book review based HW for students?
book  law  legal_system  jurisprudence  philosophy_of_law  dmce  teaching 
february 2017 by rvenkat
Brian Z. Tamanaha - Legal Realism in Context :: SSRN in Elizabeth Mertz, ed., New Legal Realism, Vol. 1 (Cambridge UP, 2015 Forthcoming)
“We are all realists now,” it is frequently said, yet what legal realism was about remains vigorously debated by legal theorists and historians. The debate continues because the jurists we think of as core legal realists were not members of a group. Karl Llewellyn said this multiple times in his famous essay detailing realism. (..) Contemporary scholars who make assertions about what the legal realists stood for often fail to account for these passages. Legal realism.. is best understood ... in terms of 3 overlapping complexes of ideas that emerged in the late 19thC and had become widespread by the time of Llewellyn’s article. [(1)] that society was changing rapidly while law, understood as a means to achieve social ends, lagged badly behind, producing an urgent need for legal reform. [(2)] the growing refrain among legal academics that newly developing social sciences should be applied to enhance an understanding of the actual facts surrounding law. [(3)] a vocal backlash against judges for impeding reform, including charges that they were importing class bias into their legal decisions, prompting a broader acknowledgement that the background social attitudes of judges play a role in their decisions. These three themes were interpenetrating: the popular dissatisfaction with the failings of law was manifested in criticism of courts, and resort to social science was the favored academic solution. (..) Realism characterized the new modern age of thinking about law, and it ran much earlier and more broadly than is now commonly recognized. -- PDF File: 47 -- Keywords: Legal history, Jurisprudence, law and the humanities, law and the social sciences
chapter  SSRN  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  19thC  20thC  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  legal_history  social_sciences  legal_realism  legal_reform  change-social  change-intellectual 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Brian Z. Tamanaha - The Third Pillar of Jurisprudence: Social Legal Theory :: SSRN - William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 56, 2015
Jurisprudence is generally thought to consist of two main classical rival branches — natural law and legal positivism — followed by a bunch of modern schools — legal realism, law and economics, critical theory, legal pragmatism, etc. In this essay I argue that three main branches of jurisprudence have existed, and battled, for centuries, not two, but the third goes unrecognized as such because it has traveled under different labels and the underlying connections have been clouded by various confusions. The core insights and focus of this third branch, what I call “Social Legal Theory,” trace in a continuous thread from Montesquieu, through historical jurisprudence, sociological jurisprudence, and legal realism, up to the present. This third branch, I argue, provides a contrasting/complementary perspective, in conjunction with natural law and legal positivism, which rounds out the full range of theoretical angles on law: natural law is normative; legal positivism is analytical/conceptual; and social legal theory is empirical. (Among a number of clarifications, I answer the common objection that empirically-grounded theories are not sufficiently theoretical.) The conventional jurisprudential narrative is redrawn in this essay in a way that exposes unseen connections among theoretical schools and brings into focus critical issues about the nature of law that currently are marginalized by natural law and legal positivism. -- Pages in PDF File: 44 -- Keywords: Jurisprudence, legal philosophy, law and society, legal realism, legal development, legal history
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  positivism-legal  natural_law  legal_realism  legal_history  sociology_of_law  social_order  social_theory  change-social  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  18thC  19thC  20thC  Montesquieu  pragmatism  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter, Michael Sevel - "Philosophy of Law" -- ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 2015 :: SSRN
Michael Sevel, University of Sydney - Faculty of Law -- A brief and general introduction to the philosophy of law. The article includes a history of the philosophy of law from Ancient Greece to the present, and a discussion of the primary questions and arguments of the field.-- Pages in PDF File: 29 -- Keywords: Jurisprudence, philosophy of law, legal positivism, natural law theory, legal realism -- downloaded pdf to Note
philosophy_of_law  intellectual_history  jurisprudence  legal_history  legal_realism  natural_law  positivism-legal  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Forum - Samuel Moyn's "Christian human rights" - overview page | The Immanent Frame
In 2010, Samuel Moyn published The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, which offered an alternative historical explanation for the origins of human rights. He rejected narratives that viewed human rights as a long-term historical product of the Judeo-Christian tradition, The French Revolution, or Enlightenment rationalism, arguing that human rights as it is now understood began to emerge only during the 1970s. Prior to this, according to Moyn, rights were connected to the nation-state and had nothing to do with an international standard of morality or justice. In addressing critiques of The Last Utopia, Moyn has given considerable attention to the relationship between human rights and religion, conceding that there is, undoubtedly, a relationship between Christianity—Catholicism in particular—and human rights, but arguing that the “death of Christian Europe” by the 1960s “forced a complete reinvention of the meaning of human rights embedded in European identity both formally and really since the war”. Contributors offer their thoughts on Moyn’s article “Personalism, Community, and the Origins of Human Rights,” which became a central focus (see excerpt) in his forthcoming book, Christian Human Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). Contributors also respond to “Christian Human Rights,” the introductory essay written for this series. -- downloaded pdfs but their footnotes and links don't work, so collected them in Evernote them
books  intellectual_history  narrative-contested  bad_history  intellectual_history-distorted  religious_history  church_history  moral_philosophy  theology  human_rights  natural_rights  medieval_philosophy  Europe-Medieval  Enlightenment  Enlightenment_Project  Enlightenment-ongoing  French_Revolution  IR  Europe  20thC  WWI  WWII  entre_deux_guerres  post-Cold_War  post-colonial  nation-state  genocide  Holocaust  UN  international_law  natural_law  law_of_nations  law_of_the_sea  justice  jurisprudence  philosophy_of_law  political_philosophy  political_culture  democracy  equality  liberty  Christendom  Judeo-Christian  links  Evernote 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Andrew S. Gold, Paul B. Miller, eds. -- Introduction: Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law (Oxford UP 2014) :: SSRN
Andrew S. Gold, DePaul University, College of Law and Paul B. Miller, McGill University Faculty of Law -- This Introduction outlines core questions of fiduciary law theory and provides thematic discussion of the contributions to the volume. The volume includes chapters by Richard Brooks, Hanoch Dagan, Evan Criddle, Deborah DeMott, Avihay Dorfman, Justice James Edelman, Evan Fox-Decent, Tamar Frankel, Joshua Getzler, Andrew Gold, Michele Graziadei, Sharon Hannes, Genevieve Helleringer, Ethan Leib, Daniel Markovits, Paul Miller, Irit Samet, Robert Sitkoff, Henry Smith, and Lionel Smith. -- PDF File: 17 -- Keywords: Philosophy of Law, Legal Theory, Philosophy of Private Law, Private Law Theory, Fiduciary Law, Fiduciary Relationships, Fiduciary Duties, Fiduciary Remedies, Duty of Loyalty, Duty of Care, Duty of Candour -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  books  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  fiduciaries  principal-agent  agents  duties-legal  rights-legal  trust  trusts  duty_of_care  duty_of_loyalty  conflict_of_interest  legal_remedies  law-and-economics  law-and-finance  Roman_law  civil_law  common_law  property  inheritance  family_law  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
David Millon - The Single Constituency Argument in the Economic Analysis of Business Law :: SSRN - Jan 2007
David Millon, Washington and Lee University - School of Law -- Research in Law and Economics, 2007 -- Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-01 -- The essay points out an interesting parallel in law-and-economics business law scholarship. Working largely independently of each other, economically oriented scholars working in different areas have argued that the law should focus on the interests of a single constituency - shareholders in corporate law, creditors in bankruptcy law, and consumers in antitrust law. Economic analysts thus have rejected arguments advanced by progressive scholars working in each of these areas that the law should instead concern itself with the full range of constituencies affected by business activity. The law-and-economics single constituency claim rests in part on skepticism about judicial competence but the underlying objection is to the use of law for redistributive purposes. The primary value is efficiency, defined in terms of market-generated outcomes. In this essay, I question this political commitment, suggesting that it implies a strong tendency toward maintenance of the existing distribution of wealth. Even more importantly, the single constituency claim may actually have redistributive implications. In each of these areas of business law, however, it is a regressive program that favors owners of capital against those who are generally less well of, such as workers and small business owners. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 31 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  political_philosophy  political_economy  law-and-economics  conflict_of_interest  principal-agent  profit_maximization  incentives  incentives-distortions  efficiency  shareholder_value  creditors  consumers  consumer_protection  competition  status_quo_bias  capital  inequality-wealth  inequality-opportunity  power-asymmetric  capital_as_power  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  corporate_governance  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  bankruptcy  antitrust  conservative_legal_challenges 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert H. Sitkoff - An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law :: SSRN - Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law, Andrew Gold & Paul Miller eds. (Oxford UP, 2014
Harvard Law -- In consequence of this common economic structure [agency problem], there is a common doctrinal structure that cuts across the application of fiduciary principles in different contexts. However, (..) the particulars of fiduciary obligation vary in accordance with the particulars of the agency problem in the fiduciary relationship at issue. This explains (1) the purported elusiveness of fiduciary doctrine and (2) why courts apply fiduciary law both categorically, such as to trustees and (legal) agents, as well as ad hoc to relationships involving a position of trust and confidence that gives rise to an agency problem. (...) a functional distinction between primary and subsidiary fiduciary rules. In all fiduciary relationships we find general duties of loyalty and care, typically phrased as standards, (..) we also find specific subsidiary fiduciary duties, often phrased as rules, that elaborate on the application of loyalty and care to commonly recurring circumstances in the particular form of fiduciary relationship. (..) the puzzle of why fiduciary law includes mandatory rules that cannot be waived in a relationship deemed fiduciary. Committed economic contractarians, such as Easterbrook and Fischel, have had difficulty in explaining why the parties to a fiduciary relationship do not have complete freedom of contract. The answer is that the mandatory core of fiduciary law serves a cautionary and protective function within the fiduciary relationship as well as an external categorization function that clarifies rights for third parties. -- PDF File: 14 -- Keywords: fiduciary, agency, trust, loyalty, care, prudence, agency costs, duty
chapter  books  SSRN  law-and-economics  behavioral_economics  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  fiduciaries  agents  principal-agent  freedom_of_contract  trust  trusts  duty_of_care  duty_of_loyalty  conflict_of_interest  legal_reasoning  rights-legal  duties-legal  common_law 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Lee Anne Fennell, Richard H. McAdams - The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics :: SSRN - Minnesota Law Review, Forthcoming (April 2015)
Lee Anne Fennell, Richard H. McAdams, both University of Chicago Law School -- University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 713 -- Welfarist law and economics ignores the distributive consequences of legal rules to focus solely on efficiency, even though distribution unambiguously affects welfare, the normative maximand. The now-conventional justification for disregarding distribution is the claim of tax superiority: that the best means of influencing or correcting distribution is via tax-and-transfer. Critics have observed that optimal redistribution through tax may be politically infeasible, but have generally overlooked the rejoinder that the same political impediments to redistribution through tax will block redistribution through legal rules. This “invariance hypothesis,” as we label it, holds that there is only one distributive equilibrium and that Congress will offset through tax any deviations from it. We highlight the centrality of invariance to the conventional economic wisdom and assert that it is just as relevantly false as the zero transaction cost assumption. In contexts where political impediments to tax-based redistribution exceed the impediments to doctrinal redistribution, it may be possible to increase welfare by redistributing outside of tax. Welfarists should, therefore, devote as much scholarly attention to the “political action costs” of redistribution as they do to transaction costs.-- PDF File: 65. -- Keywords: redistribution, tax-and-transfer, legal rules, law and economics, welfare economics -- saved to briefcase
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  welfare_economics  behavioral_economics  law-and-economics  redistribution  tax_policy  transaction_costs  inequality  inequality-wealth  policymaking  US_politics 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Nicola Lacey - Jurisprudence, History, and the Institutional Quality of Law (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 919 (2015)
A cri de coeur for putting legal theory and history back together with social theory and empirical social sciences,. -- In the early part of my career, legal history and the history of legal ideas were closed books to me, as I made my way in a field of criminal law scholarship dominated by doctrinal scholarship and by concept-focused philosophical analysis of the foundations of criminal law. These 2 very different paradigms have 1 big thing in common: They tend to proceed as if the main intellectual task is to unearth the deep logic of existing legal doctrines, not infrequently going so far as to read them back onto history, as if things could never have been other than they are. (..)I have increasingly found myself turning to historical resources (1) [to examine] the contingency of particular legal arrangements, and (2) ...to develop causal and other theses about the dynamics which shape them and hence about the role and quality of criminal law as a form of power in modern societies. So, in a sense, I have been using history in support of an analysis driven primarily by the social sciences. (..) it is no accident that all of the great social theorists, from Marx to Foucault via Weber, Durkheim, and Elias, ..have incorporated significant historical elements into their interpretations .... Indeed, without the diachronic perspective provided by history (or the perspective offered by comparative study) we could have no critical purchase on social theory’s characterizations of or causal hypotheses about the dynamics of social systems. Hence, (...) my boundless gratitude to the historians whose meticulous research makes this sort of interpretive social theory possible). -- Lacey is not over-dramatizing -- see the "commentary" from a "legal philosopher" who believes the normative basis of criminal responsibility can be investigated as timeless "moral truths". -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  social_theory  historical_sociology  historical_change  institutions  institutional_change  philosophy_of_law  philosophical_anthropology  philosophy_of_social_science  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  morality-conventional  morality-objective  criminal_justice  responsibility  mind  human_nature  norms  power-asymmetric  power-symbolic  power  Neoplatonism  neo-Kantian  a_priori  historiography  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  political_culture  moral_philosophy  evidence  mental_health  social_order  epistemology  epistemology-moral  change-social  change-intellectual  comparative_law  comparative_anthropology  civil_liberties  women-rights  women-property  rights-legal  rights-political  access_to_services  discrimination  legal_culture  legal_system  legal_reasoning  Foucault  Marx  Weber  Durkheim  metaethics  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Frederick Schauer - The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 957 (2015)
My aim in this Article is to focus on the history of thinking about law in the context of 3 topics (..) to show that the continuous development of the theory of legal positivism, however useful it may have been or may still be, has possibly caused us to ignore other aspects of what was originally part of the positivist picture. (..)The first of these dimensions is the relationship between legal theory and legal reform. (..) that an account of the nature of law might be developed not simply as an aid to understanding or accurate description, but instead as a way of facilitating reform of law itself or reform of how a society understands the idea of law. Second, legal positivism, at the time of its late 19thC (or perhaps even earlier) origins, was focused on the importance of coercion, force, and sanctions as central components of law. But as with the creation of legal theories for the purpose of legal reform, this emphasis on the coercive side of law has also been banished to a kind of jurisprudential purgatory, for reasons and with consequences that deserve further examination. The third lost element of earlier versions of legal positivism is its focus on judicial decision making and the role of judges. Modern legal positivists, for whom 1961 is all too often the beginning of useful thought about the nature of law, do not, with few exceptions, consider theories of judicial decision making to be a necessary or even important part of the positivist perspective. But it was not always so. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_system  political_philosophy  legal_reform  institutional_change  institutions  judiciary  judicial_review  law_enforcement  criminal_justice  punishment  coercion  authority  obligation  policymaking  political_change  social_theory  social_sciences  positivism-legal  positive_law  positivism  justice  Study_and_Uses  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Steven Walt - What Can The History of Jurisprudence Do For Jurisprudence? A Commentary on Schauer's "The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 977 (2015)
Walt's response (at least the abstract) appears to prove Schauer's point quite nicely, as if logic and argument by legal theorists takes place in an abstract world where "how did we get here" is universally ignored, despite its possible relevance for "why are we here", "what are we doing here" and "where does it look like we might be headed" -- but Walt devoted 10 pages to his response, so one hopes he has more to justify his position than what comes across as a mix of arrogance (we don't need to learn from history because our theoretical grounding and argumentative methods are self-contained and self-sufficient) and cynicism (history might be interesting, but no way will anybody change what gets them published and tenure) -- out of curiosity as to whether it's really as bad as the abstract makes it sound, downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  positivism  positivism-legal  historiography  legal_history  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Dan Priel - Toward Classical Legal Positivism (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 987 (2015)
I have two major aims: (1) set the historical record straight(...) Hobbes’s and Bentham’s work that seeks to understand their views on law not by isolating it from the rest of their wide-ranging body of work, but by understanding their jurisprudential work as part of a broader project. (2) My main aim is to contribute to contemporary jurisprudential debates and to suggest that the largely neglected approach of earlier positivists is superior to the view held by most contemporary legal positivists. (...) to what extent it is useful for us to call Hobbes and Bentham “legal positivists.” My answer to this question consists of three interrelated points. The first is that we draw an explicit link between their ideas and the view that (some time later) would come to be known as “positivism,” roughly the view that the methods of the “human sciences” are essentially the same as those of the natural sciences. The second point is that the classical legal positivists’ decisive break with natural law ideas prevalent in their day is to be found exactly here, in their views about metaphysics and nature. The third point is that this aspect of their work has been, in my view regrettably, abandoned by contemporary legal positivists. Though all three points are related, in this Article I will say relatively little about the first point, as I discussed it in greater detail elsewhere. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  political_philosophy  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  Hobbes  Bentham  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  natural_philosophy  nature  human_nature  scientific_method  social_theory  social_sciences  positivism  positive_law  Methodenstreit  methodology-quantitative  epistemology  sociology_of_knowledge  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski - Positivism(s): A Commentary on Priel's "Toward Classical Legal Positivism" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 1023 (2015)
Anglo-American jurisprudence, before it insulated itself in conceptual analysis and defined itself in opposition to broader questions, was properly a “sociable science,” to use Professor Postema’s phrase from his symposium article. And, in part due to the exemplars of history, so it may become again. By drawing on Bentham and Hobbes, Professor Dan Priel’s Toward Classical Positivism points forward toward more fruitful methods of jurisprudence while illuminating the recent history and current state of inquiry. His article demonstrates the virtues and promise of a more catholic approach to jurisprudence. It also raises challenging questions about the direction to take this rediscovered path, and I am not sure I always agree with his suggested answers. Any misgivings I have about Priel’s particular approach, however, do not diminish my appreciation; I find even the points of disagreement to be live and meaningful, and that itself is refreshing. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  political_philosophy  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  Hobbes  Bentham  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  natural_philosophy  nature  human_nature  scientific_method  social_theory  social_sciences  positivism  positive_law  Methodenstreit  methodology-quantitative  epistemology  sociology_of_knowledge  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Alice Ristroph - Sovereignty and Subversion (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 1029 (2015)
Hobbes’s account of law, like his account of punishment, does not fit well into our existing scholarly categories. (..). He was neither a legal positivist nor a natural law theorist, at least not as we usually use these labels. He adopted neither a retributive nor a consequentialist justification of punishment. Yet his account of human interaction, particularly with respect to law and punishment, captures actual experience better than the more familiar alternatives. Moreover, the space for subversion in Hobbes’s theory may make his account more normatively appealing than it has seemed to modern liberals. (...) 3 questions about Hobbesian theory: What is law? What is its relationship to punishment? And what are the implications of Hobbes’s theory for contemporary efforts to describe law or the relationship of law to punishment? The first (..) Hobbes’s legal theory is still so widely mischaracterized, sometimes even by Hobbes scholars, that it is worth returning to his claims. The second question has received much less attention, perhaps because a right to resist punishment seems so discordant with the authoritarian Hobbes we know, or think we know. And the third question has received still less attention, for contemporary jurisprudence scholarship rarely cites anyone who wrote before Jeremy Bentham and John Austin. I hope to show that, in many instances, Hobbes has been misread; even more importantly, I hope to persuade scholars of jurisprudence that what Hobbes actually said is worthy of their engagement. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jurisprudence  philosophy_of_law  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  Hobbes  17thC  political_philosophy  social_theory  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  sovereignty  authority  obligation  punishment  resistance  liberalism  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Mark C. Murphy - A Commentary on Ristroph’s “Sovereignty and Subversion” | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 1055 (2015)
She is correct in rejecting the assimilation of Hobbes’s legal theory to Austin’s, and in noting the strands of Hobbes’s view that disqualify him from counting as any sort of legal positivist. And I agree, on the whole, with her characterization of Hobbes’s account of justified punishment, and that this account has its attractions yet produces some puzzles which Hobbes does not fully resolve. My disagreements are with her second-order characterization of Hobbes’s legal theory. I want to discuss two related areas of disagreement. The first disagreement concerns whether we should assess Hobbes’s account of law in terms of the standards of general descriptive jurisprudence: Ristroph denies that it should be; I disagree. The second concerns whether we should take Hobbes’s treatment of the political as explanatorily prior to the legal to show that Hobbes was in some way apart from the natural law tradition in jurisprudence: Ristroph affirms this; I disagree. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jurisprudence  philosophy_of_law  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  Hobbes  17thC  political_philosophy  social_theory  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  sovereignty  authority  obligation  punishment  resistance  liberalism  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
David Luban - Time-Mindedness and Jurisprudence: A Commentary on Postema's "Jurisprudence, the Sociable Science" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 903 (2015)
Postema offers two general programmatic suggestions for jurisprudence besides greater historical consciousness: sociability and synechism. Sociability, has two dimensions. First, it means interdisciplinarity—a continual dialogue with the study of legal phenomena by the sciences, humanities, and even theology. Second, it means embedding jurisprudence in general philosophy, ... [Sellars]: “not only ‘cabbages and kings’, but numbers and duties, possibilities and finger snaps, aesthetic experience and death.” Synechism is a less familiar idea, drawn from the philosophy of C.S. Peirce. It is the commitment to seek continuity among phenomena. Peirce was metaphysically committed to the existence of actual continua everywhere in nature, history, and human psychology. So synechism will impose a certain demand on all systematic studies, namely discerning those continua.(..) a certain kind of historiography: The historian’s job is to unearth continuities between past and present rather than studying ruptures. This, it seems to me, is a contestable commitment that rules out a great deal of important historical work. Peirce understood synechism to imply that ideas are intrinsically temporal and historical phenomena. Although Postema does not endorse this general thesis, he does argue for a special case of it, namely that law is “intrinsically temporal.” This conclusion is central to his argument against the possibility of time-slice legal systems. It, too, is contestable; but, I shall suggest, Postema can reach his conclusion on grounds other than synechism, and I agree with him about law’s intrinsic temporality. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  pragmatism  historiography  historical_change  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_system  analytical_philosophy  legal_history  continuity  change-social  change-intellectual  intellectual_history  Peirce  social_sciences  legal_culture  legal_realism  philosophy_of_history  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Gerald J. Postema - Jurisprudence, the Sociable Science (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 869 (2015)
Renaissance jurisprudence strove to be a sociable science. Following Ulpian’s lead, it refused to relegate jurisprudence either to pure speculation or to mere practice. Jurisprudence was a science, a matter of knowledge and of theoretical understanding, not merely an applied art or practice of prudence innocent of theory. It was regarded as the very heart of theoretical studies, drawing to itself all that the traditional sciences of theology, metaphysics, and moral philosophy, as well as the newly emerging humanist sciences of philology and hermeneutics, had to offer. No less resolutely, however, it refused to abandon its foothold in the life of practice. (..) Rather than reject philosophical reflection, (..) Renaissance jurists sought to locate it in concrete human life and experience. (..) Philosophy.., was most true to its vocation, and was most engaged in human life, when its reflections were anchored in the social life acknowledged, comprehended, and informed by and informing law. Jurisprudence, vera philosophia, was ...the point at which the theoretical and the practical intersected (..) at its “sociable” best sought to integrate them. Analytic jurisprudence began as self-consciously, even militantly, “unsociable,” and its matured and much-sophisticated descendant, fin de siècle analytic legal philosophy, remained largely if not exclusively so. (..) It may be time, in this period of self-conscious attention to jurisprudential method, to press beyond the current limits of this debate over method to a reassessment of the ambitions of jurisprudence and of philosophy’s role in it. (..) my aim is not critical but constructive. (..) to recover something of the ideal of jurisprudence as a sociable science, to retrieve as much as our disenchanted age can be challenged to embrace, or at least to entertain, of the ambition of jurisprudence as vera philosophia. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jurisprudence  philosophy_of_law  social_theory  social_sciences  intellectual_history  Renaissance  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  common_law  moral_philosophy  morality-conventional  norms  analytical_philosophy  concepts  concepts-change  change-social  change-intellectual  social_order  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  pragmatism  Peirce  continuity  historical_change  methodology-qualitative  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Charles Barzun and Dan Priel - Jurisprudence and (Its) History - Symposium Introduction | Virginia Law Review 101 Va. L. Rev. 849 (2015)
Whereas legal philosophers offer “analyses” that aim to be general, abstract, and timeless, legal historians offer “thick descriptions” of what is particular, concrete, and time-bound. But surface appearances can deceive. Perhaps unlike other areas of philosophy, the subject matter of jurisprudence is at least partially (if not entirely) a social phenomenon. Courts, legislatures, judicial orders, and statutes are the products of human efforts, both collective and individual, and they only exist as legislatures, courts, and the like insofar as they possess the meaning they do in the eyes of at least some social group. For this reason, legal philosophers since at least H.L.A. Hart have recognized their task to be a “hermeneutic” one—one which aims to discern or make explicit the “self-understanding” of legal actors. At the same time, legal historians aim not simply to record legal rules that existed at some given point in history, but to unearth the meaning that actual people—judges, lawyers, politicians, and ordinary citizens—have attached to law. When they do so, they might be seen as uncovering evidence of those same “self-understandings” that philosophers claim constitute law. Perhaps, then, philosophical and historical inquiries about law do not differ so radically from each other after all. -- downloaded pdf to Note
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june 2015 by dunnettreader

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