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The op-ed that got Stephen Moore his Fed nomination is based on two major falsehoods - The Washington Post
So I figured, why not ask Volcker? I sent an inquiry through his book publicist, who passed it along to Volcker’s assistant. The assistant replied: “I showed this to Mr. Volcker and he says that he does not remember ever establishing a commodity-price rule.”
volcker  moore  trump  centralbank 
11 weeks ago by yorksranter
SHA1 Salted Hashing & Password Storage
"Salted SHA is near useless: Sorry to be the bearer of bad news (actually, one of many bearers), but the ease, speed and price with which salted SHA can be cracked for the vast majority of passwords is just too simple.

Use an adaptive hashing algorithm: You have numerous options, some of which have been discussed here. Choose one – with appropriate care.

Strike a balance between speed and performance: Slower algorithms increase computing overhead so tailor the work factor to suit both the capability of the infrastructure and the volume of the audience."
security  password  hash  salt  SHA  cryptography  login  rainbow  table  crack  hack  GPU  Moore's  Law  Moore 
january 2019 by Tonti
S.3389 - 115th Congress (2017-2018): A bill to redesignate a facility of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. | | Library of Congress
S.3389 A bill to redesignate a facility of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration., sponsored by Sen. Shelley Moore Capito, became law on December 11th, 2018
law  Sen.  Shelley  Moore  Capito 
december 2018 by sunlightfoundation
Sharing secrets and distributing passwords
Shamir’s Algorithm

Key to the utility of this algorithm is that it does not force the restriction that the number of sub-passwords to decrypt has to be the same as the number of sub-passwords generated. We can tweak the parameters such that any number of sub-passwords (less than or equal to the total number generated), can be used to unlock.

Advanced feature support

We can see how this algorithm is not a broken-plate type problem. We don't need all the sub-passwords to re-create the secret. All we need is sufficient to mathematically solve the order of the equation we are using.

Knowledge of any non-complete combination of sub-passwords gives an attacker no additional information on how to solve the problem. Even if you have knowledge of n-1 passwords, there are still an infinite number of curves that fit through these points, and thus an infinite number of possible intercepts.

As we can clearly see, it's very easy to generate new sub-passwords as needed. If we need to generate and distribute a new sub-password, we simply pull off another coordinate from the curve and give that out! None of the existing passwords need to change.

If some of the sub-passwords are compromised (and you know which ones) and you want to regenerate new ones, but keep the uncompromised ones the same, you can generate a new curve that passes through the points you wish to keep. [Edit - Only if the the number of uncompromised points is two (or more) less than the minimum number needed to reconstruct the secret. Thanks for the correction @N1DQ]

To weight passwords (such as giving The President a nuclear launch password with three times the power of a regular password), we simply give out multiple coordinates to that person. Thus, for the nuclear launch example requiring requiring five votes, we generate an order-4 polynomial, give The President three coordinates from the curve, The Secretary of Defence two coordinates off the curve, and the rest of the troops one coordinate each.
cryptography  password  share  secret  polynomial  parabolic  Moore  security  hash  login 
december 2018 by Tonti

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