logical_positivism   26

Neurath Reconsidered | SpringerLink
"This highly readable book is a collection of critical papers on Otto Neurath (1882-1945). It comprehensively re-examines Neurath’s scientific, philosophical and educational contributions from a range of standpoints including historical, sociological and problem-oriented perspectives. Leading Neurath scholars disentangle and connect Neurath’s works, ideas and ideals and evaluate them both in their original socio-historical context and in contemporary philosophical debates. Readers will discover a new critical understanding.
"Drawing on archive materials, essays discuss not only Neurath’s better-known works from lesser-known perspectives, but also his lesser-known works from the better-known perspective of their place in his overall philosophical oeuvre. Reflecting the full range of Neurath's work, this volume has a broad appeal. Besides scholars and researchers interested in Neurath, Carnap, the Vienna Circle, work on logical empiricism and the history and philosophy of science, this book will also appeal to graduate students in philosophy, sociology, history and education. Readers will find Neurath’s thoughts described and evaluated in an accessible manner, making it a good read for those beyond the academic world such as social leaders and activists."

--- There is something charming about the idea of "social leaders and activists" reading a compilation like this...
to:NB  books:noted  logical_positivism  socialism  history_of_ideas  neurath.otto  vienna_circle  philosophy 
march 2019 by cshalizi
Kenneth R Westphal - Empiricism, Pragmatic Realism & the A Priori in "Mind and the World Orde" (draft - forthcoming 2017 | Academia.edu
Forthcoming in: Carl SACHS & Peter OLEN eds., Contemporary Perspectives on C. I. Lewis: Pragmatism in Transition (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017) --This paper re-examines how C.I. Lewis’s pragmatic realism in Mind and the World Order (1929, ‘MWO’) contrasts to logical empiricism, and to Lewis’s later An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (1946, ‘AKV’), to highlight several important philosophical points Lewis clearly understood and argued for in MWO, which we need to recover today. MWO is expressly an ‘Outline of a Theory of Knowledge’; nevertheless, it provides several important lessons about human knowledge, action and our worldly context. These are highlighted by contrast to some key points in Carnap’s empiricist semantics (§2) and by considering a point important to scientific realism, not properly accommodated by Carnap’s semantics: Reichenbach’s (1920, 1922) ‘coördination’ (Zuordnung) principles – a very important point about scientific measurement procedures, central both to Peirce and to MWO (§3). These coördinating principles for exact scientific measurements highlight the contrast between the meta-linguistic ‘relative a priori’ admissible by empiricist semantics (Friedman 1999, 2001), and Lewis’ robustly realist ‘pragmatic a priori’ in MWO. I re-examine key features of MWO (§4), including Lewis’s rejection of mythical givenness and of a series of false dichotomies which still plague current discussions of epistemology, pragmatism and history and philosophy of science. -- Research Interests: Epistemology, Semantic Externalism, Pragmatism (Philosophy), Explication (Philosophy), Clarence Irving Lewis,
paper  downloaded  intellectual_history  20thC  pragmatism  Logical_Positivism  empiricism  Lewis_CI  Carnap  metaphysics  epistemology  apriori  philosophy_of_science  logic  semantics  Peirce  realism-scientific  scientific_method  myth_of_the_given 
september 2016 by dunnettreader
Kenneth R Westphal - 'Analytic Philosophy
The definitive version of this article appears in:
The Owl of Minerva , 42.1–2 (2010–11):1–18.
Rejection of the philosophical relevance of history of philosophy remains pronounced within contemporary Anglophone analytic philosophy. The two main reasons for this rejection presuppose that strict deduction isboth necessary and sufficient for rational justification. However, this justificatory ideal of scientia holds only within strictly formal domains. This is confirmed by a neglected non-sequitur in van Fraassen’s original defence of ‘Constructive Empiricism’. Conversely, strict deduction is insufficient for rationaljustification in non-formal, substantive domains of inquiry. In non-formal, substantive domains, rational justification is also, in part, ineliminably social and historical, for sound reasons Hegel was the first to articulate. -- Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
history_of_philosophy  historical_sociology  analytical_philosophy  Logical_Positivism  deduction  contextualism  evolution-social  development_process  Hegel  contingency  intellectual_history  logic  historicism  evolution-as-model  philosophy_of_social_science  van_Frassen  article  downloaded  analysis-logic  epistemology  epistemology-social  empiricism 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Richard Rorty - Davidson between Wittgenstein and Tarsk | JSTOR - Critica (1998)
Davidson between Wittgenstein and Tarski
Richard Rorty
Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía
Vol. 30, No. 88 (Apr., 1998), pp. 49-71
Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
article  analytical_philosophy  downloaded  logic  Logical_Positivism  pragmatism  epistemology  jstor  truth  Wittgenstein  Davidson  Rorty  epistemology-social 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Étienne Bimbenet, review - Claude Romano, Au cœur de la raison, la phénoménologie - La Vie des idées - 17 décembre 2010
Recensé : Claude Romano, Au cœur de la raison, la phénoménologie. Gallimard (Folio Essais), 2010 ; 1141 p., 13, 50 €. -- Repenser la phénoménologie dans ses présupposés les plus forts, et la transformer de l’intérieur : tel est le geste théorique de Claude Romano qui, à partir des objections formulées par la philosophie analytique et l’empirisme logique, défend une phénoménologie redonnant toute sa place à la sensibilité dans l’analyse de l’expérience et la saisie des essences. -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  French_language  intellectual_history  20thC  post-WWII  21stC  continental_philosophy  phenomenology  Heidegger  Merleau-Ponty  Levinas  analytical_philosophy  Logical_Positivism  empiricism  metaphysics  experience  sensation  reason  rationality  epistemology  downloaded 
december 2015 by dunnettreader
Paul Guyer and Rolf-Peter Horstmann - Idealism | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - 1st published August 2015
This entry discusses philosophical idealism as a movement chiefly in the 18thC and 19thC, although anticipated by certain aspects of 17thC philosophy. It examines the relationship between epistemological idealism (the view that the contents of human knowledge are ineluctably determined by the structure of human thought) and ontological idealism (the view that epistemological idealism delivers truth because reality itself is a form of thought and human thought participates in it). After discussing precursors, the entry focuses on the eighteenth-century versions of idealism due to Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, the nineteenth-century movements of German idealism and subsequently British and American idealism, and then concludes with an examination of the attack upon idealism by Moore and Russell. -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Idealism in early modern Rationalism -- 3. Idealism in early modern British philosophy -- 4. Kant -- 5. German Idealism -- 6. Schopenhauer -- 7. Nietzsche -- 8. British and American Idealism -- 9. The Fate of Idealism in the Twentieth Century -- downloaded as pdf to Note (62 pgs!)
intellectual_history  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  idealism  idealism-transcendental  German_Idealism  epistemology  ontology  Berkeley  Kant  Hegel  Hegelian  Schopenhauer  Nietzsche  neo-Kantian  Absolute_Idealism  British_Idealism  Royce  Bradley  Moore_GE  Russell_Bertrand  analytical_philosophy  Logical_Positivism  Pittsburgh_Hegelians  philosophy_of_science  mind  bibliography  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Hartshorne, Charles : Dipolar Theism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Hartshorne’s views on the existence of a divine reality are treated separately in another article, “Charles Hartshorne: Theistic and Anti-Theistic Arguments.” -- Hartshorne spent much of his career in a philosophical atmosphere in which the question was not so much “Does God exist?” as it was “Does ‘God’ name a coherent idea?” Philosophers from very diverse schools of thought—from Sartre to the Logical Positivists—rejected theism on the basis of alleged inconsistencies in the very idea of deity. Hartshorne himself remarked that there would be fewer atheists if theists had done a better job of making sense of the concept of God. Hartshorne’s response to this situation was to develop his dipolar or neoclassical concept of God. It can plausibly be claimed that Hartshorne accomplished at least two tasks: first, he introduced a sophisticated and religiously important form of theism heretofore unheard of or at least very poorly developed through philosophical argument and, second, he shifted the burden of proof onto those who claim that the concept of God is hopelessly muddled. -- downloaded pdf to Note
philosophy_of_religion  metaphysics  20thC  rational_religion  Whitehead  Hartshorne  God-attributes  analytical_philosophy  Logical_Positivism  existentialism  panentheism  theism  atheism  process_theology  modal_logic  ontological_argument  empiricism  downloaded 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
JOEL ISAAC -- DONALD DAVIDSON AND THE ANALYTIC REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY, 1940–1970 (2013). | The Historical Journal, 56, pp 757-779 - Cambridge Journals Online - Abstract
JOEL ISAAC - Christ's College, Cambridge -- Histories of analytic philosophy in the United States have typically focused on the reception of logical positivism, and especially on responses to the work of the Vienna Circle. Such accounts often call attention to the purportedly positivist-inspired marginalization of normative concerns in American philosophy: according to this story, the overweening positivist concern for logic and physics as paradigms of knowledge displaced questions of value and social relations. This article argues that the reception framework encourages us to mistake the real sources of the analytic revolution in post-war philosophy. These are to be found in debates about intentional action and practical reasoning – debates in which ‘normative’ questions of value and social action were in fact central. Discussion of these topics took place within a transatlantic community of Wittgensteinians, ordinary languages philosophers, logical empiricists, and decision theorists. These different strands of ‘analytical’ thinking were bound together into a new philosophical mainstream not by a positivist alliance with logic and physics, but by the rapid development of the mathematical and behavioural sciences during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath. An illustrative application of this new framework for interpreting the analytic revolution is found in the early career and writings of Donald Davidson.
article  paywall  intellectual_history  20thC  analytical_philosophy  Logical_Positivism  Wittgenstein  ordinary_language_philosophy  behavioralism  social_sciences-post-WWII  decision_theory  mathematics  logic  empiricism  US  cultural_history  academia  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
A. W. Moore and Peter Sullivan - Ineffability and Nonsense (debate) | JSTOR: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 77 (2003), pp. 169-193+195-223
[A. W. Moore] There are criteria of ineffability whereby, even if the concept of ineffability can never serve to modify truth, it can sometimes (non-trivially) serve to modify other things, specifically understanding. This allows for a reappraisal of the dispute between those who adopt a traditional reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus and those who adopt the new reading recently championed by Diamond, Conant, and others. By maintaining that what the nonsense in the Tractatus is supposed to convey is ineffable understanding, rather than ineffable truth, we can do considerable justice to each of these readings. We can also do considerable justice to the Tractatus. /// [Peter Sullivan] Moore proposes to cut between 'traditional' and 'new' approaches to the Tractatus, suggesting that Wittgenstein's intention is to convey, through the knowing use of nonsense, ineffable understanding. I argue, first, that there is indeed room for a proposal of Moore's general kind. Secondly, though, I question whether Moore's actual proposal is not more in tune with Wittgenstein's later thought than with the attitude of the Tractatus. -- nearly 200 references -- should provide an overview of the Old vs New Wittgenstein positions, who's who and background for Moore's modern metaphysics book (kindle) -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  20thC  21stC  metaphysics  philosophy_of_science  Logical_Positivism  philosophy_of_language  Wittgenstein  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Kevin Cahill - Ethics and the "Tractatus": A Resolute Failure | JSTOR: Philosophy, Vol. 79, No. 307 (Jan., 2004), pp. 33-55
He's in the New Wittgenstein camp. Very useful development of themes across the New Wittgenstein crowd, distinguishing PI from Tractatus and why Wittgenstein came to see the Tractatus as a failure, not only in method, but in still being wedded to the intellectualizing impulse of philosophy, to elaborate the world as it really is by unlocking the central problem. His ethical objectives in the Tractatus have been developed by New Wittgenstein proponents, with analogies to Kierkegaard, St Paul and Augustine. -- read online, didn't download
article  jstor  20thC  21stC  philosophy_of_language  moral_philosophy  dogmatism  analytical_philosophy  Wittgenstein  Frege  Russell_Bertrand  Kierkegaard  Paul  Augustine  logic  Logical_Positivism  syntax  language-bad_metaphysics  language_games  concepts  propositions  predicate  bibliography  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for Skepticism :: SSRN - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, Spring 2012
Legal philosophers have been preoccupied with specifying the differences between two systems of normative guidance - law and morality. Positivists such as Kelsen, Hart, and Raz propose a solution to this “Demarcation Problem” according to which the legal validity of a norm can not depend on its being morally valid, either in all or at least some possible legal systems. The proposed analysis purports to specify the essential and necessary features of law.... Yet the concept of law is an “artifact concept,” that is, a concept that picks out a phenomenon that owes its existence to human activities. Artifact concepts, even simple ones like “chair,” are notoriously resistant to analyses in terms of their essential attributes, precisely because they are hostage to human ends and purposes, and also can not be individuated by their natural properties. 20th-century philosophy of science dealt with a kindred Demarcation Problem: ...how to demarcate science from pseudo-science or nonsense. -- they sought to identify the essential properties of a human artifact (namely, science). They failed, and spectacularly so, which led some philosopher to wonder, “Why does solving the Demarcation Problem matter?” This essay develops the lessons for legal philosophy -- lest we want to become embroiled in pointless Fullerian speculations about the effects of jurisprudential doctrines on behavior, it is time to abandon the Demarcation Problem in jurisprudence. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  20thC  21stC  Logical_Positivism  linguistic_turn  concepts  analytical_philosophy  essentialism  natural_kinds  modal_logic  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  legal_system  positivism-legal  psychologism  natural_law  epistemology-social  epistemology-moral  Carnap  Hempel  Popper  Fuller  Hart  Kelsen  Raz  Finnis  normativity  moral_sentiments  reason-passions  reasons-internalism  reasons-externalism  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Sébastien Gandon & Mathieu Marion - Issue intro - L’idéalisme britannique : histoire et actualité - Philosophiques v36 n1 2009, p. 3-34 | Érudit 
Sébastien Gandon - Université Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand & Mathieu Marion -Université du Québec à Montréal -- British Idealism is a philosophical movement that dominated British universities (and those of its empire), for fifty years around the turn from the XIXth to the XXth century, but it went largely unnoticed in the French-speaking world. Condemned by analytic philosophers, these authors were also ignored in their own country, but some of them, notably Bradley and Collingwood, are now enjoying a newly found popularity within the larger trend towards a study of the origins of analytic philosophy. This text is an introduction to British Idealism that plots, in an historical first part, the outlines of its rise, development and decline. In the second part, we provide reasons for further studies of this movement. -- downloaded pdf to Note
intellectual_history  cultural_history  19thC  20thC  21stC  British_history  idealism  British_Idealism  Bradley  Collingwood  Royce  analytical_philosophy  Russell_Bertrand  Logical_Positivism  pragmatism  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Richard Rorty's Platonists, Positivists, and Pragmatists (1982)
Source: Consequences of Pragmatism, University of Minnesota Press, 1982. Introduction only reproduced, “Fair Use” provisions; Transcribed Andy Blunden 1998. -- One can use language to criticise and enlarge itself, as one can exercise one’s body to develop and strengthen and enlarge it, but one cannot see language-as-a-whole in relation to something else to which it applies, or for which it is a means to an end... But Philosophy, the attempt to say “how language relates to the world” by saying what makes certain sentences true, or certain actions or attitudes good or rational, is, on this view, ... the impossible attempt to step outside our skins – the traditions, linguistic and other, within which we do our thinking and self-criticism – and compare ourselves with something absolute. This Platonic urge to escape from the finitude of one’s time and place, the “merely conventional” and contingent aspects of one’s life, is responsible for the original Platonic distinction between two kinds of true sentence. By attacking this latter distinction, the holistic “pragmaticising” strain in analytic philosophy has helped us see how the metaphysical urge – common to fuzzy Whiteheadians and razor-sharp “scientific realists” – works. It has helped us be sceptical about the idea that some particular science (say physics) or some particular literary genre (say Romantic poetry, or transcendental philosophy) gives us that species of true sentence which is not just a true sentence, but rather a piece of Truth itself.
etexts  intellectual_history  20thC  pragmatism  Platonism  Logical_Positivism  empiricism  neo-Kantian  analytical_philosophy  analytic-synthetic  philosophy_of_language  epistemology  Rorty  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
the unravelling of morality in the 20thC, from the intuitionism of GE Moore to JL Mackie’s ‘error theory’ and moral nihilism. This extract begins with Moore and looks at how intuitionism gave way to emotivism. -- Like moral truths themselves, Prichard clearly saw his case as self-evident and intuitive. The idea of moral truths as intuitions harked back to the English Platonists of the 18thC. Prichard’s essay helped give those ideas new traction, launching the Cambridge Intuitionist school, that included WD Ross, EF Carritt, WHB Joseph and CD Broad. For each of the Intuitionists the good was self-evident. The trouble was that the goods that were self-evident were not the same to all of them. Since no empirical fact or rational argument could settle this debate, ..so the very notion of moral truth began to disintegrate. -- ‘Questions as to “values”’, Bertrand Russell wrote, ‘lie wholly outside the domain of knowledge.’ So arose ‘emotivism’, first sketched by AJ Ayer in his groundbreaking 1936 book Language, Truth and Logic -- Like Hume, Ayer insisted that when we talk of right and wrong we are not directly referring to things in the world but to our own attitudes towards these things. --The American philosopher Charles L Stevenson developed the emotivist argument, especially in his 1944 book Ethics and Language.-- GE Moore was no emotivist, nor thought that values were simply subjective. Yet the argument he set running in the Principia Ethica led inexorably to Stevenson’s emotivism. -- To suggest that slavery is a good would be more than simply ‘odd’. The trouble with emotivism is that it finds it difficult – nay, impossible – to capture this distinction.
intellectual_history  20thC  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  morality-conventional  analytical_philosophy  morality-objective  EF-add  metaethics  utilitarianism  obligation  Logical_Positivism  Cambridge_Platonists 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Robert Sinclair - Quine and Conceptual Pragmatism | JSTOR: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Spring 2012), pp. 335-355
Quine famously concluded that his rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction resulted in a more ‘thorough' pragmatism. While suggesting a possible link to American pragmatism, Quine would later explain that he was only extending the use of ‘pragmatic’ found in Carnap's thought. However, Quine has also acknowledged the influence of his teacher C.I. Lewis, who defended his ‘Conceptual Pragmatism’ in the 1920s and 1930s. This essay focuses on Quine's alleged connection to pragmatism by examining the influence of Lewis's pragmatism on Quine's developing epistemological perspective. It makes reference to Quine's unpublished graduate papers in order to argue that the structural affinities between Quine's and Lewis's conceptions of epistemology suggest an important historical source of the pragmatic elements in Quine's view. This further highlights a forgotten element of the epistemological backdrop to Quine's mid-century interpretation and criticism of Carnap's use of the analytic-synthetic distinction. -- paywall
article  jstor  paywall  intellectual_history  20thC  pragmatism  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  epistemology  Quine  Carnap  Logical_Positivism  apriori  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Ken Gemes interviewed by Richard Marshall - on the tragedy of life » 3:AM Magazine - Jan 2014
Ken Gemes never stops brooding on what the postmoderns got right about Nietzsche, about the lack of seriously considered theories in Nietzsche, about why his naturalism isn’t of interest, about the stark nihilist fact at the heart of Nietzsche’s philosophical outlook, about the role of the genius, about being strangers to ourselves, ressentiment, Nietzschean localism, about Freud and Nietzsche’s relationship, about the ascetic ideal, about the canonical virtue of scientific empirical testability, about the need for fine grained logical content, about the value of his different philosophical interests and why what Nietzsche says may well be literally true.
article  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  Nietzsche  Freud  Foucault  philosophy_of_science  Logical_Positivism  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Adam Timmins, review - Kerwin Lee Klein, From History to Theory (2011) | Reviews in History
Recommended -- Timmins gives high marks for 1st chapters from professionalization thru logical positivism and obsession with covering laws. Next 2 (linguistic and cultural turns) weaker mostly because they had little impact on actual practice of historians. Tyen picks up with Memory Studies. "However, the Holocaust argument is not the only one that can made to account for the rise of Memory. Pierre Nora has argued that ‘we are obsessed with memory because we have destroyed it with historical consciousness’. Another argument posits that memory ‘is a new category of experience that grew out of the modernist crisis of the self in the nineteenth century and then gradually evolved into our current usage’. A third states that ‘memory is a mode of discourse natural to people without a history, and so its emergence is a salutary feature of decolonization’. However, none of these explanations on their own can fully account for the memory boom. The roots of the rise in memory lead into Klein’s’ final chapter, which ‘takes off the academic gown’ and examines how memory is used by the right-wing Christian movement in the US to reduce history to eschatology."
books  reviews  intellectual_history  historiography  20thC  Logical_Positivism  analytical_philosophy  philosophy_of_history  linguistic_turn  postmodern  memory_studies  right-wing  eschatology 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
James Schmidt - Charles W. Morris on Empiricism and the Counter-Enlightenment (Fabricating the “Counter-Enlightenment” Part IV) | Persistent Enlightenment
there remains an ambiguity in the way in which the term is used: it can function either as a characterization of views that were held in an earlier period (e.g., during the “Romantic Age”) or as a way of describing a continuing opposition to the continuing project of the Enlightenment......This last point can be seen in the two English examples from 1942. In his discussion of opposition to Enlightenment idea in eighteenth-century Latin America, Lanning was engaged in the historian’s task of exploring the ways in which ideas were appropriated during another period. But the “counter-Enlightenment” that figures in Charles W. Morris’s contribution to the second meeting of the Conference on Science, Religion, and Philosophy is not something that resides in the past; it is a present threat..... The tension inherent in the attempt to respect the autonomy of disciplines while, at the same time, appealing to fundamental religious values was nowhere more apparent than in the caustic address delivered by Mortimer J. Adler (one of the Conference’s founding members) at the inaugural meeting. As he saw it, the greatest danger to “the democratic way of life” came not from foreign enemies but from forces closer to home..... Morris’ account of democracy conforms rather closely to what we have grown accustomed to describing as “political liberalism.” But, as we shall see in our next installment, by the end of the 1940s the question of just what “liberalism” meant had become quite contested. And one of the results of that contestation would be a discussion of the nature of something called “the Counter-Enlightenment.”
intellectual_history  20thC  WWII  Cold_War  social_sciences-post-WWII  US_politics  political_culture  science-and-religion  Logical_Positivism  empiricism  conservatism  liberalism  nihilism  Counter-Enlightenment  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader

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