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حكومة عبد المهدي على كف التناقضات بسبب الفياض و«الاجتثاث» | الشرق الأوسط
Nov. 6, Lebanese Hezbollah rep Kawtharani pushing for Fayad as MoI, but Sadr still holding out, Ghaban also backing Fayad; PUK's Khaled Shwani apparently to be Minister of Justice
FalehFayyad  Sadr  Hashd  Cabinet  Lebanon  MoI  SalemGhaban  PUK  judiciary 
5 weeks ago by insideiraqipolitics
Physical and Societal (Re)construction in Nineveh post Islamic State – Project on Middle East Political Science, Oct 2018
Reconstruction needs to be depoliticised and must address both the physical and societal needs of citizens.  But viewing reconstruction as an inherently political process means that policy and analysis must take into account the political power dynamics at play between members of the NPC, as well as between the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the NPC, the KRG and Baghdad, and Baghdad and the NPC. The competition for control between these actors, or the act of preventing others from gaining control, or benefiting from reconstruction of areas that they control, is the greatest obstacle to reconstruction in Nineveh, as the process becomes politicised and the best interests of the population are not taken into account.

There are a number of lessons that can be taken from the pre-IS period in order to ensure past failures are not reproduced. Firstly, processes that limit political control at the provincial level should not be reconstructed. Additionallyt, local voices also need to be heard and decentralisation should not be only to the province, but also within, to the districts and sub-districts. Governance in Nineveh (and across Iraq) also needs to become more transparent and accountable to the people, as corruption has long affected the process. Secondly, security cannot feel imposed from Baghdad and must have a strong sense of local ownership, whilst still operating within the national system. 

Additionally, notions of collective guilt from the other communities towards Sunni Arabs must be countered, as this not only hinders reconciliation, but also wider governance. There is a common misconception within the minority communities of Nineveh – as voiced on numerous occasions in interviews between 2016-2017 – that the majority of Sunnis are complicit in the actions of IS and that they have not suffered as a community. The suffering of Sunnis should not be denied and should be included in the shared narrative of truth to strengthen the process of reconciliation (O’Driscoll, 2016a).
Iraq  Ninewa  reconstruction  Reconciliation  Judiciary  Sunni  sectarianism  IDPs  Mosul 
7 weeks ago by elizrael
Legal Pluralism and Justice in Iraq after ISIL – Project on Middle East Political Science
Now, ISIL affiliates face justice in disparate forums. The Iraqi Federal Government relies on a 2005 Anti-Terrorism Law to prosecute ISIL suspects, drawing little distinction between those who committed violent acts and those who performed ancillary roles for the group.[6] Provincial councils have used their authority to pass governorate-level decrees: the provincial councils of Babylon and Salah al-Din, for example, both ordered the homes of ISIL suspects demolished and their extended families deported from the province.[7] Some tribes have also enacted community punishments, such as in Al Qaim and al-Alam where tribal leaders ordered the destruction of the homes of accused ISIL supporters, without the possibility of pardon.[8]

This article explores two such mechanisms and what happens when they clash. The first is the security vetting of ISIL suspects, a process that Tamanaha categorizes as a ‘functional normative (legal) system.’[13] The second is the customary normative system of tribal law. Both mechanisms interact with and challenge the state framework in different ways, and this article seeks to understand the implications. If justice – a highly political arena where issues of power, resources and rights are at stake[14] – remains the purview of subnational groups, what does this mean for the state, state-citizen relations and reconciliation?

the Operations Command Centre frequently seeks advice not only from armed groups but also from tribal authorities or other local informants as to who is ‘guilty’ in the community.[19] Then, once a person or family is identified as guilty, it is often left up to the PMU to enforce the punishment, be it property destruction, deportation, or even arrest and detention at (unlawful, non-state) facilities belonging to the PMUs or other armed groups.[20]

Moreover, the PMF involvement in vetting exacerbates a sectarian narrative about victimhood. The events of 2003 and its aftermath have elevated the political relevance of sectarian identities in Iraq, such that sect-centric fears and ambitions have come to dominate people’s political perceptions. This has led Iraqis to view themselves as part of sectarian collectives, and to speak of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ on sectarian terms.[23] In such a context, the identity of vetting actors matters deeply. When vetting is carried out by predominantly Shia actors against Sunni Arab communities in conditions that lack transparency and due process; when it is left to Shia PMUs to enforce negative vetting decisions and punishments against Sunni families; and when the actors responsible for vetting stand accused of detaining, disappearing or executing (Sunni) ISIL suspects,[24] it reinforces a sectarian sense of victimhood and undermines prospects for justice.

In recent years, also, tribal leaders and tribal law have played a key role in mediating grievances generated by ISIL. In Tikrit, for example, the massacre of 1,700 unarmed Shiite soldiers at Camp Speicher triggered widespread anger against the Sunni community due to a perception that many Sunni residents were complicit in the executions.[33] Therefore, when the 400,000 Sunni Arab residents displaced by military operations sought to return, local authorities and tribal leadership feared that the PMF and Shia tribes would engage in largescale revenge killings.[34] Following days of negotiation, Sunni and Shia tribal leaders finally reached a joint agreement: both sides agreed to disavow violence (thus diminishing the possibility of revenge killings), establish a vetting process with national authorities to clear Sunni Arab residents who wished to return, refer any of their own guilty tribesman to the national vetting process, and commit to seeking justice through formal legal channels. The strength of tribal influence in Salah al Din meant that residents largely upheld this agreement and, since then, more than 390,000 IDPs have returned to Tikrit.[35]

In addition, tribal leaders wished to preserve their role as agents of reconciliation. Iraq’s large tribes include both Sunni and Shiite members and this offers tribal leaders a unique vantage from which to mediate, particularly since tribal law is neither political, religious nor sectarian, but draws instead on shared norms. Some tribal leaders (such as those who joined the Hawija pact) worried that using tribal law to punish offenders without procedural justice would jeopardize this reconciliatory potential. There was also concern that enforcing the khamsa unit of responsibility for ISIL crimes would play into the narrative of collective guilt and condemn hundreds of (innocent) families.[39] By adapting tribal law to work alongside state law and delineate their different functions, then, the tribal pacts of Tikrit and Hawija were able to challenge the stereotypes that condemn whole tribes or the entire Sunni Arab community for the crimes of ISIL.[40]
Hashd  ISIS  Judiciary  tribes  IDPs  Iraq 
7 weeks ago by elizrael
The Suffocation of Democracy | by Christopher R. Browning | The New York Review of Books
The fascist movements of that time prided themselves on being overtly antidemocratic, and those that came to power in Italy and Germany boasted that their regimes were totalitarian. The most original revelation of the current wave of authoritarians is that the construction of overtly antidemocratic dictatorships aspiring to totalitarianism is unnecessary for holding power. Perhaps the most apt designation of this new authoritarianism is the insidious term “illiberal democracy.” Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, Putin in Russia, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, and Viktor Orbán in Hungary have all discovered that opposition parties can be left in existence and elections can be held in order to provide a fig leaf of democratic legitimacy, while in reality elections pose scant challenge to their power. Truly dangerous opposition leaders are neutralized or eliminated one way or another.

Total control of the press and other media is likewise unnecessary, since a flood of managed and fake news so pollutes the flow of information that facts and truth become irrelevant as shapers of public opinion. Once-independent judiciaries are gradually dismantled through selective purging and the appointment of politically reliable loyalists. Crony capitalism opens the way to a symbiosis of corruption and self-enrichment between political and business leaders. Xenophobic nationalism (and in many cases explicitly anti-immigrant white nationalism) as well as the prioritization of “law and order” over individual rights are also crucial to these regimes in mobilizing the popular support of their bases and stigmatizing their enemies.
USA  politics  history  1920s  1930s  fascism  TrumpDonald  nationalism  isolationism  protectionism  authoritarianism  Nazism  Hitler  polarisation  Weimar  democracy  McConnellMitch  KavanaughBrett  judiciary  Germany  Italy  totalitarianism  misinformation  control  funding  lobbying  tradeUnions  illiberalism 
9 weeks ago by petej
Alex Kozinski - Wikipedia
Background on USA judicial system—and relation to Brett Kavanaugh
usa  judiciary  california  judge  sexuality  abuse  history  reference  court 
10 weeks ago by csrollyson

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