intellectual_history-distorted   35

ADRIAN BLAU - UNCERTAINTY AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS | JSTOR - History and Theory (Oct 2011)
History and Theory, Vol. 50, No. 3 (October 2011), pp. 358-372 -- Intellectual historians often make empirical claims, but can never know for certain if these claims are right. Uncertainty is thus inevitable for intellectual historians. But accepting uncertainty is not enough: we should also act on it, by trying to reduce and report it. We can reduce uncertainty by amassing valid data from different sources to weigh the strengths and weaknesses of competing explanations, rather than trying to "prove" an empirical claim by looking for evidence that fits it. Then we should report our degree of certainty in our claims. When we answer empirical questions in intellectual history, we are not telling our readers what happened: we are telling them how strong we think our evidence is—a crucial shift of emphasis. For intellectual historians, then, uncertainty is subjective, as discussed by Keynes and Collingwood; the paper thus explores three differences between subjective and objective uncertainty. Having outlined the theoretical basis of uncertainty, the paper then offers examples from actual research: Noel Malcolm's work shows how to reduce and report uncertainty about composition, and David Wootton's work shows how to reduce and report uncertainty about beliefs. -- VERY Anti Straussian based on extensive bibliography -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  historiography  intellectual_history-distorted  philosophy_of_history  hermeneutics  hermeneutics_of_suspicion  Strauss  Straussians  epistemology-history  evidence  coherence  uncertainty  Keynes  Keynes-uncertainty  Collingwood  objectivity  positivism  post-foundational  Cambridge_School  author_intention  reception  audience  bibliography  downloaded 
january 2016 by dunnettreader
Samuel Moyn - The First Historian of Human Rights (2011) | JSTOR - The American Historical Review
Vol. 116, No. 1 (February 2011), pp. 58-79 -- Revisiting Ritter's story of the invention of human rights—as perverse as it was pioneering—affords critical distance from what has become a central historiographical fashion. It is precisely because his narrative constructs the past of human rights for so unfamiliar a project that Ritter provides a more vivid reminder of how easy it still is to devise a field with the goal of crafting a usable past for new imperatives. The deep past out of which human rights are supposed to have sprung provides rich but manipulable material for such enterprises. Ritter's first history is also a salutary reminder of the meanings that the concept of human rights accreted in the postwar era, when they transcended the nation‐state and began to be called in English by their current name. The 1940s, when Ritter wrote, are often forced to play the role of precursor in contemporary narratives—as a kind of failed early version of the post–Cold War 1990s, when human rights as a movement and a framework became visible enough to motivate historians to work on them. Given the Universal Declaration, the chronological focus on the 1940s is understandable. But Ritter provides an inadvertent warning against omitting the conservative and religious sources of human rights in that era, and therefore interpreting it anachronistically. His case powerfully buttresses emerging skepticism about the whole notion of rooting contemporary human rights in the 1940s, let alone earlier, given more recent transformations in the very meaning of the concept, and the unprecedented explosion of a movement based on them. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  20thC  entre_deux_guerres  post-WWII  Cold_War  IR-realism  IR  religious_history  Christianity  Christian_Democracy  human_rights  anti-capitalism  anti-materialism  communitarian  anti-individualism  international_law  usable_past  historiography-postWWII  United_Nations  post-war_reconstruction  Germany  Europe  theology  rights-legal  conservatism  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Paul A. Newberry - Joseph Butler on Forgiveness: A Presupposed Theory of Emotion | JSTOR - Journal of the History of Ideas (2001)
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Apr., 2001), pp. 233-244 -- corrects misreading of Butler's position - not overcoming emotions of resentment but restraining one's actions or forbearance of taking revenge -- and discusses why Butler has been misread -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  18thC  Butler  moral_philosophy  moral_psychology  theology  forgiveness  moral_sentiments  morality-Christian  emotions  reason-passions  action-theory  agency  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Brian Z. Tamanaha - Legal Realism in Context :: SSRN in Elizabeth Mertz, ed., New Legal Realism, Vol. 1 (Cambridge UP, 2015 Forthcoming)
“We are all realists now,” it is frequently said, yet what legal realism was about remains vigorously debated by legal theorists and historians. The debate continues because the jurists we think of as core legal realists were not members of a group. Karl Llewellyn said this multiple times in his famous essay detailing realism. (..) Contemporary scholars who make assertions about what the legal realists stood for often fail to account for these passages. Legal realism.. is best understood ... in terms of 3 overlapping complexes of ideas that emerged in the late 19thC and had become widespread by the time of Llewellyn’s article. [(1)] that society was changing rapidly while law, understood as a means to achieve social ends, lagged badly behind, producing an urgent need for legal reform. [(2)] the growing refrain among legal academics that newly developing social sciences should be applied to enhance an understanding of the actual facts surrounding law. [(3)] a vocal backlash against judges for impeding reform, including charges that they were importing class bias into their legal decisions, prompting a broader acknowledgement that the background social attitudes of judges play a role in their decisions. These three themes were interpenetrating: the popular dissatisfaction with the failings of law was manifested in criticism of courts, and resort to social science was the favored academic solution. (..) Realism characterized the new modern age of thinking about law, and it ran much earlier and more broadly than is now commonly recognized. -- PDF File: 47 -- Keywords: Legal history, Jurisprudence, law and the humanities, law and the social sciences
chapter  SSRN  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  19thC  20thC  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  legal_history  social_sciences  legal_realism  legal_reform  change-social  change-intellectual 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Brian Z. Tamanaha - The Third Pillar of Jurisprudence: Social Legal Theory :: SSRN - William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 56, 2015
Jurisprudence is generally thought to consist of two main classical rival branches — natural law and legal positivism — followed by a bunch of modern schools — legal realism, law and economics, critical theory, legal pragmatism, etc. In this essay I argue that three main branches of jurisprudence have existed, and battled, for centuries, not two, but the third goes unrecognized as such because it has traveled under different labels and the underlying connections have been clouded by various confusions. The core insights and focus of this third branch, what I call “Social Legal Theory,” trace in a continuous thread from Montesquieu, through historical jurisprudence, sociological jurisprudence, and legal realism, up to the present. This third branch, I argue, provides a contrasting/complementary perspective, in conjunction with natural law and legal positivism, which rounds out the full range of theoretical angles on law: natural law is normative; legal positivism is analytical/conceptual; and social legal theory is empirical. (Among a number of clarifications, I answer the common objection that empirically-grounded theories are not sufficiently theoretical.) The conventional jurisprudential narrative is redrawn in this essay in a way that exposes unseen connections among theoretical schools and brings into focus critical issues about the nature of law that currently are marginalized by natural law and legal positivism. -- Pages in PDF File: 44 -- Keywords: Jurisprudence, legal philosophy, law and society, legal realism, legal development, legal history
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  positivism-legal  natural_law  legal_realism  legal_history  sociology_of_law  social_order  social_theory  change-social  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  18thC  19thC  20thC  Montesquieu  pragmatism  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeet Heer - Sex, Economics, and Austerity | The American Prospect - 2013
John Maynard Keynes was the sexiest economist who ever lived. This might seem like half-hearted praise since in our mind’s eye the typical economist appears as… On the decades of right-wing attacks on Keynes and Keynesianism using sexual "immorality" as linked to purported moral failings of Keynes' policy responses from Versailles onward.
article  Instapaper  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  20thC  21stC  Keynes  Keynesianism  economic_history  economic_theory  macroeconomics  Great_Depression  right-wing  neoconservatism  fiscal_policy  budget_deficit  austerity  economics-and-morality  from instapaper
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Brad DeLong - That Friedrich von Hayek Was Inconsistent and That Milton Friedman Was Running a Con on His Ideological Allies - August 2015 (replay)
That Friedrich von Hayek Was Inconsistent and That Milton Friedman Was Running a Con on His Ideological Allies Are Not to Their Benefit : Hoisted from the Archives from Two Years Ago
Hayek  Friedman_Milton  intellectual_history-distorted  Pocket  from pocket
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Paul Romer - Solow’s Choice ("After the Phillips Curve" Conference) | August 2015
Several economists, including Brad DeLong and Paul Krugman, have commented on how macroeconomics developed in the late 1970s. There are many points on which we… Romer's post us a very useful illustration of how the myths of the New Classical "Revolution" by Lucas and Sargent were formulated and maintained. Even Romer, who has only recently seen the light that the "freshwater" folks are not playing by the rules of scientific inquiry, can still place the "who started it" blame on the "saltwater" folks by singling out Solow’s refusal to accept the starting assumptions of Lucas et al, since he found them (as they have proven to be after 3+decades) prima facia absurd. The text Romer highlights as Solow’s failure to follow "the rules of Science" by being sarcastic, is for anyone who didn't believe the "freshwater" version of history, not appallingly dismissive, but a mild and mostly respectful response to the hysterical attacks that were even at the time demonstrably false (and enormously disrespectful). It's Romer's "critical moment" when the "freshwater" guys left the path of scientific integrity. But it was precisely the extreme denigration and open rejection of the macroeconomic mainstream that the "freshwater" school used as its rhetorical stance in order to launch its attempt to monopolize macroeconomics -- their insistence on their own purity, untainted by mainstream macro. It was exclusive and cultish from the get-go. And though Romer is reporting on his "close reading" of the texts from the conference where the Revolution was announced and Solow pushed back, Romer can't see what he's reading because he filters it all through the myth. Downloaded pdf of conference papers to Note
Instapaper  conference  sociology_of_knowledge  sociology_of_science_&_technology  intellectual_history-distorted  intellectual_history  20thC  post-WWII  macroeconomics  economic_theory  neoclassical_economics  Lucas_critique  rational_expectations  Keynesianism  Kuhn  myth  scientific_method  Romer  downloaded  from instapaper
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Michael Kwass, review essay - Reassessing Enlightenment Economics - Reinert's "Translating Empire" | Books & ideas - 25 March 2013
Reviewed: Sophus A. Reinert, Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy. Harvard University Press, 438 pp - Resurrecting the life of John Cary’s Essay on the State of England, a book which travelled all over Europe throughout the 18th century, S.A. Reinert challenges our understanding of Enlightenment economics, while calling for a more nuanced and historically-informed understanding of political economy in general. (..) By resurrecting the life of a text that scholars have dismissed as “mercantilist” and repositioning that work at the center of 18th-century political economy, Reinert challenges our basic understanding of Enlightenment economics, so often reduced to the free-trade doctrines of the physiocrats and Adam Smith. He argues that the diffusion of Cary’s work demonstrates that state-centered approaches to the creation of wealth enjoyed wide resonance at the very moment when discussions of economic policy were expanding beyond state chambers to engage a broader public. Far from being eclipsed by theories of laissez-faire economics, as conventional histories of economic thought would have us believe, such approaches became “the absolute mainstream in Europe” by the late 18th century -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  kindle  18thC  economic_history  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  political_economy  Enlightenment  economic_theory  mercantilism  laisser-faire  Physiocrats  Smith  British_history  British_foreign_policy  nation-state  economic_growth  development  public_policy  public_goods  government-roles  Italy  Austria  Germany  readership  history_of_book  print_culture  information-intermediaries  networks-information  networks-business  networks-policy  Republic_of_Letters  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Alan Jacobs - the three big stories of modernity | TextPatterns July 2015
So far there have been three widely influential stories about the rise of modernity: the Emancipatory, the Protestant, and the Neo-Thomist. (..) all these narrators of modernity see our own age as one in which the consequences of 500-year-old debates conducted by philosophers and theologians are still being played out. I think all of these narratives are wrong. They are wrong because they are the product of scholars in universities who overrate the historical importance and influence of other scholars in universities, and because they neglect ideas that connect more directly with the material world. All of these grands recits should be set aside, and they should not immediately be replaced with others, but with more particular, less sweeping, and more technologically-oriented stories. The technologies that Marshall McLuhan called "the extensions of Man" are infinitely more important for Man's story, for good and for ill, than the debates of the schoolmen and interpreters of the Bible. Instead of grand narratives of the emergence of The Modern we need something far more plural: technological histories of modernity.
Instapaper  cultural_history  cultural_capital  modernity  technology  Tech/Culture  social_theory  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  religious_history  Thomism-21stC  Reformation  Renaissance  Enlightenment  Enlightenment_Project  Enlightenment-ongoing  modernity-emergence  material_culture  economic_history  Great_Divergence  Industrial_Revolution  colonialism  Military_Revolution  Scientific_Revolution  consumer_revolution  technology-history  historiography  medicine  public_health  public_sphere  public_goods  media  print_culture  history_of_science  history_of_book  history-and-social_sciences  narrative  narrative-contested  from instapaper
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Frederick Schauer - The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 957 (2015)
My aim in this Article is to focus on the history of thinking about law in the context of 3 topics (..) to show that the continuous development of the theory of legal positivism, however useful it may have been or may still be, has possibly caused us to ignore other aspects of what was originally part of the positivist picture. (..)The first of these dimensions is the relationship between legal theory and legal reform. (..) that an account of the nature of law might be developed not simply as an aid to understanding or accurate description, but instead as a way of facilitating reform of law itself or reform of how a society understands the idea of law. Second, legal positivism, at the time of its late 19thC (or perhaps even earlier) origins, was focused on the importance of coercion, force, and sanctions as central components of law. But as with the creation of legal theories for the purpose of legal reform, this emphasis on the coercive side of law has also been banished to a kind of jurisprudential purgatory, for reasons and with consequences that deserve further examination. The third lost element of earlier versions of legal positivism is its focus on judicial decision making and the role of judges. Modern legal positivists, for whom 1961 is all too often the beginning of useful thought about the nature of law, do not, with few exceptions, consider theories of judicial decision making to be a necessary or even important part of the positivist perspective. But it was not always so. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  legal_system  political_philosophy  legal_reform  institutional_change  institutions  judiciary  judicial_review  law_enforcement  criminal_justice  punishment  coercion  authority  obligation  policymaking  political_change  social_theory  social_sciences  positivism-legal  positive_law  positivism  justice  Study_and_Uses  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Steven Walt - What Can The History of Jurisprudence Do For Jurisprudence? A Commentary on Schauer's "The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 977 (2015)
Walt's response (at least the abstract) appears to prove Schauer's point quite nicely, as if logic and argument by legal theorists takes place in an abstract world where "how did we get here" is universally ignored, despite its possible relevance for "why are we here", "what are we doing here" and "where does it look like we might be headed" -- but Walt devoted 10 pages to his response, so one hopes he has more to justify his position than what comes across as a mix of arrogance (we don't need to learn from history because our theoretical grounding and argumentative methods are self-contained and self-sufficient) and cynicism (history might be interesting, but no way will anybody change what gets them published and tenure) -- out of curiosity as to whether it's really as bad as the abstract makes it sound, downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  positivism  positivism-legal  historiography  legal_history  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Dan Priel - Toward Classical Legal Positivism (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 987 (2015)
I have two major aims: (1) set the historical record straight(...) Hobbes’s and Bentham’s work that seeks to understand their views on law not by isolating it from the rest of their wide-ranging body of work, but by understanding their jurisprudential work as part of a broader project. (2) My main aim is to contribute to contemporary jurisprudential debates and to suggest that the largely neglected approach of earlier positivists is superior to the view held by most contemporary legal positivists. (...) to what extent it is useful for us to call Hobbes and Bentham “legal positivists.” My answer to this question consists of three interrelated points. The first is that we draw an explicit link between their ideas and the view that (some time later) would come to be known as “positivism,” roughly the view that the methods of the “human sciences” are essentially the same as those of the natural sciences. The second point is that the classical legal positivists’ decisive break with natural law ideas prevalent in their day is to be found exactly here, in their views about metaphysics and nature. The third point is that this aspect of their work has been, in my view regrettably, abandoned by contemporary legal positivists. Though all three points are related, in this Article I will say relatively little about the first point, as I discussed it in greater detail elsewhere. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  political_philosophy  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  Hobbes  Bentham  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  natural_philosophy  nature  human_nature  scientific_method  social_theory  social_sciences  positivism  positive_law  Methodenstreit  methodology-quantitative  epistemology  sociology_of_knowledge  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski - Positivism(s): A Commentary on Priel's "Toward Classical Legal Positivism" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 1023 (2015)
Anglo-American jurisprudence, before it insulated itself in conceptual analysis and defined itself in opposition to broader questions, was properly a “sociable science,” to use Professor Postema’s phrase from his symposium article. And, in part due to the exemplars of history, so it may become again. By drawing on Bentham and Hobbes, Professor Dan Priel’s Toward Classical Positivism points forward toward more fruitful methods of jurisprudence while illuminating the recent history and current state of inquiry. His article demonstrates the virtues and promise of a more catholic approach to jurisprudence. It also raises challenging questions about the direction to take this rediscovered path, and I am not sure I always agree with his suggested answers. Any misgivings I have about Priel’s particular approach, however, do not diminish my appreciation; I find even the points of disagreement to be live and meaningful, and that itself is refreshing. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  political_philosophy  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  Hobbes  Bentham  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  analytical_philosophy  metaphysics  natural_philosophy  nature  human_nature  scientific_method  social_theory  social_sciences  positivism  positive_law  Methodenstreit  methodology-quantitative  epistemology  sociology_of_knowledge  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Alice Ristroph - Sovereignty and Subversion (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 1029 (2015)
Hobbes’s account of law, like his account of punishment, does not fit well into our existing scholarly categories. (..). He was neither a legal positivist nor a natural law theorist, at least not as we usually use these labels. He adopted neither a retributive nor a consequentialist justification of punishment. Yet his account of human interaction, particularly with respect to law and punishment, captures actual experience better than the more familiar alternatives. Moreover, the space for subversion in Hobbes’s theory may make his account more normatively appealing than it has seemed to modern liberals. (...) 3 questions about Hobbesian theory: What is law? What is its relationship to punishment? And what are the implications of Hobbes’s theory for contemporary efforts to describe law or the relationship of law to punishment? The first (..) Hobbes’s legal theory is still so widely mischaracterized, sometimes even by Hobbes scholars, that it is worth returning to his claims. The second question has received much less attention, perhaps because a right to resist punishment seems so discordant with the authoritarian Hobbes we know, or think we know. And the third question has received still less attention, for contemporary jurisprudence scholarship rarely cites anyone who wrote before Jeremy Bentham and John Austin. I hope to show that, in many instances, Hobbes has been misread; even more importantly, I hope to persuade scholars of jurisprudence that what Hobbes actually said is worthy of their engagement. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jurisprudence  philosophy_of_law  intellectual_history  intellectual_history-distorted  Hobbes  17thC  political_philosophy  social_theory  natural_law  natural_rights  positivism-legal  sovereignty  authority  obligation  punishment  resistance  liberalism  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader

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