institutional_economics   157

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David Ciepley - Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation (2013) | American Political Science Review on JSTOR
This article challenges the liberal, contractual theory of the corporation and argues for replacing it with a political theory of the corporation. Corporations are government-like in their powers, and government grants them both their external "personhood" and their internal governing authority. They are thus not simply private. Yet they are privately organized and financed and therefore not simply public. Corporations transgress all the basic dichotomies that structure liberal treatments of law, economics, and politics: public/private, government/market, privilege/equality, and status/contract. They are "franchise governments" that cannot be satisfactorily assimilated to liberalism. The liberal effort to assimilate them, treating them as contractually constituted associations of private property owners, endows them with rights they ought not have, exacerbates their irresponsibility, and compromises their principal public benefit of generating long-term growth. Instead, corporations need to be placed in a distinct category—neither public nor private, but "corporate"—to be regulated by distinct rules and norms. - downloaded via iphone to dbox
organizations  institutional_economics  corporations  corporate_citizenship  markets-dependence_on_government  article  corporate_control  institutions  management  public-private_gaps  bibliography  social_contract  liberalism  jstor  property_rights  downloaded  corporate_law  political_theory  managerialism  corporate_governance  corporate_personhood  firms-organization  property 
july 2017 by dunnettreader
Revisiting the theory of institutional hybridity and diversity developed by Vincent and Elinor Ostrom to cope with the challenge of the "neither states nor markets" institutional domain, this article reconstructs the Ostromian system along the "value heterogeneity-co-productionpolycentricity" axis. It articulates the elements of a theory of value heterogeneity and of the fuzzy boundaries between private and public. It rebuilds the model of co-production, clarifying the ambiguity surrounding a key technical public choice theoretical assumption, and it demonstrates (a) why it should not be confused with the Alchian-Demsetz team production model and (b) how co-production engenders a type of market failure that has been neglected so far. In light of this analysis, the article reconsiders polycentricity, the capstone of the Ostromian system, explaining why polycentricity may be seen as a solution both to this co-production market failure problem and to the problems of social choice in conditions of deep heterogeneity. It also discusses further normative corollaries. - Downloaded via iphone
power  market_failure  political_economy  centralization  power-asymmetric  governance  downloaded  public-private_gaps  bargaining  institutional_economics  commons  article  normativity  accountability  common_good  jstor  political_science  decentralization  public_goods  public_choice  norms 
july 2017 by dunnettreader
Elena Seghezza - Fiscal capacity and the risk of sovereign debt after the Glorious Revolution: A reinterpretation of the North–Weingast hypothesis (2015) — ScienceDirect
European Journal of Political Economy, June 2015, Vol.38:71–81, doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.12.002
Dept. of Economics, University of Genoa, Via Vivaldi 5, 16126 Genova, Italy
Several explanations have been given to account for the fact that, in contrast to the claim made by North and Weingast (1989), the decline in interest rates on British sovereign debt did not occur until several years after the Glorious Revolution in 1688. This paper puts forward the hypothesis that the decline in the risk premium on Britain's sovereign debt was due to the significant increase in excise duties in the early part of the eighteenth century. This increase was possible for two reasons. On the one hand, with the Glorious Revolution, parliament no longer had reason to fear that the King would strengthen his political power due to the availability of more fiscal revenue. On the other hand, the new excise taxes were borne mostly by the poor, that is a social class not represented in parliament. The delay in reducing the interest rate on British sovereign debt, following the Glorious Revolution, was, therefore, due to the length of time needed to increase and improve the fiscal bureaucracy responsible for the collection of excise duties.
Keywords -- Glorious Revolution Fiscal capacity Sovereign debt Interest rates
article  paywall  political_economy  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  Glorious_Revolution  fiscal-military_state  fiscal_space  tax_policy  tax_collection  bureaucracy  sovereign_debt  interest_rates  Parliament  Parliamentary_supremacy  interest_groups  inequality  excise  lower_orders  taxes-consumption  landed_interest 
december 2016 by dunnettreader
Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson
The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution
Daron Acemoglu, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson
The American Economic Review
Vol. 101, No. 7 (DECEMBER 2011), pp. 3286-3307
Downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
commerce  urbanization  guilds  elites  republicanism  reform-legal  Rhineland  reform-political  Germany  economic_growth  political_economy  reform-economic  jstor  political_history  civil_code  French_Revolution  rule_of_law  institutional_economics  bourgeoisie  aristocracy  trade  article  downloaded  feudalism  economic_history 
september 2016 by dunnettreader
Guido Alfani, Wouter Ryckbosch - Income inequality in pre-industrial Europe | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal 06 November 2015
Thomas Piketty and others have prompted renewed interest in understanding long-term patterns of inequality. This column presents evidence from pre-industrial Europe. Inequality rose even during the success stories of early modern Europe, but it can hardly have been the sole requisite for growth. In both economic history and today’s economic theory, the idea of a universal trade-off between growth and inequality needs to be replaced by stronger attention to social processes and institutional developments. -- brief but extensive lit review of how thinking of economic historians has been evolving -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  economic_history  early_modern  Europe-Early_Modern  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  economic_growth  inequality  capital_formation  new_institutionalism  institutional_economics  political_economy  state-building  nation-state  human_capital  urbanization  Innovation  Industrial_Revolution  consumer_revolution  consumer_demand  wages  growth-equity_tradeoff  bibliography  downloaded 
november 2015 by dunnettreader
Brian Z. Tamanaha - The Knowledge and Policy Limits of New Institutional Economics on Development :: SSRN - Dec 2014, Journal of Economic Issues, 2015, Forthcoming
Washington University in Saint Louis - School of Law -- New Institutional Economics (NIE) has secured impressive achievements in academia and policy circles. The World Bank and other development organization in the past two decades have expended billions of dollars on efforts to build “good governance” and the “rule of law” informed by the NIE theory that economic development requires supportive political and legal institutions. NIE appears to be the new consensus view of development thinking, supplanting the neo-liberal Washington Consensus (..) This essay elaborates on the barriers that stand in the way of the knowledge and policy goals of NIE. Foremost is the “interconnectedness of society:” cultural, technological, legal, political, and economic activities all affect one another and are affected by one another, often in ways that are subtle and all but invisible; each situation unique in its constellation of social forces and is dynamic, constantly changing in reaction to surrounding influences. (..) I explore the ongoing struggle to identify a shared conception of “institution” — and I explain why this cannot be solved. For reasons I go on to elaborate, NIE scholars also will not be able to get a precise grip on the surrounding institutional influences that affect economic development. (..) NIE scholars today, it turns out, are repeating lessons announced five decades ago in the law and development field. The problems were insuperable then and will remain so. (..) While critical of NIE knowledge and policy objectives, this essay is not negative in orientation. NIE research is illuminating. Greater awareness of the limits will help orient future work in the field in the most fruitful directions. - Pages in PDF File: 35 -- Keywords: economic development, new institutional economics, old institutional economics, legal development, rule of law, legal theory -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  institutional_economics  law-and-economics  institutions  legal_culture  political_culture  institution-building  institutional_change  institutionalization  development  rule_of_law  legal_reform  legal_theory  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Joram Mayshar, Omer Moav, Zvika Neeman, Luigi Pascali - The Neolithic roots of economic institutions | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 11 September 2015
Conventional theory suggests that hierarchy and state institutions emerged due to increased productivity following the Neolithic transition to farming. This column argues that these social developments were a result of an increase in the ability of both robbers and the emergent elite to appropriate crops. Hierarchy and state institutions developed, therefore, only in regions where appropriable cereal crops had sufficient productivity advantage over non-appropriable roots and tubers. -- I.e. Eurasia, not Sub-Saharan Africa
paper  economic_history  pre-historical_people  development  institutional_economics  institutions  state-building  state-roles  agriculture  elites  violence  hierarchy  Sub-Saharan_Africa  geography  geography-and-economics 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert O. Keohane, review - Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (1983) | JSTOR
Reviewed Work: The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. -- Journal of Economic Literature
Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jun., 1983), pp. 558-560 -- quite positive, but useful on where Olson's theory has blind spots -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  bookshelf  reviews  political_economy  economic_history  economic_growth  interest_groups  collective_action  international_political_economy  institutional_economics  rational_choice  rationality-economics  rationality  stagnation  rent-seeking  politics-and-money  status  status_quo_bias  social_order  hierarchy  change-social  change-economic  castes  discrimination  inequality  mobility  post-WWII  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Mary Hallward-Driemeier and Lant Pritchett - How Business Is Done in the Developing World: Deals versus Rules(2015) | AEAweb: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(3): 121-40
Affiliations World Bank and Harvard - What happens in the developing world when stringent regulations characterizing the investment climate meet weak government willingness or capability to enforce those regulations? How is business actually done? The Doing Business project surveys experts concerning the legally required time and costs of regulatory compliance for various aspects of private enterprise—starting a firm, dealing with construction permits, trading across borders, paying taxes, getting credit, enforcing contracts, and so on—around the world. The World Bank's firm-level Enterprise Surveys around the world ask managers at a wide array of firms about their business, including questions about how long it took to go through various processes like obtaining an operating license or a construction permit, or bringing in imports. This paper compares the results of three broadly comparable indicators from the Doing Business and Enterprise Surveys. Overall, we find that the estimate of legally required time for firms to complete a certain legal and regulatory process provided by the Doing Business survey does not summarize even modestly well the experience of firms as reported by the Enterprise Surveys. When strict de jure regulation and high rates of taxation meet weak governmental capabilities for implementation and enforcement, we argue that researchers and policymakers should stop thinking about regulations as creating "rules" to be followed, but rather as creating a space in which "deals" of various kinds are possible. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  development  institutional_economics  institutional_capacity  regulation  regulation-enforcement  regulation-costs  SMEs  World_Bank  doing_business  business_practices  business-norms  business_influence  investment  business-and-politics  business-ethics  FDI  investor_protection  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Timothy Besley - Law, Regulation, and the Business Climate: The Nature and Influence of the World Bank Doing Business Project (2015) | AEAweb: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(3): 99-120
Affiliation LSE - The importance of a well-functioning legal and regulatory system in creating an effective market economy is now widely accepted. One flagship project that tries to measure the environment in which businesses operate in countries across the world is the World Bank's Doing Business project, which was launched in 2002. This project gathers quantitative data to compare regulations faced by small and medium-size enterprises across economies and over time. The centerpiece of the project is the annual Doing Business report. It was first published in 2003 with five sets of indicators for 133 economies, and currently includes 11 sets of indicators for 189 economies. The report includes a table that ranks each country in the world according to its scores across the indicators. The Doing Business project has become a major resource for academics, journalists, and policymakers. The project also enjoys a high public profile with close to ten million hits on its website each year. With such interest, it's no surprise that the Doing Business report has come under intense scrutiny. In 2012, following discussions by its board, the World Bank commissioned an independent review panel to evaluate the project, on which I served as a member. In this paper, I first describe how the Doing Business project works and illustrate with some of the key findings of the 2015 report. Next, I address what is valuable about the project, the criticisms of it, and some wider political economy issues illustrated by the report. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  institutional_economics  World_Bank  development  SMEs  doing_business  FDI  investment  investor_protection  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Roger Backhouse, Mauro Boianovsky - Secular Stagnation: The History of a Macroeconomic Heresy :: SSRN - May 5, 2015
Roger Backhouse, University of Birmingham - Department of Economics -- Mauro Boianovsky, Universidade de Brasilia. *--* This paper covers the history of secular stagnation from Alvin's Hansen's AEA Presidential address in 1938 to the recent re-discovery of the idea by Lawrence Summers. It is argued that the story of secular stagnation is more complicated than the simple version usually told: the theory changed in ways that meant that, though its immediate relevance might be less, postwar prosperity left open the possibility that it might one day become relevant. It is also pointed out that the history of the term has never been free of political concerns, and it is suggested that changing conceptions of economic theory played an important role in the fate of secular stagnation -- Pages in PDF File: 36 -- Keywords: secular stagnation, unemployment equilibrium, Keynesian economics, Hansen -' downloaded to Note
paper  SSRN  economic_theory  intellectual_history  economic_history  US_economy  US_politics  20thC  Great_Depression  post-WWII  Keynesianism  stagnation  macroeconomics  institutional_economics  prices  competition  deficit_finance  downloaded 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Joseph Adelson, review essay - What Caused Capitalism? | Foreign Affairs - May 2015
Once upon a time, smart people thought the world was flat. As globalization took off, economists pointed to spreading market forces that… Includes new Cambridge History of Capitalism, Mokyr Enlightened Economy, Acemoglu and Robinson Why Nations Fail, and Beckert Empire of Cotton -- contrasts tales that are, in broad brush, optimistic and internalist re origins (especially Mokyr) vs pessimistic and externalist (especially Cotton) -- copied to Instapaper
books  reviews  bookshelf  economic_history  capitalism  Great_Divergence  ancient_history  global_economy  global_history  global_system  Europe-Early_Modern  city_states  Italy  Spain  France  British_history  India  US_history  colonialism  imperialism  empires  institutional_economics  technology  development  Scientific_Revolution  Industrial_Revolution  industrialization  industrial_policy  US_Civil_War  slavery  property  property_rights  mercantilism  mercantilism-violence  Instapaper  markets  political_economy  economic_culture  economic_growth  from instapaper
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Dietz Vollrath - All Institutions, All the Time? | The Growth Economics Blog - April 2015
Wolfgang Keller and Carol Shiue just released a working paper on “Market Integration as a Mechanism for Growth“. They are looking at growth in Germany during… Discusses a neat paper looking at parts of Germany that followed different patterns of economic development and growth in the 19thC, comparing cities based on (1) degree of market integration (measured by wheat prices) and (2) whether they transformed property relations from feudal to liberal, disbanded guilds, and adopted "equality before the rule of law". The second tended to reflect whether a city was conquered by Napoleon. He first looks at each variable and how the authors define it, what's likely involved in whether it's positive for a given city. He critiques some of their methodology, such as combining legal and socioeconomic indicators into a single weighted index. But his strongest critique is how the authors keep refining their analysis to make "institutional" factors appear highly significant, when the significance is unclear to put it charitably. And the biggest problem where they are likely to find significance, cities conquered by Napoleon, doesn't consider different types of causality that might have been involved, e.g. a city's situation geographically (which affected market integration) and degree of economic development might have been part of why Napoleon focused on those cities to conquer, from which he organized things like supply lines or transport for his armies. It's a continuation of his ongoing critique of what he sees as a fad for institutional explanations that don't actually demonstrate what they say they do -- let alone suggest how institutional development could be replicated. -- copied to Instapaper
economic_history  19thC  Germany  feudalism  capitalism  property_rights  guilds  urban_development  institutional_economics  market_integration  Napoleonic_Wars  Napoleonic_Wars-impact  Instapaper  from instapaper
april 2015 by dunnettreader
George Serafeim - The Role of the Corporation in Society: An Alternative View and Opportunities for Future Research b(revised June 2014) :: SSRN
Harvard University - Harvard Business School *--* A long-standing ideology in business education has been that a corporation is run for the sole interest of its shareholders. I present an alternative view where increasing concentration of economic activity and power in the world’s largest corporations, the Global 1000, has opened the way for managers to consider the interests of a broader set of stakeholders rather than only shareholders. Having documented that this alternative view better fits actual corporate conduct, I discuss opportunities for future research. Specifically, I call for research on the materiality of environmental and social issues for the future financial performance of corporations, the design of incentive and control systems to guide strategy execution, corporate reporting, and the role of investors in this new paradigm. -- Pages in PDF File: 27 -- Keywords: corporate performance, corporate size, sustainability, corporate social responsibility, accounting -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  global_economy  global_governance  international_political_economy  shareholder_value  shareholders  CSR  disclosure  accountability  accounting  institutional_economics  institutional_investors  incentives  institutional_change  long-term_orientation  business-and-politics  business-norms  business_practices  business_influence  sustainability  MNCs  firms-theory  firms-structure  firms-organization  power  power-concentration  concentration-industry  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader

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