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'BeiDou + GLONASS Better than GPS' - Global Times (China) | RNTF Sep 2019
Cover of article in Global Times, Sep 2019

Blog Editor’s Note: We reported on this cooperation last month and assessed the concerns for GPS and America. It is interesting this month to see China touting it in public as a way to offset GPS (and by extension, US) leadership around the world.

Some related items/thoughts:

There are already more Bei Dou satellites in view over much of the world than GPS satellites. Add in GLONASS satellites and you have something bigger than GPS + Galileo.
China is actively promoting Bei Dou as the PNT of choice for its neighbors. As one example, police/first responders in one Malaysian state have decided to use it exclusively, undoubtedly with some free equipment included in the deal.
Every time Russia or China disrupts GPS, which is often, users are nudged away from the American system and toward Russia’s and/or China’s.
GPS is a US military asset. Both China and Russia regard it as such, as can be seen in the below article. This means that both:
See it as a threat and something they need to counter
Jam and spoof GPS as mentioned above for tactical and strategic reasons
Have established their own satellite PNT systems
Have maintained and continue to cooperate in the operation of terrestrial PNT (Loran-C)
China has placed a PNT capability in Low Earth Orbit (GPS and other GNSS are in Medium Earth Orbit) and has been making other preparations that seem to indicate it will establish a LEO PNT constellation. Doing so would provide much more powerful signals and other functionalities that would place China firmly in the lead for global PNT.
RNTF  GPS  GNSS  BeiDou  GLONASS 
13 days ago by pierredv
Viewpoint: Russia, China Alliance on Navigation Satellites Threatens GPS - National Defense | RNTF aug 2019
"Russia and China have been increasingly moving toward greater synergies between their respective satellite navigation systems since at least 2015."

"At least a few industry insiders see this as part of an on-going effort to virtually combine the two systems and replace GPS as the leading global navigation system. This has far reaching geo-political implications and could impact GPS operations globally."

"Having such a large and robust satellite system could also add to the two nations’ predilection for interfering with international GPS signals over broad areas. . . . Jamming and spoofing GPS has tactical and strategic advantages for Russia and China. "
RNTF  GPS  China  Russia  GNSS  GLONASS  BeiDou 
22 days ago by pierredv
China's version of GPS now has more satellites than US original - Nikkei Asian Review, Aug 2019
Via RNTF https://rntfnd.org/2019/08/22/more-beidou-than-gps-in-130-of-195-countries/

"China's BeiDou satellite positioning system has overtaken its U.S. rival in size, a shift with potentially huge implications for both high-tech industry and national security. ... As of the end of June, there were 35 BeiDou satellites in operation, compared with 31 for GPS"

"Qianxun SI, a location services provider funded by Alibaba Group Holding and others, is using BeiDou signals and data from more than 2,000 ground stations to create a positioning service for self-driving vehicles with an accuracy in the centimeter range. Just as the U.S. became the leader in positioning services with GPS, China is working to develop new satellite-based technology and promote it around the world using BeiDou."

"When using BeiDou for car navigation, the receiver could theoretically transmit the car's location to a satellite in orbit, said Dean Cheng, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. He also believes Chinese satellites can jam signals in specific areas. The U.S. government is worried that such capabilities could be used in cyberattacks."
China  GPS  GNSS  BeiDou  RNTF 
25 days ago by pierredv
UK, 'Five Eyes' & the Future of SatNav & PNT | RNTF, Aug 2019
The United Kingdom has a golden opportunity with this initiative to be a world leader in PNT.

To capture this title, they must be innovative and not just field a British version of what the US, Russia, Europe, and China have already done. The UK must focus on users, reliability, resilience, and affordability.
RNTF  PNT  GNSS  GPS  UK  LEO 
26 days ago by pierredv
GNSS Threat Monitoring and Reporting: Past, Present, and a Proposed Future | RNTF Aug 2019
The authors of this excellent paper, which was named the Journal of Navigation’s best paper for 2018, propose a technical architecture to enable collection and use of diverse GNSS threat monitoring sources.
RNTF  GPS  GNSS  Interference  measurement 
29 days ago by pierredv
GNSS Threat Monitoring and Reporting: Past, Present, and a Proposed Future | The Journal of Navigation | Cambridge Core
Via RNTF blog, Aug 2019

Abstract

Vulnerability of satellite-based navigation signals to intentional and unintentional interference calls for a high-level overview of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) threats occurring globally to understand the magnitude and evolution of the problem. Therefore, a mechanism needs to be developed whereby disparate monitoring systems will be capable of contributing to a common entity of basic information about the threat scenarios they experience. This paper begins with a literature survey of 37 state-of-the-art GNSS threat monitoring systems, which have been analysed based on their respective operational features - constellations monitored and whether they possess the capability to perform interference-type classification, spoofing detection, and interference localisation. Also described is a comparative analysis of four GNSS threat reporting formats in use today. Based on these studies, the paper describes the Horizon2020 Standardisation of GNSS Threat Reporting and Receiver Testing through International Knowledge Exchange, Experimentation and Exploitation (STRIKE3) proposed integrated threat monitoring demonstration system and related standardised threat reporting message, to enable a high-level overview of the prevailing international GNSS threat scenarios and its evolution over time.
GNSS  GPS  Interference  measurement 
29 days ago by pierredv
Highway gantries identify jammers - GPS World : GPS World Apr 2019
Via Dale Hatfield

"An ION GNSS+ 2018 presentation by Wim de Wilde and Jean-Marie Sleewaegen presentation showed how a multi-antenna GNSS receiver with built-in RF spectrum monitor and adequate processing tool can efficiently detect and classify jamming events and identify the offending car or truck. They conducted a five-day test with two Septentrio AsteRx-U dual-antenna receivers installed on an overhead structure above a busy highway."

"Over the five days of the experiment, 45 jamming events were recorded and analyzed, most of them intentional: continuous wave, chirp or even less-known pulse jammers."
GNSS  GPS  jamming  GPSWorld 
april 2019 by pierredv
Above Us Only Stars — C4ADS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In this report, we present findings from a year-long investigation ending in November 2018 on an emerging subset of EW activity: the ability to mimic, or spoof, legitimate GNSS signals in order to manipulate PNT data. Using publicly available data and commercial technologies, we detect and analyze patterns of GNSS spoofing in the Russian Federation, Crimea, and Syria which demonstrate that the Russian Federation is growing a comparative advantage in the targeted use and development of GNSS spoofing capabilities to achieve tactical and strategic objectives at home and abroad. We profile different use cases of current Russian state activity to trace the activity back to basing locations and systems in use.
“In Section One, we examine GNSS spoofing events across the entire Russian Federation, its occupied territories, and overseas military facilities. We identify 9,883 suspected instances across 10 locations that affected 1,311 civilian vessel navigation systems since February 2016. We demonstrate that these activities are much larger in scope, more diverse in geography, and longer in duration than any public reporting suggests to date.”

“Finally, in Section Four, we expose the use of GPS spoofing in active Russian combat zones, particularly Syria, for airspace denial purposes. This is a capability scarcely reported in the public domain. Using data from a scientific sensor on the International Space Station (ISS), we are able to identify ongoing activity that poses significant threats to civilian airline GPS systems in the region. . . . ”
GPS  GNSS  spoofing  cybersecurity 
april 2019 by pierredv

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