geheimdienst_us_nsa_ncsc   11

Five Country Ministerial 2018: Official Communiqué
We, the Homeland Security, Public Safety, and Immigration Ministers of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States met on the Gold Coast, Australia, on August 28-29 2018, to discuss how we can better collaborate to meet our common security challenges. We reaffirmed that the close and enduring five country partnership, developed following the Second World War, remains fundamental to the security and prosperity of our nations. While senior digital industry representatives did not accept our invitation to participate in discussions on pressing issues regarding the illicit use of online spaces, we reiterated the need for digital industry to take more responsibility for content promulgated and communicated through their platforms and applications. We agreed to a Joint Statement on Countering the Illicit Use of Online Spaces, outlining our communities' high expectations of digital industry companies, with a focus on countering online child sexual abuse and exploitation, and violent extremist and terrorist material. We called for the further development and expansion of capabilities to prevent upload of illicit content, and to execute urgent and immediate takedowns. We reiterated the importance of industry investment in human and automated detection capabilities, underscoring the need for major companies to set industry standards and to help smaller companies deploy these capabilities to their platforms, including through the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). And we called for increased efforts to counter foreign interference and disinformation conducted via online platforms. Encryption is vital to the digital economy, a secure cyberspace and the protection of personal, commercial and government information. The five countries have no interest or intention to weaken encryption mechanisms. We recognise, however, that encryption, including end-to-end encryption, is also used in the conduct of terrorist and criminal activities. The inability of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to lawfully access encrypted data and communications poses challenges to law enforcement agencies' efforts to protect our communities. Therefore, we agreed to the urgent need for law enforcement to gain targeted access to data, subject to strict safeguards, legal limitations, and respective domestic consultations. We have agreed to a Statement of Principles on Access to Evidence and Encryption that sets out a framework for discussion with industry on resolving the challenges to lawful access posed by encryption, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.
australian government, department of home affairs, 29.08.2018
geheimdienst_abkommen_ukusa_5eyes  krypto_crypto_war  staat_propaganda_kriminalität_terrorismus  staat_propaganda_sicherheit_going_dark  datenschutz_niveau_senkung  staat_propaganda_agenda_setting  internet_regulierung  staat_propaganda_rechtspositivismus  internet_dienst_anbieter  unternehmen_allg_itk_netz  internet_zugang_anbieter  überwachung_int_sigint_comint  überwachung_abhörschnittstelle  überwachung_itk_inhaltsdaten  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sigint_enabling  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_cpa  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ncsc  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ces_bullrun  zensur_infrastruktur  software_zensur_filter  verband_gifct  terror_bekämpfung  staat_politik_sicherheit 
21 days ago by kraven
EXT4/Fscrypt Changes For Linux 4.18: Speck File-System Encryption Being Added
Theodore Ts'o at Google submitted the feature updates today for the EXT4 file-system and FSCRYPT file-system encryption framework updates for the Linux 4.18 kernel merge window. The main change with the FSCRYPT support in Linux 4.18 is adding support for Speck128/Speck256 as supported algorithms. The Speck crypto work was added for the Linux 4.17 kernel and now would be an option for file-system encryption with FSCRYPT-backed file-systems for Linux 4.18. Speck though, for the uninitiated, was developed at the US National Security Agency (NSA). This cipher is quite controversial [NB:] due to the NSA withholding details on some aspects of its design and some alleging that the NSA has lied or fabricated details about Speck. Long story short, some believe Speck could be back-doored by the NSA or at the very least weak to attacks and not trustworthy due to originating at a US spy agency. The NSA states that Speck and the hardware-focused Simon ciphers were designed for delivering an acceptable level of encryption on low-power IoT hardware.
phoronix, 05.06.2018
software_os_linux_kernel_modul  krypto_algo_simon_speck  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ncsc  geheimdienst_us_nsa_do_sid_iad  krypto_verschlüsselung_datenträger 
june 2018 by kraven
The NSA Worked to “Track Down” Bitcoin Users, Snowden Documents Reveal
Classified documents provided by whistleblower Edward Snowden show that the National Security Agency worked urgently to target bitcoin users around the world — and wielded at least one mysterious source of information to “help track down senders and receivers of Bitcoins,” according to a top-secret passage in an internal NSA report dating to March 2013. The data source appears to have leveraged the NSA’s ability to harvest and analyze raw, global internet traffic while also exploiting an unnamed software program that purported to offer anonymity to users, according to other documents. The documents indicate that “tracking down” bitcoin users went well beyond closely examining bitcoin’s public transaction ledger, known as the Blockchain, where users are typically referred to through anonymous identifiers; the tracking may also have involved gathering intimate details of these users’ computers. The NSA collected some bitcoin users’ password information, internet activity, and a type of unique device identification number known as a MAC address, a March 29, 2013 NSA memo suggested. In the same document, analysts also discussed tracking internet users’ internet addresses, network ports, and timestamps to identify “BITCOIN Targets.” As of 2013, the NSA’s bitcoin tracking was achieved through program code-named OAKSTAR, a collection of covert corporate partnerships enabling the agency to monitor communications, including by harvesting internet data as it traveled along fiber optic cables that undergird the internet. Specifically, the NSA targeted bitcoin through MONKEYROCKET, a sub-program of OAKSTAR, which tapped network equipment to gather data from the Middle East, Europe, South America, and Asia, according to classified descriptions. As of spring 2013, MONKEYROCKET was “the sole source of SIGDEV for the BITCOIN Targets,” the March 29, 2013 NSA report stated. At the same time, MONKEYROCKET is also described in the documents as a “non-Western Internet anonymization service” with a “significant user base” in Iran and China, with the program brought online in summer 2012. NSA documents note that although MONKEYROCKET works by tapping an unspecified “foreign” fiber cable site, and that data is then forwarded to the agency’s European Technical Center in Wiesbaden, Germany, meetings with the corporate partner that made MONKEYROCKET possible sometimes took place in Virginia. The source of the bitcoin and Liberty Reserve monitoring, MONKEYROCKET, is governed by an overseas surveillance authority known as Executive Order 12333, the language of which is believed to give U.S. law enforcement agencies wide latitude to use the intelligence when investigating U.S. citizens.
intercept, 20.03.2018
überwachung_int_sigint_comint  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_oakstar_monkeyrocket  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ncsc  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ncsc_thunderisland  geheimdienst_abkommen_ukusa_xks_xkeyscore  datenbank_blockchain  bezahlsystem_anonym_pseudonym  überwachung_identifizierung_itk_nutzer  überwachung_int_finint  internet_vpn  anonymisierung_anti  land_usa  geheimdienst_us_nsa_etc  land_deutschland  us_regierung_eo12333  geheimdienst_us_nsa_upstream  überwachung_itk_inhaltsdaten  überwachung_itk_netzwerkleitung  überwachung_itk_verkehrs_metadaten 
march 2018 by kraven
How to Sabotage Encryption Software (And Not Get Caught)
In a paper titled “Surreptitiously Weakening Cryptographic Systems” [NB:], well-known cryptographer and author Bruce Schneier and researchers from the Universities of Wisconsin and Washington take the spy’s view to the problem of crypto design: What kind of built-in backdoor surveillance works best? The researchers looked at a variety of methods of designing and implementing crypto systems so that they can be exploited by eavesdroppers. The methods ranged from flawed random number generation to leaked secret keys to codebreaking techniques. Then the researchers rated them on variables like undetectability, lack of conspiracy (how much secret dealing it takes to put the backdoor in place), deniability, ease of use, scale, precision and control.
wired, 27.02.2015
geheimdienst_allg_sabotage  geheimdienst_uk_gchq_ptd_arthur  geheimdienst_uk_gchq_edgehill  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ces_bullrun  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ces  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ncsc  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sigint_enabling  itsicherheit_strategie  krypto_analyse  krypto_backdoor  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  uni_us_wisc  uni_us_uw  krypto_rng  krypto_tls  unternehmen_resilient_systems  software_krypto_bitlocker  geheimdienst_polizei_infiltration_tech  itsicherheit_angriff_modell 
march 2015 by kraven
Core Secrets: NSA Saboteurs in China and Germany
The agency’s core secrets are outlined in a 13-page “brief sheet” about Sentry Eagle, an umbrella term that the NSA used to encompass its most sensitive programs “to protect America’s cyberspace.” Sentry Eagle includes six programs: Sentry Hawk (for activities involving computer network exploitation, or spying), Sentry Falcon (computer network defense), Sentry Osprey (cooperation with the CIA and other intelligence agencies), Sentry Raven (breaking encryption systems), Sentry Condor (computer network operations and attacks), and Sentry Owl (collaborations with private companies). One of the most interesting components of the “core secrets” involves an array of clandestine activities in the real world by NSA agents working with their colleagues at the CIA, FBI, and Pentagon. The agency also participates in a variety of “human intelligence” programs that are grouped under the codename Sentry Osprey. According to the description of Sentry Osprey, the NSA “employs its own HUMINT assets (Target Exploitation—TAREX) to support SIGINT operations.” According to a 2012 classification guide describing the program, TAREX “conducts worldwide clandestine Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) close-access operations and overt and clandestine Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations.” The guide states that TAREX personnel are “integrated” into operations conducted by the CIA, FBI, and Defense Intelligence Agency. It adds that TAREX operations include “off net-enabling,” “supply chain-enabling,” and “hardware implant-enabling.” The most controversial revelation in Sentry Eagle might be a fleeting reference to the NSA infiltrating clandestine agents into “commercial entities.” The briefing document states that among Sentry Eagle’s most closely guarded components are “facts related to NSA personnel (under cover), operational meetings, specific operations, specific technology, specific locations and covert communications related to SIGINT enabling with specific commercial entities (A/B/C).” The briefing sheet’s description of Sentry Owl indicates the NSA has previously unknown relationships with foreign companies. According to the document, the agency “works with specific foreign partners (X/Y/Z) and foreign commercial industry entities” to make devices and products “exploitable for SIGINT.” The description of Sentry Hawk, which involves attacks on computer networks, also indicates close ties with foreign as well as American companies. The document states that the NSA “works with U.S. and foreign commercial entities…in the conduct of CNE [Computer Network Exploitation].” The description of Sentry Raven, which focuses on encryption, provides additional confirmation that American companies have helped the NSA by secretly weakening encryption products to make them vulnerable to the agency. The briefing sheet states the NSA “works with specific U.S. commercial entities…to modify U.S manufactured encryption systems to make them exploitable for SIGINT.”
intercept, 11.10.2014
geheimdienst_us_nsa_tao_cna_cne  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sentry_eagle  geheimdienst_us_nsa_pawleys  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_cpa_blarney_ragtime  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_cpa_blarney_mischief  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_cpa_blarney_stereo  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_cpa_blarney_visitor  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_cpa_whipgenie  geheimdienst_abkommen_ukusa_5eyes  geheimdienst_allg_verdeckte_operation  geheimdienst_polizei_zusammenarbeit  geheimdienst_us_army_inscom  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sigint_enabling  geheimdienst_us_dhs  geheimdienst_us_fbi  geheimdienst_us_dia  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ces_bullrun  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ces_longhaul_coralreef  geheimdienst_us_nsa_css_scs_stateroom  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ncsc  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_rampart_m  geheimdienst_us_nsa_upstream  geheimdienst_us_nsa_wealthycluster  geheimdienst_us_nsa_nceur  geheimdienst_allg_sabotage  geheimdienst_allg_spionage  land_usa  land_deutschland  land_europa  unternehmen_allg_itk_netz  überwachung_abhörschnittstelle  überwachung_beschlagnahme_hardware  überwachung_backdoor_hardwa 
october 2014 by kraven
Data Pirates of the Caribbean: The NSA Is Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas
According to documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, the surveillance is part of a top-secret system – code-named SOMALGET – that was implemented without the knowledge or consent of the Bahamian government. SOMALGET is part of a broader NSA program called MYSTIC. But while MYSTIC scrapes mobile networks for so-called “metadata” – information that reveals the time, source, and destination of calls – SOMALGET is a cutting-edge tool that enables the NSA to vacuum up and store the actual content of every conversation in an entire country. In March, The Washington Post revealed that the NSA had developed the capability to record and store an entire nation’s phone traffic for 30 days [NB:]. Documents show that the NSA has been generating intelligence reports from MYSTIC surveillance in the Bahamas, Mexico, Kenya, the Philippines, and one other country, which The Intercept is not naming in response to specific, credible concerns that doing so could lead to increased violence. SOMALGET provides the massive amounts of storage needed to archive all those calls so that analysts can listen to them at will after the fact [NB: Bullshit, NCSC CP "Provider"/LI company, censored by Intercept]. SOMALGET’s capabilities are further detailed in a May 2012 memo written by an official in the NSA’s International Crime and Narcotics division. Rather than simply making “tentative analytic conclusions derived from metadata,” the memo notes, analysts can follow up on hunches by going back in time and listening to phone calls recorded during the previous month. The documents don’t spell out how the NSA has been able to tap the phone calls of an entire country [NB: Bullshit ->]. Countries like the Bahamas don’t install lawful intercepts on their own. With the adoption of international standards, a thriving market has emerged for private firms that are contracted by foreign governments to install and maintain lawful intercept equipment. The proliferation of private contractors has apparently provided the NSA with direct access to foreign phone networks. According to the documents, MYSTIC draws its data from “collection systems” that were overtly installed on the telecommunications systems of targeted countries, apparently by corporate “partners” cooperating with the NSA. The classified 2013 intelligence budget also describes MYSTIC as using “partner-enabled” access to both cellular and landline phone networks. The NSA documents don’t specify who is providing access in the Bahamas. But they do describe SOMALGET as an “umbrella term” for systems provided by a private firm, which is described elsewhere in the documents as a “MYSTIC access provider.” (The documents don’t name the firm, but rather refer to a cover name that The Intercept has agreed not to publish in response to a specific, credible concern that doing so could lead to violence.) The behemoth NSA contractor General Dynamics is directly involved in both MYSTIC and SOMALGET. According to documents, the firm has an eight-year, $51 million contract to process “all MYSTIC data and data for other NSA accesses” at a facility in Annapolis Junction, Maryland, down the road from NSA’s headquarters. In the Philippines, MYSTIC collects “GSM, Short Message Service (SMS) and Call Detail Records” via access provided by a “DSD asset in a Philippine provider site.” The operation in Kenya is “sponsored” by the CIA, according to the documents, and collects “GSM metadata with the potential for content at a later date.” The Mexican operation is likewise sponsored by the CIA. SOMALGET operates under Executive Order 12333.
intercept, 19.05.2014
geheimdienst_us_nsa_ncsc  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_cpa  geheimdienst_us_cia  geheimdienst_us_dea_sod  geheimdienst_au_dsd_asd  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_retrospective  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_somalget_scalawag  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_eveningeasel  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_duskpallet  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_acidwash  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_venator  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_laundromat  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_lockstock  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_somalget_oilyrag  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_somalget_lollygag  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_somalget_basecoat  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_rancidrinse  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_permanentpress  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_etchingspin  geheimdienst_us_jitf  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_ec  geheimdienst_us_nsa_mrsoc  geheimdienst_us_nsa_icn  datenanalyse_echtzeit  datenanalyse_audio  geheimdienst_abkommen_ukusa_5eyes  geheimdienst_allg_verdeckte_operation  geheimdienst_polizei_datenaustausch  geheimdienst_polizei_zusammenarbeit  land_us 
may 2014 by kraven
OpenSSL mit kaputter Hintertür
Die Open-Source-Bibliothek für Krypto-Funktionen OpenSSL enthält auch eine Implementierung des Pseudo-Zufallszahlen-Generators "Dual EC DRBG" – das ist der mit der NSA-Backdoor. Dummerweise enthielt diese Implementierung einen Fehler, der dazu führt, dass die Funktion keine Zufallszahlen ausspuckt, sondern nur einen Fehler. Der Generator hat also über Jahre hinweg nie funktioniert – und niemand hat es gemerkt, weil niemand ihn verwendet hat. Bei OpenSSL wurde Dual EC DRBG für einen ungenannten Sponsor eingebaut, der die komplette Umsetzung des NIST-Zufallszahlen-Standards SP800-90A (PDF) beaufragte. Er war jedoch nie voreingestellt.
heise, 26.12.2013
krypto_rng  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ces_bullrun  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ncsc  überwachung_backdoor_software  software_krypto_openssl 
december 2013 by kraven
Secret contract tied NSA and security industry pioneer
Documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden show that the NSA created and promulgated a flawed formula for generating random numbers to create a "back door" in encryption products, the New York Times reported in September. Reuters later reported that RSA became the most important distributor of that formula by rolling it into a software tool called Bsafe that is used to enhance security in personal computers and many other products. Undisclosed until now was that RSA received $10 million in a deal that set the NSA formula as the preferred, or default, method for number generation in the BSafe software, according to two sources familiar with the contract. Although that sum might seem paltry, it represented more than a third of the revenue that the relevant division at RSA had taken in during the entire previous year, securities filings show. RSA, now a subsidiary of computer storage giant EMC Corp, urged customers to stop using the NSA formula after the Snowden disclosures revealed its weakness [NB:].
reuters, 20.12.2013
geheimdienst_us_nsa_ces_bullrun  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ncsc  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  krypto_backdoor  krypto_bibliothek_bsafe  unternehmen_rsa_emc_corp  land_usa  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sigint_enabling  krypto_rng  überwachung_backdoor_software  unternehmen_allg_desinformation_propaganda 
december 2013 by kraven
N.S.A. Report Outlined Goals for More Power
In a February 2012 paper laying out the four-year strategy for the N.S.A.’s signals intelligence operations [NB:], which include the agency’s eavesdropping and communications data collection around the world, agency officials set an objective to “aggressively pursue legal authorities and a policy framework mapped more fully to the information age.” Written as an agency mission statement with broad goals, the five-page document said that existing American laws were not adequate to meet the needs of the N.S.A. to conduct broad surveillance in what it cited as “the golden age of Sigint,” or signals intelligence. The N.S.A. document, titled “Sigint Strategy 2012-2016,” does not make clear what legal or policy changes the agency might seek. Agency leaders believe that the N.S.A. has never enjoyed such a target-rich environment as it does now because of the global explosion of digital information — and they want to make certain that they can dominate “the Sigint battle space” in the future, the document said.

The document also mentioned a goal of integrating the agency’s eavesdropping and data collection systems into a national network of sensors that interactively “sense, respond and alert one another at machine speed.” One of the agency’s other four-year goals was to “share bulk data” more broadly to allow for better analysis. Other N.S.A. documents offer hints of how the agency is trying to do just that. One program, code-named Treasure Map, provides what a secret N.S.A. PowerPoint presentation describes as “a near real-time, interactive map of the global Internet.” According to the undated PowerPoint presentation, disclosed by Mr. Snowden, Treasure Map gives the N.S.A. “a 300,000 foot view of the Internet.” Relying on Internet routing data, commercial and Sigint information, Treasure Map is a sophisticated tool, one that the PowerPoint presentation describes as a “massive Internet mapping, analysis and exploration engine.” It collects Wi-Fi network and geolocation data, and between 30 million and 50 million unique Internet provider addresses — code that can reveal the location and owner of a computer, mobile device or router — are represented each day on Treasure Map, according to the document. It boasts that the program can map “any device, anywhere, all the time.” The program takes advantage of the capabilities of other secret N.S.A. programs. To support Treasure Map, for example, the document states that another program, called Packaged Goods, tracks the “traceroutes” through which data flows around the Internet. Through Packaged Goods, the N.S.A. has gained access to “13 covered servers in unwitting data centers around the globe,” according to the PowerPoint.
new york times, 23.11.2013
geheimdienst_us_nsa_ces  geheimdienst_us_nsa_gao  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sigint_enabling  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_cpa  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ncsc  krypto_analyse  krypto_entschlüsselung  geheimdienst_allg_spionage  land_usa  sicherheitsarchitektur  software_benutzeroberfläche  tech_computing_ubiquitous  us_cnci  geheimdienst_allg_desinformation  überwachung_fingerprint_hardware  überwachung_fingerprint_software  überwachung_identifizierung_itk_nutzer  überwachung_internet_trafficanalyse  überwachung_int_sigint_comint  überwachung_massenkontrolle  überwachung_abhörsystem_us_tia  überwachung_sensor_netzwerk  geheimdienst_us_nsa_treasure_map  geheimdienst_us_nsa_packaged_goods  staat_politik_sicherheit  geheimdienst_us_nsa_tao_cna_cne  überwachung_netzwerk_topologie  krypto_crypto_war  geheimdienst_us_dhs_nsa_einstein_ncps  geheimdienst_polizei_infiltration_tech  us_darpa_plan_x  itsicherheit_angriff_modell_globalerangreifer 
november 2013 by kraven
Revealed: how US and UK spy agencies defeat internet privacy and security
US and British intelligence agencies have successfully cracked much of the online encryption relied upon by hundreds of millions of people to protect the privacy of their personal data, online transactions and emails, according to top-secret documents revealed by former contractor Edward Snowden. The files show that the National Security Agency and its UK counterpart GCHQ have broadly compromised the guarantees that internet companies have given consumers to reassure them that their communications, online banking and medical records would be indecipherable to criminals or governments. The agencies, the documents reveal, have adopted a battery of methods in their systematic and ongoing assault on what they see as one of the biggest threats to their ability to access huge swathes of internet traffic – "the use of ubiquitous encryption across the internet".
guardian, 05.09.2013
anonymisierung_anti  geheimdienst_allg_verdeckte_operation  geheimdienst_us_nsa_csc  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ces  geheimdienst_us_nsa_css_scs  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sigint_enabling  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ncsc  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  krypto_backdoor  krypto_entschlüsselung  krypto_analyse  krypto_tls  krypto_verschlüsselung_datenträger  krypto_verschlüsselung_kommunikation  krypto_verschlüsselung_transport  krypto_ipsec  krypto_regulierung  tech_computing_trusted  krypto_ssh  internet_vpn  unternehmen_allg_itk_netz  geheimdienst_uk_gchq_edgehill  land_uk  land_usa  software_propietär_closed  tech_computing_mobil  überwachung_abhörschnittstelle  überwachung_int_sigint_comint  überwachung_internet_cloud  überwachung_int_osint_socmint  überwachung_internet_email  überwachung_internet_p2p  überwachung_itk_inhaltsdaten  überwachung_massenkontrolle  überwachung_mobilfunk  überwachung_onlinedurchsuchung  überwachung_quellen_tkü  internet_wlan  internet_ngn_ngx  krypto_srtp  krypto_zrtp  krypto_pptp  geheim 
september 2013 by kraven
The NSA's Secret Campaign to Crack, Undermine Internet Encryption
The National Security Agency is winning its long-running secret war on encryption, using supercomputers, technical trickery, court orders and behind-the-scenes persuasion to undermine the major tools protecting the privacy of everyday communications in the Internet age, according to newly disclosed documents. The agency has circumvented or cracked much of the encryption, or digital scrambling, that guards global commerce and banking systems, protects sensitive data like trade secrets and medical records, and automatically secures the e-mails, Web searches, Internet chats and phone calls of Americans and others around the world, the documents show. Many users assume — or have been assured by Internet companies — that their data is safe from prying eyes, including those of the government, and the N.S.A. wants to keep it that way. The agency treats its recent successes in deciphering protected information as among its most closely guarded secrets, restricted to those cleared for a highly classified program code-named Bullrun, according to the documents, provided by Edward J. Snowden, the former N.S.A. contractor.
pro publica / new york times, 05.09.2013
anonymisierung_anti  geheimdienst_allg_verdeckte_operation  geheimdienst_us_nsa_csc  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ces  geheimdienst_us_nsa_css_scs  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sigint_enabling  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ncsc  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  krypto_backdoor  krypto_entschlüsselung  krypto_analyse  krypto_tls  krypto_verschlüsselung_datenträger  krypto_verschlüsselung_kommunikation  krypto_verschlüsselung_transport  krypto_ipsec  krypto_regulierung  tech_computing_trusted  krypto_ssh  internet_vpn  unternehmen_allg_itk_netz  geheimdienst_uk_gchq_edgehill  land_uk  land_usa  software_propietär_closed  tech_computing_mobil  tech_router_isp  überwachung_abhörschnittstelle  überwachung_int_sigint_comint  überwachung_internet_cloud  überwachung_int_osint_socmint  überwachung_internet_email  überwachung_internet_p2p  überwachung_itk_inhaltsdaten  überwachung_massenkontrolle  überwachung_mobilfunk  überwachung_onlinedurchsuchung  überwachung_quellen_tkü  internet_wlan  internet_ngn_ngx  krypto_srtp  krypto_zrtp  kr 
september 2013 by kraven

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anonymisierung_anti  bezahlsystem_anonym_pseudonym  datenanalyse_audio  datenanalyse_echtzeit  datenanalyse_graph_sna  datenanalyse_raster_muster  datenbank_blockchain  datenschutz_niveau_senkung  geheimdienst_abkommen_ukusa_5eyes  geheimdienst_abkommen_ukusa_xks_xkeyscore  geheimdienst_allg_desinformation  geheimdienst_allg_sabotage  geheimdienst_allg_spionage  geheimdienst_allg_unternehmen_tarnfirma  geheimdienst_allg_verdeckte_operation  geheimdienst_au_dsd_asd  geheimdienst_polizei_datenaustausch  geheimdienst_polizei_infiltration_tech  geheimdienst_polizei_tarnung_undercover  geheimdienst_polizei_zusammenarbeit  geheimdienst_uk_gchq_cheesyname  geheimdienst_uk_gchq_edgehill  geheimdienst_uk_gchq_hot  geheimdienst_uk_gchq_ptd_arthur  geheimdienst_us_army_inscom  geheimdienst_us_cia  geheimdienst_us_cia_do_ncs  geheimdienst_us_dea_sod  geheimdienst_us_dhs  geheimdienst_us_dhs_nsa_einstein_ncps  geheimdienst_us_dia  geheimdienst_us_fbi  geheimdienst_us_fbi_otd_ecsu_ditu  geheimdienst_us_jitf  geheimdienst_us_nsa_cao_tao  geheimdienst_us_nsa_cao_tarex  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ces  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ces_bullrun  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ces_longhaul_coralreef  geheimdienst_us_nsa_csc  geheimdienst_us_nsa_css_scs  geheimdienst_us_nsa_css_scs_stateroom  geheimdienst_us_nsa_do_sid_iad  geheimdienst_us_nsa_etc  geheimdienst_us_nsa_gao  geheimdienst_us_nsa_icn  geheimdienst_us_nsa_mrsoc  geheimdienst_us_nsa_nceur  geheimdienst_us_nsa_ncsc_thunderisland  geheimdienst_us_nsa_packaged_goods  geheimdienst_us_nsa_pawleys  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sentry_eagle  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sigint_enabling  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_cpa  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_cpa_blarney_mischief  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_cpa_blarney_ragtime  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_cpa_blarney_stereo  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_cpa_blarney_visitor  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_cpa_whipgenie  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_ec  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_lockstock  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_acidwash  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_duskpallet  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_etchingspin  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_eveningeasel  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_laundromat  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_permanentpress  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_rancidrinse  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_retrospective  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_somalget_basecoat  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_somalget_lollygag  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_somalget_oilyrag  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_somalget_scalawag  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_mystic_venator  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_oakstar_monkeyrocket  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_rampart_i  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_rampart_m  geheimdienst_us_nsa_sso_rampart_x  geheimdienst_us_nsa_tao_cna_cne  geheimdienst_us_nsa_treasure_map  geheimdienst_us_nsa_turbulence_turmoil  geheimdienst_us_nsa_upstream  geheimdienst_us_nsa_wealthycluster  internet_dienst_anbieter  internet_ngn_ngx  internet_regulierung  internet_vpn  internet_wlan  internet_zugang_anbieter  itsicherheit_angriff_modell  itsicherheit_angriff_modell_globalerangreifer  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  itsicherheit_strategie  krypto_algo_simon_speck  krypto_analyse  krypto_backdoor  krypto_bibliothek_bsafe  krypto_crypto_war  krypto_entschlüsselung  krypto_ipsec  krypto_key_escrow  krypto_key_recovery  krypto_passwort  krypto_pki_ca  krypto_pptp  krypto_regulierung  krypto_rng  krypto_srtp  krypto_ssh  krypto_tls  krypto_tls_cert  krypto_verschlüsselung_datenträger  krypto_verschlüsselung_kommunikation  krypto_verschlüsselung_transport  krypto_zrtp  land_australien  land_bahamas  land_deutschland  land_europa  land_kenia  land_mexiko  land_philippinen  land_uk  land_usa  medien_presse_gatekeeperfilter  medien_presse_intercept  militär_allg_kriegsführung_elektro_it_ki  militär_us_cyber_command_jtfgno  militär_us_cyber_command_jtfngo  militär_us_cyber_command_oco_cna_cne  sicherheitsarchitektur  software_benutzeroberfläche  software_krypto_bitlocker  software_krypto_openssl  software_os_linux_kernel_modul  software_propietär_closed  software_zensur_filter  staat_politik_geheimhaltung  staat_politik_sicherheit  staat_propaganda_agenda_setting  staat_propaganda_kriminalität_terrorismus  staat_propaganda_rechtspositivismus  staat_propaganda_sicherheit_going_dark  tech_computing_mobil  tech_computing_trusted  tech_computing_ubiquitous  tech_hw_chip_krypto_tpm  tech_hw_router_home  tech_mobilfunk_lte_ngmn  tech_router_isp  terror_bekämpfung  uni_us_uw  uni_us_wisc  unternehmen_allg_desinformation_propaganda  unternehmen_allg_itk_netz  unternehmen_allg_sicherheit_rüstung  unternehmen_allg_tarnfirma  unternehmen_general_dynamics  unternehmen_resilient_systems  unternehmen_rsa_emc_corp  us_cnci  us_darpa_plan_x  us_ministerium_handel_nist  us_regierung_eo12333  verband_gifct  zensur_infrastruktur  zensur_selbstzensur  überwachung_abhörschnittstelle  überwachung_abhörsystem_us_tia  überwachung_backdoor_hardware  überwachung_backdoor_software  überwachung_beschlagnahme_hardware  überwachung_chat_telefonie_voip  überwachung_fingerprint_hardware  überwachung_fingerprint_software  überwachung_identifizierung_itk_nutzer  überwachung_int_finint  überwachung_int_humint  überwachung_int_osint_socmint  überwachung_int_sigint_comint  überwachung_internet_cloud  überwachung_internet_email  überwachung_internet_mitm  überwachung_internet_mitm_sslproxy  überwachung_internet_p2p  überwachung_internet_trafficanalyse  überwachung_internet_wlan_catcher  überwachung_itk_inhaltsdaten  überwachung_itk_netzwerkleitung  überwachung_itk_verkehrs_metadaten  überwachung_massenkontrolle  überwachung_mobilfunk  überwachung_netzwerk_topologie  überwachung_onlinedurchsuchung  überwachung_quellen_tkü  überwachung_sensor_netzwerk  überwachung_vorratsdaten_itk_inhalt 

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