distribution-wealth   16

Thomas Palley » A Theory of Economic Policy - Lock-in and Lock-out via Hysterisis (WP October 2016)
A Theory of Economic Policy Lock-in and Lock-out via Hysterisis: Rethinking Economists’ Approach to Economic Policy
This paper explores lock-in and lock-out via economic policy. It argues policy decisions may near-irrevocably change the economy’s structure, thereby changing its performance. That causes changed economic outcomes concerning distribution of wealth, income and power, which in turn induces locked-in changes in political outcomes. That is a different way of thinking about policy compared to conventional macroeconomic stabilization theory. The latter treats policy as a dial which is dialed up or down, depending on the economy’s state. Lock-in policy is illustrated by the euro, globalization, and the neoliberal policy experiment. - downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
inequality-wealth  political_economy  inequality  neoliberalism  downloaded  economic_policy  elites-political_influence  distribution-wealth  macroeconomics  paper  path-dependency  business_cycles 
october 2016 by dunnettreader
Maximillian Kasy - Empirical Research on Economic Inequality -- AN OPEN ONLINE TEXTBOOK
AN OPEN ONLINE TEXTBOOK BY MAXIMILIAN KASY -- Welcome to
Empirical Research on Economic Inequality -- This textbook developed out of a class I taught at Harvard, and subsequently at IHS Wien and at the University of Zurich. The purpose of this textbook is twofold. First, to teach you about economic inequality, some of its causes, and how it is affected by policy. Second, to teach you econometric methods that have been used in the literature on economic inequality, so as to help you conduct your own research on these topics.
website  etexts  inequality  inequality-wealth  inequality-opportunity  inequality-global  econometrics  economic_sociology  justice  discrimination  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  gender  racism  1-percent  labor  unions  diversity 
july 2016 by dunnettreader
Ravi Kanbur, Joseph Stiglitz - Wealth and income distribution: New theories needed for a new era | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 18 August 2015
Growth theories traditionally focus on the Kaldor-Kuznets stylised facts. Ravi Kanbur and Nobelist Joe Stiglitz argue that these no longer hold; new theory is needed. The new models need to drop competitive marginal productivity theories of factor returns in favour of rent-generating mechanism and wealth inequality by focusing on the ‘rules of the game.’ They also must model interactions among physical, financial, and human capital that influence the level and evolution of inequality. A third key component will be to capture mechanisms that transmit inequality from generation to generation. -- short and sweet summary of the various gaps in standard models and where both new explanatory and normative work needed -- also see references -- downloaded as pdf to Note
paper  economic_growth  economic_theory  economic_models  capital  productivity-labor_share  production  macroeconomics  distribution-wealth  distribution-income  inequality  inequality-wealth  labor_share  wages  inequality-opportunity  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
David Millon - The Single Constituency Argument in the Economic Analysis of Business Law :: SSRN - Jan 2007
David Millon, Washington and Lee University - School of Law -- Research in Law and Economics, 2007 -- Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-01 -- The essay points out an interesting parallel in law-and-economics business law scholarship. Working largely independently of each other, economically oriented scholars working in different areas have argued that the law should focus on the interests of a single constituency - shareholders in corporate law, creditors in bankruptcy law, and consumers in antitrust law. Economic analysts thus have rejected arguments advanced by progressive scholars working in each of these areas that the law should instead concern itself with the full range of constituencies affected by business activity. The law-and-economics single constituency claim rests in part on skepticism about judicial competence but the underlying objection is to the use of law for redistributive purposes. The primary value is efficiency, defined in terms of market-generated outcomes. In this essay, I question this political commitment, suggesting that it implies a strong tendency toward maintenance of the existing distribution of wealth. Even more importantly, the single constituency claim may actually have redistributive implications. In each of these areas of business law, however, it is a regressive program that favors owners of capital against those who are generally less well of, such as workers and small business owners. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 31 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  political_philosophy  political_economy  law-and-economics  conflict_of_interest  principal-agent  profit_maximization  incentives  incentives-distortions  efficiency  shareholder_value  creditors  consumers  consumer_protection  competition  status_quo_bias  capital  inequality-wealth  inequality-opportunity  power-asymmetric  capital_as_power  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  corporate_governance  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  bankruptcy  antitrust  conservative_legal_challenges 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Nick Bunker - Mortgage fraud, income growth, and credit supply | Feb 11, 2015 - Washington Center for Equitable Growth
Earlier this year, a new working paper cast doubt on one of the dominant explanations of the reasons for the 2002-2006 housing bubble in the United States—that growth in mortgage credit and income growth uncoupled as credit flowed to areas to with declining income growth. Instead, economists Manuel Adelino of Duke University, Antoinette Schoar of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Felipe Severino of Dartmouth College, argue that the cause of the increase on household debt was a classic speculative mania. But a new paper by economists Atif Mian of Princeton University and Amir Sufi of the University of Chicago questions this view of the debt build-up. The seeming flaws in the dominant narrative that an increase in the supply of credit caused the bubble, they say, can be explained by one thing: mortgage fraud. -- Bunker links to both papers - didn't download but will follow debate via "House of Debt" blog
paper  21stC  US_economy  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  housing  securitization  capital_markets  mortgages  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  asset_prices  bubbles  fraud  GSEs  bankruptcy  debt  investors  yield  risk  credit  rating_agencies  credit_ratings  speculative_finance  EF-add  from instapaper
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Chuck Marr and Chye-Ching Huang - Obama’s Capital Gains Tax Proposals Would Make Tax Code More Efficient and Fair | Center on Budget and Policy Priorities -Jan 2015
The tax code strongly favors income from capital gains — increases in the value of assets, such as stocks — over income from wages and salaries. These preferences are economically inefficient: they promote tax schemes that convert ordinary income into capital gains and encourage people to hold assets just to escape tax, even if they have better investment opportunities. They are also highly regressive, since capital gains are heavily concentrated at the top of the income scale. The President has proposed to make the tax code more efficient and equitable by reducing one of the biggest subsidies for capital gains (a preferential rate compared to wage and salary income) and largely eliminating another (the ability to avoid capital gains tax completely by holding on to an asset until death). These changes would allow investments to flow to where they are most productive and reduce investment in creating tax avoidance schemes instead of in real economic activity, among other economic benefits. And, because the benefits of the current preferences for capital gains flow overwhelmingly to the top, fully 99 percent of the revenue from the President’s capital gains proposals would come from the top 1 percent of filers, the Treasury Department estimates. -- 7 page report downloaded as pdf to Note
US_economy  US_politics  Obama_administration  taxes  tax_policy  tax_reform  capital  investment  1-percent  inheritance  tax_collection  public_finance  public_policy  trickle-down  incentives  incentives-distortions  distribution-wealth  distribution-income  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Mike Konczal - The 2003 Dividend Tax Cut Did Nothing to Help the Real Economy | Next New Deal January 2015
Pre Obama proposal to reverse part of Bush tax cuts - Berkeley economist Danny Yagan’s fantastic new paper, “Capital Tax Reform and the Real Economy: The Effects of the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut” -- He uses a large amount of IRS data on corporate tax returns to compare S-corporations with C-corporations. C-corps are publicly-traded, S-corps are closely held without institutional investors. But they are largely comparable in the range Yagan looks at (between $1 million and $1 billion dollars in size), as they are competing in the same industries and locations. -- S-corps don’t pay a dividend tax and thus didn’t benefit from the big 2003 dividend tax cut, while C-corps do pay them and did benefit. So that allows Yagan to set up S-corps as a control group and see what the effect of the massive dividend tax cut on C-corporations has been. -- [Yagan finds no difference in things we want to encourage] -- The one thing that does increase for C-corps of course, is the disgorgement of cash to shareholders -- an increase in dividends and share buybacks. This shows that these corps are responding to the tax cut; they just happen to be decisions that benefit, well, probably not you. If right now you are worried that too much cash is leaving firms to benefit a handful of investors while the real economy stagnates, suddenly Clinton-era levels of dividend taxation don’t look so bad. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  US_economy  US_politics  21stC  taxes  corporate_finance  corporate_tax  capital  dividends  investment  shareholders  investors  GOP  shareholder_value  tax_policy  tax_reform  supply-side  trickle-down  Obama_administration  Bush_administration  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  1-percent  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Full transcript: President Obama, Dec 4 2013 - Inequality and rolling back Reagan Revolution | The Washington Post
But starting in the late ‘70s, this social compact began to unravel.Technology made it easier for companies to do more with less, eliminating certain job occupations. A more competitive world led companies ship jobs anyway. And as good manufacturing jobs automated or headed offshore, workers lost their leverage; jobs paid less and offered fewer benefits. As values of community broke down and competitive pressure increased, businesses lobbied Washington to weaken unions and the value of the minimum wage. As the trickle-down ideology became more prominent, taxes were slashes for the wealthiest while investments in things that make us all richer, like schools and infrastructure, were allowed to wither. And for a certain period of time we could ignore this weakening economic foundation, in part because more families were relying on two earners, as women entered the workforce. We took on more debt financed by juiced-up housing market. But when the music stopped and the crisis hit, millions of families were stripped of whatever cushion they had left. And the result is an economy that’s become profoundly unequal and families that are more insecure. (..) it is harder today for a child born here in America to improve her station in life than it is for children in most of our wealthy allies, countries like Canada or Germany or France. They have greater mobility than we do, not less.(..) The combined trends of increased inequality and decreasing mobility pose a fundamental threat to the American dream, our way of life and what we stand for around the globe. And it is not simply a moral claim that I’m making here. There are practical consequences to rising inequality and reduced mobility. -- downloaded as pdf to Note
speech  Obama  inequality  supply-side  labor_share  business-ethics  norms  norms-business  morality-conventional  morality-Christian  utilitarianism  globalization  technology  US_foreign_policy  US_economy  US_politics  US_society  US_government  US_history  common_good  civic_virtue  economic_growth  economic_culture  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  unemployment  health_care  public_goods  public_opinion  public_policy  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Adelino, Schoar, and Severino - Changes in Buyer Composition and the Expansion of Credit During the Boom :: SSRN - Jan 2015
Manuel Adelino, Duke University, Fuqua School of Business -- Antoinette Schoar, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) -- Felipe Severino, Dartmouth College,Tuck School of Business -- Earlier research has suggested that distortions in the supply of mortgage credit during the run up to the 2008 financial crisis, in particular a decoupling of credit flow from income growth, may have been responsible for the rise in house prices and the subsequent collapse of the housing market. Focusing on individual mortgage transactions rather than whole zip codes, we show that the apparent decoupling of credit from income shown in previous research was driven by changes in buyer composition. In fact, the relationship between individual mortgage size and income growth during the housing boom was very similar to previous periods (..). Zip codes that had large house price increases experienced significant changes in the composition of buyers, i.e. home buyers (mortgage applicants) had increasingly higher income than the average residents in an area. Poorer areas saw an expansion of credit mostly through the extensive margin, i.e. a larger numbers of mortgages originated, but at DTI levels in line with borrower income. When we break out the volume of mortgage origination from 2002 to 2006 by income deciles across the US population, we see that the distribution of mortgage debt is concentrated in middle and high income borrowers, not the poor. Middle and high income borrowers also contributed most significantly to the increase in defaults after 2007. These results are consistent with an interpretation where house price expectations led lenders and buyers to buy into an unfolding bubble based on inflated asset values, rather than a change in the lending technology. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  housing  securitization  capital_markets  mortgages  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  asset_prices  bubbles  bad_economics  bad_history  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Andrew Sprung - Reagan Revolution rollback | xpostfactoid - Jan 2015
Thanks largely to Piketty it's become increasingly clear that in the Reagan Revolution, middle class America sold its birthright for a mess of supply-side pottage. Dems willingness to credit GOP dogma -- raising taxes on high incomes and investment gains inhibits growth, deregulation spurs it -- are melting away. Post midterm losses, Dems are beginning to heighten rather than soft-pedal the policy contrasts between the parties. Wounded politically by perceptions that the ACA helps the poor at the expense of working people, they are looking for proposals attractive to the middle class. Emboldened by accelerating growth and employment gains, they are perhaps shedding inhibitions about leveling the playing field between workers and management. (..)To mess up my timeline a bit, Obama delivered a Pikettian narrative in Dec 2013 ..should have been a landmark speech on inequality (..) if he (and Dems) hadn't (tried to) protect their Senate majority. [In the Dec 2013 soeech] Obama zeroed in on policy choices. "As values of community broke down and competitive pressure increased, businesses lobbied Washington to weaken unions and the value of the minimum wage. As the trickle-down ideology became more prominent, taxes were slashes for the wealthiest while investments in things that make us all richer, like schools and infrastructure, were allowed to wither. And for a certain period of time we could ignore this weakening economic foundation (..) But when the music stopped and the crisis hit, millions of families were stripped of whatever cushion they had left. And the result is an economy that’s become profoundly unequal and families that are more insecure. -- terrific links roundup
US_economy  US_politics  Obama  Obama_administration  Reagan  supply-side  trickle-down  neoliberalism  inequality  middle_class  wages  wages-minimum  labor  labor_law  labor_share  labor_standards  Labor_markets  investment  executive_compensation  1-percent  infrastructure  education  education-higher  civic_virtue  common_good  Piketty  economic_growth  economic_culture  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  unemployment  health_care  public_goods  public_opinion  public_policy  elections  political_culture  political_economy  political_discourse  political_participation  Pocket 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Nitzan, Jonathan - From Olson to Veblen: The Stagflationary Rise of Distributional Coalitions (1992) | bnarchives
Paper read at the annual meeting of the History of Economics Society. Fairfax, Virginia. 1-2 June (1992). pp. 1-75. -- This essay deals with the relationship between stagflation and the process of restructuring. The literature dealing with the interaction of stagnation and inflation is invariably based on some explicit or implicit assumptions about economic structure, but there are very few writings which concentrate specifically on the link between the macroeconomic phenomenon of stagflation and the process of structural change. Of the few who dealt with this issue, we have chosen to focus mainly on two important contributors – Mancur Olson and Thorstein Veblen. The first based his theory on neoclassical principles, attempting to demonstrate their universality across time and place. The second was influenced by the historical school and concentrated specifically on the institutional features of modern capitalism. Despite the fundamental differences in their respective frameworks, both writers arrive at a similar conclusion, namely, that the phenomenon of stagflation is inherent in the dynamic evolution of collective economic action, particularly in the rise and consolidation of 'distributional coalitions.' -- Keywords: absentee ownership, intangible assets, big business, bonds, capital, accumulation, capitalism, collective action, collusion, corporation, credit, degree of monopoly, distributional coalitions, excess capacity, finance, immaterial wealth, income distribution, industry, inflation, institutions, interest, labour, liabilities, machine process, material wealth, neoclassical economics, normal rate of return, power, price, profit, productivity, property, sabotage, scarcity, stagnation, stagflation, stocks, tangible assets, technology, United States, value
paper  US_economy  economic_history  economic_theory  institutional_economics  Veblen  political_economy  Olson_Mancur  public_choice  collective_action  capital  capitalism  power  power-asymmetric  business-and-politics  interest_groups  interest_rates  interest_rate-natural  profit  corporate_ownership  managerialism  industry  production  productivity  productivity-labor_share  sabotage-by_business  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  wealth  asset_prices  financial_system  credit  competition  monopolies  oligopoly  prices  inflation  stagnation  property  technology  capital_markets  antitrust  neoclassical_economics  change-economic  change-social  levels_of_analyis  mesolevel  microfoundations  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Jonathan Nitzan - Global Capital: Political Economy of Capitalist Power (YorkU, Graduate Seminar, Fall Term, 2014-15) | bnarchives
The seminar has two related goals: substantive and pedagogical. The substantive purpose is to tackle the question of capital head on. The course explores a spectrum of liberal and Marxist theories, ideologies and dogmas – as well as a radical alternative to these views. The argument is developed theoretically, historically and empirically. The first part of the seminar provides a critical overview of political economy, examining its historical emergence, triumph and eventual demise. The second part deals with the two ‘materialistic’ schools of capital – the liberal theory of utility and the Marxist theory of labour time – dissecting their structure, strengths and limitations. The third part brings power back in: it analyses the relation between accumulation and sabotage, studies the institutions of the corporation and the state and introduces a new framework – the capitalist mode of power. The final part offers an alternative approach – the theory of capital as power – and illustrates how this approach can shed light on conflict-ridden processes such as corporate merger, stagflation, imperialism and Middle East wars. Pedagogically, the seminar seeks to prepare students toward conducting their own independent re-search. Students are introduced to various electronic data sources, instructed in different methods of analysis and tutored in developing their empirical research skills. As the seminar progresses, these skills are used both to assess various theories and to develop the students’ own theoretical/empirical research projects. -- Keywords: arms accumulation capital capitalism conflict corporation crisis distribution elite energy finance globalization growth imperialism GPE liberalism Marxism military Mumford national interest neoclassical neoliberalism oil ownership peace power profit ruling class security stagflation state stock market technology TNC Veblen violence war -- syllabus and session handouts downloaded pdf to Note
bibliography  syllabus  capital_as_power  international_political_economy  political_economy  economic_theory  liberalism  neoliberalism  neoclassical_economics  Keynesian  Marxist  capital  capitalism  social_theory  power-asymmetric  globalization  financial_system  financial_regulation  risk-systemic  international_finance  finance_capital  financialization  production  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  inequality  MNCs  corporations  corporate_finance  corporate_ownership  corporate_control_markets  economic_growth  economic_models  imperialism  military  military-industrial_complex  IR_theory  ruling_class  class_conflict  energy  energy-markets  MENA  accumulation  accumulation-differential  capital_markets  public_finance  profit  investment  technology  elite_culture  elites-self-destructive  capitalism-systemic_crisis  Veblen  Mumford  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Nitzan, Jonathan - LSE Public Event: Can Capitalists Afford Recovery? -- Video and Paper (May 2014) | bnarchives
Presentation at the LSE Department of International Relations. 27 May 2014. -- Theorists and policymakers from all directions and of all persuasions remain obsessed with the prospect of recovery. For mainstream economists, the key question is how to bring about such a recovery. For heterodox political economists, the main issue is whether sustained growth is possible to start with. But there is a prior question that nobody seems to ask: can capitalists afford recovery in the first place? If we think of capital not as means of production but as a mode of power, we find that accumulation thrives not on growth and investment, but on unemployment and stagnation. And if accumulation depends on crisis, why should capitalists want to see a recovery? -- Video duration: 2:24 hours -- Keywords: crisis, differential accumulation, economic policy, economic theory, expectations, growth, income distribution, Keynesianism, Marxism, monetarism, neoclassical economics, profit, underconsumption -- Subjects: BN State & Government, BN Power, BN Region - North America, BN Business Enterprise, BN Value & Price, BN Crisis, BN Production, BN Macro, BN Conflict & Violence, BN Money & Finance, BN Ideology, BN Distribution, BN Methodology, BN Capital & Accumulation, BN Policy, BN Class, BN Labour, BN Growth -- links to LSE on YouTube -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  video  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  economic_growth  capital_as_power  capitalism-systemic_crisis  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  Keynesian  Marxist  monetarism  monetary_policy  fiscal_policy  austerity  sovereign_debt  public_finance  public_policy  productivity  production  consumer_demand  underconsumption  investment  profit  productivity-labor_share  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  finance_capital  financialization  capitalization  accumulation  accumulation-differential  elites-self-destructive  elite_culture  ruling_class  class_conflict  Labor_markets  inequality  unemployment 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Hyeng-Joon Park - Korea’s Post-1997 Restructuring: An Analysis of Capital as Power | forthcoming in Review of Radical Political Economics (2015) pp. 1-44 | bnarchives
This paper aims to transcend current debates on Korea’s post-1997 restructuring, which rely on a dichotomy between domestic industrial capital and foreign financial capital, by adopting Nitzan and Bichler’s capital-as-power perspective. Based on this approach, the paper analyzes Korea’s recent political economic restructuring as the latest phase in the evolution of capitalist power and its transformative regimes of capital accumulation. -- Keywords: differential accumulation dominant capital chaebols transnationalization strategic sabotage -- Subjects: BN State & Government, BN Institutions, BN Power, BN International & Global, BN Region - Asia, BN Business Enterprise, BN Value & Price, BN Crisis, BN Production, BN Conflict & Violence, BN Money & Finance, BN Distribution, BN Comparative, BN Capital & Accumulation, BN Policy, BN Class, BN Labour, BN Growth -- downloaded from author's blog to Note
article  international_political_economy  capital_as_power  globalization  Korea  East_Asia  20thC  21stC  economic_history  1990s  2000s  2010s  Asian_crisis  Asia_Pacific  international_finance  FDI  finance_capital  financialization  emerging_markets  oligopoly  chaebols  crony_capitalism  industry  production  capitalism  capitalism-systemic_crisis  capitalization  accumulation  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  cross-border  trade  productivity-labor_share  class_conflict  labor_share  Labor_markets  unions  violence  economic_growth  sabotage-by_business  business-and-politics  business-norms  power-asymmetric  public_policy  public_goods  corporate_finance  corporate_ownership  investment  banking  political_culture  economic_culture  economic_reform  economic_policy  democracy  opposition  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal - Surviving Large Losses: Financial Crises, the Middle Class, and the Development of Capital Markets (2009) | Harvard University Press
Since they're experts on especially French economic history from the 17thC onwards, the political economy approach should be interesting. **--** 1. The Political Economy of Financial Crises. -- 2. Information and Crises. -- 3. Crises and the Middle Class. -- 4. What Happens after Crises. -- 5. Financial Intermediaries and the Demand for Change. -- 6. Governments and the Demand for Reform. -- Conclusion: The Lessons of History
books  kindle-available  economic_history  economic_policy  political_economy  financial_system  financial_crisis  financial_sector_development  capital_markets  banking  middle_class  leverage  debtors  creditors  sovereign_debt  reform-economic  reform-political  distribution-wealth 
september 2014 by dunnettreader

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