cyber_warfare   155

« earlier    

Russian General Pitches ‘Information’ Operations as a Form of War - The New York Times
By Andrew E. Kramer
March 2, 2019

MOSCOW — The chief of Russia’s armed forces endorsed on Saturday the kind of tactics used by his country to intervene abroad, repeating a philosophy of so-called hybrid war that has earned him notoriety in the West, especially among American officials who have accused Russia of election meddling in 2016.
cyber_warfare  information_warfare  Russia  security_&_intelligence 
7 weeks ago by jerryking
Japan gears up for mega hack of its own citizens
February 5, 2019 | Financial Times | by Leo Lewis.

Yoshitaka Sakurada, Japan’s 68-year-old minister for cyber security, stands ready to press the button next week on an unprecedented hack of 200m internet enabled devices across Japan — a genuinely imaginative, epically-scaled and highly controversial government cyber attack on homes and businesses designed as an empirical test of the nation’s vulnerability. A new law, fraught with public contention over constitutionally-guaranteed privacy, was passed last May and has just come into effect to give the government the right to perform the hack and make this experiment possible. The scope for government over-reach, say critics, cannot be overstated. Webcams, routers and other devices will be targeted in the attacks, which will primarily establish what proportion have no password protection at all, or one that can be easily guessed. At best, say cyber security experts at FireEye, the experiment could rip through corporate Japan’s complacency and elevate security planning from the IT department to the C-suite.

The experiment, which will run for five years and is being administered through the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, is intended to focus on devices that fall into the broadly-defined category of “internet of things” (IoT) — anything from a yoga mat that informs a smartphone of your contortions, to remotely controlled factory robots. And while cyber experts say IoT security may not be the very top priority in the fight against cyber crime and cyber warfare, they see good reasons why Japan has chosen to make its stand here.....warnings that the rise of IoT will create a vast new front of vulnerability unless the security of, for example, a web-enabled yoga mat is taken as seriously by both manufacturers and users as the security of a banking website. The big cyber security consultancies, along with various governments, have historically relied on a range of gauges to calculate the scale of the problem. The Japanese government’s own National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT) uses scans of the dark web to estimate that, of the cyber attacks it detected in 2017, 54 per cent targeted IoT devices.
C-suite  cyberattacks  cyber_security  cyber_warfare  dark_web  experimentation  hacks  Industrial_Internet  Japan  overreach  preparation  privacy  readiness  testing  vulnerabilities  white_hat 
10 weeks ago by jerryking
The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate U.S. Companies - Bloomberg
October 4, 2018, 5:00 AM EDTILLUSTRATOR: SCOTT GELBER FOR BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
By and October 4, 2018, 5:00 AM EDT

In 2015, Amazon.com Inc. began quietly evaluating a startup called Elemental Technologies, a potential acquisition to help with a major expansion of its streaming video service, known today as Amazon Prime Video. Based in Portland, Ore., Elemental made software for compressing massive video files and formatting them for different devices. Its technology had helped stream the Olympic Games online, communicate with the International Space Station, and funnel drone footage to the Central Intelligence Agency. Elemental’s national security contracts weren’t the main reason for the proposed acquisition, but they fit nicely with Amazon’s government businesses, such as the highly secure cloud that Amazon Web Services (AWS) was building for the CIA......investigators determined that the chips allowed the attackers to create a stealth doorway into any network that included the altered machines. Multiple people familiar with the matter say investigators found that the chips had been inserted at factories run by manufacturing subcontractors in China.

This attack was something graver than the software-based incidents the world has grown accustomed to seeing. Hardware hacks are more difficult to pull off and potentially more devastating, promising the kind of long-term, stealth access that spy agencies are willing to invest millions of dollars and many years to get.......Over the decades, the security of the supply chain became an article of faith despite repeated warnings by Western officials. A belief formed that China was unlikely to jeopardize its position as workshop to the world by letting its spies meddle in its factories. That left the decision about where to build commercial systems resting largely on where capacity was greatest and cheapest. “You end up with a classic Satan’s bargain,” one former U.S. official says. “You can have less supply than you want and guarantee it’s secure, or you can have the supply you need, but there will be risk. Every organization has accepted the second proposition.”
China  cyber_security  cyber_warfare  hacks  semiconductors  security_&_intelligence  supply_chains  infiltration 
january 2019 by jerryking
Computer vision: how Israel’s secret soldiers drive its tech success
November 20, 2018 | Financial Times | Mehul Srivastava in Tel Aviv.
.... those experiences that have helped such a tiny country become a leader in one of the most promising frontiers in the technology world: computer vision. Despite the unwieldy name it is an area that has come of age in the past few years, covering applications across dozens of industries that have one thing in common: the need for computers to figure out what their cameras are seeing, and for those computers to tell them what to do next.........Computer vision has become the connecting thread between some of Israel’s most valuable and promising tech companies. And unlike Israel’s traditional strengths— cyber security and mapping — computer vision slides into a broad range of different civilian industries, spawning companies in agriculture, medicine, sports, self-driving cars, the diamond industry and even shopping. 

In Israel, this lucrative field has benefited from a large pool of engineers and entrepreneurs trained for that very task in an elite, little-known group in the military — Unit 9900 — where they fine-tuned computer algorithms to digest millions of surveillance photos and sift out actionable intelligence. .........The full name for Unit 9900 — the Terrain Analysis, Accurate Mapping, Visual Collection and Interpretation Agency — hints at how it has created a critical mass of engineers indispensable for the future of this industry. The secretive unit has only recently allowed limited discussion of its work. But with an estimated 25,000 graduates, it has created a deep pool of talent that the tech sector has snapped up. 

Soldiers in Unit 9900 are assigned to strip out nuggets of intelligence from the images provided by Israel’s drones and satellites — from surveilling the crowded, chaotic streets of the Gaza Strip to the unending swaths of desert in Syria and the Sinai. 

With so much data to pour over, Unit 9900 came up with solutions, including recruiting Israelis on the autistic spectrum for their analytical and visual skills. In recent years, says Shir Agassi, who served in Unit 9900 for more than seven years, it learned to automate much of the process, teaching algorithms to spot nuances, slight variations in landscapes and how their targets moved and behaved.....“We had to take all these photos, all this film, all this geospatial evidence and break it down: how do you know what you’re seeing, what’s behind it, how will it impact your intelligence decisions?” .....“You’re asking yourself — if you were the enemy, where would you hide? Where are the tall buildings, where’s the element of surprise? Can you drive there, what will be the impact of weather on all this analysis?”

Computer vision was essential to this task....Teaching computers to look for variations allowed the unit to quickly scan thousands of kilometres of background to find actionable intelligence. “You have to find ways not just to make yourself more efficient, but also to find things that the regular eye can’t,” she says. “You need computer vision to answer these questions.”.....The development of massive databases — from close-ups of farm insects to medical scans to traffic data — has given Israeli companies a valuable headstart over rivals. And in an industry where every new image teaches the algorithm something useful, that has made catching up difficult.......“Computer vision is absolutely the thread that ties us to other Israeli companies,” he says. “I need people with the same unique DNA — smart PhDs in mathematics, neural network analysis — to tell a player in the NBA how to improve his jump shot.”
Israel  cyber_security  hackers  cyber_warfare  dual-use  Israeli  security_&_intelligence  IDF  computer_vision  machine_learning  Unit_9900  start_ups  gene_pool  imagery  algorithms  actionable_information  geospatial  mapping  internal_systems  PhDs  drones  satellites  surveillance  autism 
november 2018 by jerryking
Cyber Operations Tracker
The Digital and Cyberspace Policy program’s cyber operations tracker is a database of the publicly known state-sponsored incidents that have occurred since 2005.
cyber_warfare  database 
september 2018 by strohps
Why is America so bad at information wars?
JULY 18, 2018 | Financial Times | Gillian Tett.

In his new book Messing With the Enemy, Clint Watts, a former FBI agent, describes this exchange as the first “international-terrorist-versus-counter-terrorist Twitter battle”......One way to make sense of today’s extraordinary cyber battles with the Russians is to look at how jihadi groups developed such campaigns years earlier — not least because this oft-ignored parallel shows how the US government has done a poor job fighting its enemies in cyberspace. “America sucks at information warfare,” Watts laments. “Absolutely sucks.”.....US officials attempted to fight back against Isis’s social media campaigns. Watts reveals that in 2013 while at the FBI — and later as a security consultant — he engaged in a long Twitter duel with American-born terrorist Omar Hammami. Other US intelligence groups tried to develop psychological-operations campaigns to fight the extremists. Some of the experimental techniques used to profile social media users were later deployed in the ad-tech industry by companies such as Cambridge Analytica.

However, the US military was simply too bureaucratic, slow moving and rule-laden to match its enemies. And the country that seemed to learn the most from the social media extremists was Russia: Watts describes how he inadvertently witnessed Russian-backed groups populating American social media from the autumn of 2015 onwards, copying some of the tactics of the Islamists....Watts’s proposed remedy is just as startling: he believes that US government agencies are now so ill-equipped to fight in these type of social media wars that it is time for non-government groups to take the lead instead.....many leading figures in Silicon Valley furtively express similar views. Indeed, some appear to be quietly funding civilian “volunteers” to do exactly what Watts suggests: namely, hunt for ways to counter Russian attacks by infiltrating enemy cyber groups.

Who knows whether this type of grass-roots action will work, or how widespread it might be — everything is deeply murky in the arena of cyberspace and information wars.
Gillian_Tett  information_warfare  U.S.  security_&_intelligence  Twitter  al-Shabab  books  cyber_warfare  Russians  hackers  Russia  disinformation  persuasion  trolls  politics  delegitimization  destabilization  deception  infiltration 
july 2018 by jerryking
Quantum Computing Will Reshape Digital Battlefield, Says Former NSA Director Hayden - CIO Journal. - WSJ
Jun 27, 2018 | WSJ | By Jennifer Strong.

In the ongoing battle between law enforcement and Apple Inc. over whether the company should assist the government in cracking into iPhones, Mr. Hayden says it “surprised a lot of folks that people like me generally side with Apple” and its CEO Tim Cook.

Do you believe there’s a deterrence failure when it comes to cyber threats?

Yes, and it’s been really interesting watching this debate take shape. I’m hearing folks who think we should be more aggressive using our offensive cyber power for defensive purposes. Now that’s not been national policy. We have not tried to dissuade other countries from attacking us digitally by attacking them digitally.

What are your current thoughts on quantum encryption or quantum codebreaking?

When machine guns arrived it clearly favored the defense. When tanks arrived? That favored the offense. One of the tragedies of military history is that you’ve got people making decisions who have not realized that the geometry of the battlefield has changed because of new weapons. And so you have the horrendous casualties in World War I and then you’ve got the French prepared to fight World War I again and German armor skirts the Maginot Line. Now I don’t know whether quantum computing will inherently favor the offense or inherently favor the defense, when it comes to encryption, security, espionage and so on, but I do know it’s going to affect something.

What other emerging technologies are you watching?

Henry Kissinger wrote an article about this recently in which he warned against our infatuation with data and artificial intelligence. We can’t let data crowd out wisdom. And so when I talk to people in the intelligence community who are going all out for big data and AI and algorithms I say, “you really do need somebody in there somewhere who understands Lebanese history, or the history of Islam.”
Michael_Hayden  security_&_intelligence  national_strategies  offensive_tactics  defensive_tactics  wisdom  quantum_computing  NSA  Henry_Kissinger  Apple  cyber_security  encryption  cyber_warfare 
june 2018 by jerryking
Australia's Offensive Cyber Capability
April 2018 ASPI policy brief
For Australia, both defensive and offensive cyber capabilities are now an essential component of our nation’s military arsenal, and a necessary step to ensure that we keep up with global players. The cyber arms race moves fast, so continued investment in cyber capability is pivotal to keep ahead of and defend against the latest threats, while being able to deploy our own capabilities when and where we choose.

So, too, is ensuring that we have the skills and the talent to drive cyber capabilities in Australia. This means attracting and keeping the brightest young minds, the sharpest skilled local talent and the most experienced technology veterans to drive and grow a pipeline of cyber specialists, and in turn help protect and serve Australia’s military and economic interests.
aspi  australia  cybersecurity  cyber_warfare 
april 2018 by strohps
How Vladimir Putin mastered the cyber disinformation war
February 18, 2018 | FT | by Andrei Soldatov.

outsourcing cyber disinformation campaigns has become a tactic used by Russia to create plausible deniability and lower the costs and risks of controversial overseas operations. Today, Kremlin-backed cyber campaigns have an unorthodox chain of command. It is one in which non-state actors — primarily businessmen with personal ties to important figures in the Kremlin — call the shots, not, as in western cyber operations, the electronic and signals intelligence gathering wings of the army and government agencies.
Vladimir_Putin  Robert_Mueller  indictments  Russia  disinformation  persuasion  trolls  politics  delegitimization  destabilization  deception  cyber_warfare  information_warfare  Kremlin 
february 2018 by jerryking
Rethinking Cybersecurity: Strategy, Mass Effect, and States
Jan 2018 CSIS report
If our perceptions of the nature of cybersecurity are skewed, so are our defenses. This report examines the accuracy of our perceptions of cybersecurity. It attempts to embed the problem of cyber attack (not crime or espionage) in the context of larger strategic calculations and effects. It argues that policies and perceptions of cybersecurity are determined by factors external to cyberspace, such as political trends affecting relations among states, by thinking on the role of government, and by public attitudes toward risk.
csis  cybersecurity  cyber_warfare 
january 2018 by strohps
Security Breach and Spilled Secrets Have Shaken the N.S.A. to Its Core
NOV. 12, 2017 | The New York Times | By SCOTT SHANE, NICOLE PERLROTH and DAVID E. SANGER.

“These leaks have been incredibly damaging to our intelligence and cyber capabilities,” said Leon E. Panetta, the former defense secretary and director of the Central Intelligence Agency. “The fundamental purpose of intelligence is to be able to effectively penetrate our adversaries in order to gather vital intelligence. By its very nature, that only works if secrecy is maintained and our codes are protected.”
data_breaches  hacking  vulnerabilities  CIA  counterintelligence  counterespionage  moles  malware  ransomware  Fedex  Mondelez  Edward_Snowden  security_&_intelligence  Russia  Leon_Panetta  NSA  cyber_security  cyber_warfare  cyberweapons  tools  David_Sanger  SecDef 
november 2017 by jerryking

« earlier    

related tags

2016_election  21st._century  3pla  5g  9/11  accs  actionable_information  ad_hoc  addounia  air_university  al-shabab  algorithms  amazon  andy_kessler  anti-americanism  apple  arksy  armed_forces  arms_race  artificial_intelligence  asia  asia_pacific  asian  aspi  asymmetrical  atlantic_council  auctions  australia  authoritarian  autism  autocracies  autocrats  back_doors  balance_of_power  baltics  big_tech  black_markets  blackcube  blacklists  blackmail  blowback  book_reviews  books  bounties  brazil  c-suite  campaign_2016  campaigns  capabilities  censorship  challenges  china  china_rising  chinese  christopher_mims  cia  cisco  clingendael  cnas  coding  cold_war  colin_freeze  colleges_&_universities  computer_vision  contagions  contextual  control_systems  corporatism  counterespionage  counterintelligence  counterterrorism  covert_operations  cse  csis  cyber_attack  cyber_security  cyberattack  cyberattacks  cybercrimes  cyberespionage  cybermercenaries  cybersecurity  cyberthreats  cyberweapons  dark_side  dark_web  darkmatter  darpa  data  data_breaches  database  david_ignatius  david_sanger  deception  defensive_tactics  delegitimization  destabilization  deterrence  digital  dilma_rousseff  diplomacy  disinformation  disruption  dissension  dissidents  dmitri_medvedev  dnc  dnd  dod  doe  doj  donald_trump  doug_saunders  dprk  drones  drug_cartels  dual-use  eavesdropping  economic_warfare  editorials  edward_snowden  elizabethan  encryption  entertainment_industry  epicenters  espionage  europe  experimentation  exploits  fareed_zakaria  fbi  federal_politics  fedex  fiction  films  financial_markets  financial_system  five_eyes  fred_kaplan  frenemies  gene_pool  geopolitics  geospatial  germany  gillian_tett  goc  hacker  hackers  hacking  hacks  hard_work  hedge_funds  henry_kissinger  high-frequency_trading  history  hollywood  holman_jenkins  huawei  icct  ics  idf  imagery  inaugurations  indictments  indonesia  industrial_espionage  industrial_internet  infiltration  influence_campaigns  information_flows  information_warfare  infrastructure  insecurity  instability  int'l_relations  intellectual_property  intelligence_analysts  interconnections  internal_systems  international_system  internet  iran  isis  israel  israeli  jamal_khashoggi  james_clapper  japan  jihad  kgb  konrad_yakabuski  korea_north  kremlin  l._gordon_crovtiz  leon_panetta  lessons_learned  leverage  log_rolling  machine_learning  malware  mapping  maritime  massive_data_sets  mathematics  mbs  mercenaries  mexico  michael_hayden  middle_east  miscalculations  mobile_phones  moles  mondelez  money_laundering  mossad  movies  narratives  national_security  national_strategies  nationalism  nato  natural_gas  network_risk  new_zealand  nicholas_kristof  nonfiction  north_korea  nsa  nso  nuclear  nytimes  obama  offensive_tactics  ottawa  overreach  oversight  pco  pegasus  pentagon  personnel  perspectives  persuasion  petro-politics  phds  phishing  pilot_programs  pla  playbooks  poaching  poland  policy  policy_tools  policymakers  policymaking  politics  power_grid  preparation  primers  privacy  propaganda  public_sector  punitive  putin  quantum_computing  radicalization  ransomware  rcmp  readiness  realism  realpolitik  red_lines  remote_monitoring  research  resilience  retaliation  retribution  richard_clarke  risk-mitigation  robert_kaplan  robert_mueller  rogue_actors  russia  russian_interference  russians  sanctions  satellites  saudi_arabia  saudis  scenario-planning  secdef  security  security_&_intelligence  self-censorship  semiconductors  sigint  simon_kuper  simulations  small_states  social_media  software  software_bugs  sony  south_china_sea  spectrum  spycraft  spymasters  spyware  start_ups  statesmen  stealth  stockpiles  strategic_thinking  studios  stuxnet  subversion  supply_chains  surveillance  syrian_electronic_army  taiwan  targeted_assassinations  technology  telecommunications  terrorism  testing  threats  tom_clancy  tools  traders  treasury_board  triumphalism  trolls  twitter  u.s.-china_relations  u.s.  u.s._cyber_command  u.s._military  u.s._navy  u.s.foreign_policy  undermining_of_trust  unit_8200  unit_9900  united_kingdom  unprepared  usaf  vladimir_putin  vulnerabilities  wall_street  warfare  weaponry  white_hat  wikileaks  william_gibson  wisdom  wwi  xi_jinping  zero-sum_games  zte 

Copy this bookmark:



description:


tags: