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Trump's Tax Promises Undercut by CEO Plans to Help Investors - Bloomberg
The president has held fast to his pledge even as top executives’ comments have run counter to it for months. Instead of hiring more workers or raising their pay, many companies say they’ll first increase dividends or buy back their own shares.

Robert Bradway, chief executive of Amgen Inc., said in an Oct. 25 earnings call that the company has been “actively returning capital in the form of growing dividend and buyback and I’d expect us to continue that.” Executives including Coca-Cola CEO James Quincey, Pfizer Chief Financial Officer Frank D’Amelio and Cisco CFO Kelly Kramer have recently made similar statements.
investor_capitalism  agency_theory  taxes  tax_breaks  corporate_governance 
november 2017 by perich
David Ciepley - Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation (2013) | American Political Science Review on JSTOR
This article challenges the liberal, contractual theory of the corporation and argues for replacing it with a political theory of the corporation. Corporations are government-like in their powers, and government grants them both their external "personhood" and their internal governing authority. They are thus not simply private. Yet they are privately organized and financed and therefore not simply public. Corporations transgress all the basic dichotomies that structure liberal treatments of law, economics, and politics: public/private, government/market, privilege/equality, and status/contract. They are "franchise governments" that cannot be satisfactorily assimilated to liberalism. The liberal effort to assimilate them, treating them as contractually constituted associations of private property owners, endows them with rights they ought not have, exacerbates their irresponsibility, and compromises their principal public benefit of generating long-term growth. Instead, corporations need to be placed in a distinct category—neither public nor private, but "corporate"—to be regulated by distinct rules and norms. - downloaded via iphone to dbox
organizations  institutional_economics  corporations  corporate_citizenship  markets-dependence_on_government  article  corporate_control  institutions  management  public-private_gaps  bibliography  social_contract  liberalism  jstor  property_rights  downloaded  corporate_law  political_theory  managerialism  corporate_governance  corporate_personhood  firms-organization  property 
july 2017 by dunnettreader
Why Uber Won’t Fire Its CEO – Backchannel
That’s due in part to the dual-class share structure that savvy tech founders have come to embrace in recent years. Essentially, in one class, a share carries one vote; in the other class, shares come with ten votes each or more. These super-voting shares allow founders and some early investors to maintain control over decisions the company makes, even if their ownership in the company is significantly reduced. Founders increasingly pair this strategy with smart management techniques when setting up a board to guarantee control in perpetuity.
uber  silicon_valley  tech  investor_capitalism  corporate_governance 
april 2017 by perich
Admati et al - The Leverage Ratchet Effect (WP 2016) | Stanford Graduate School of Business
The Leverage Ratchet Effect
By Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig, Paul Pfleiderer
October 11,2016Working Paper No. 3029
Economics, Corporate Governance
Firms’ inability to commit to future funding choices has profound consequences for capital structure dynamics. With debt in place, shareholders pervasively resist leverage reductions no matter how much such reductions may enhance firm value. Shareholders would instead choose to increase leverage even if debt levels are already high and new debt must be junior to existing debt. These asymmetric forces in leverage adjustments, which we call the leverage ratchet effect, cause equilibrium leverage outcomes to be history-dependent. When forced to reduce leverage, shareholders are biased toward selling assets relative to potentially more efficient alternatives such as pure recapitalizations.

Keywordscapital structure, leverage, agency costs of debt, dynamic capital structure, tradeoff theory of capital structure, capital regulation, bank equity, debt overhang, under-investment, recapitalization, deleveraging, bankruptcy costs
finance_capital  equity-corporate  downloaded  capital_markets  debt-seniority  debt-restructuring  corporate_governance  recapitalization  risk_capital  debt-overhang  leverage  equity  equity_markets  corporate_finance  debt 
april 2017 by dunnettreader

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