corporate_citizenship   56

« earlier    

Corporate Criminal Accountability for International Crimes
Above: The International Criminal Court Ed. note. This post is the latest in our series on the upcoming U.S. Supreme Court case Jesner. v. Arab Bank , a case…
corporate_citizenship  corporate_personhood  accountability  international_law  international_crimes  Evernote  from instapaper
december 2017 by dunnettreader
David Ciepley - Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation (2013) | American Political Science Review on JSTOR
This article challenges the liberal, contractual theory of the corporation and argues for replacing it with a political theory of the corporation. Corporations are government-like in their powers, and government grants them both their external "personhood" and their internal governing authority. They are thus not simply private. Yet they are privately organized and financed and therefore not simply public. Corporations transgress all the basic dichotomies that structure liberal treatments of law, economics, and politics: public/private, government/market, privilege/equality, and status/contract. They are "franchise governments" that cannot be satisfactorily assimilated to liberalism. The liberal effort to assimilate them, treating them as contractually constituted associations of private property owners, endows them with rights they ought not have, exacerbates their irresponsibility, and compromises their principal public benefit of generating long-term growth. Instead, corporations need to be placed in a distinct category—neither public nor private, but "corporate"—to be regulated by distinct rules and norms. - downloaded via iphone to dbox
organizations  institutional_economics  corporations  corporate_citizenship  markets-dependence_on_government  article  corporate_control  institutions  management  public-private_gaps  bibliography  social_contract  liberalism  jstor  property_rights  downloaded  corporate_law  political_theory  managerialism  corporate_governance  corporate_personhood  firms-organization  property 
july 2017 by dunnettreader
Suresh Naidu - Capital Eats the World | Jacobin May 2014
A first step could be a multisector model with both a productive sector and an extractive, rent-seeking outlet for investment, so that the rate of return on capital has the potential to be unanchored from the growth of the economy. This model could potentially do a better job of explaining r > g in a world where capital has highly profitable opportunities in rent-seeking ....More fundamentally, a model that started with the financial and firm-level institutions underneath the supply and demand curves for capital, rather than blackboxing them in production and utility functions, could illuminate complementarities among the host of other political demands that would claw back the share taken by capital and lower the amount paid out as profits before the fiscal system gets its take. This is putting meat on what Brad Delong calls the “wedge” between the actual and warranted rate of profit. -- We need even more and even better economics to figure out which of these may get undone via market responses and which won’t, and to think about them jointly with the politics that make each feasible or not. While Piketty’s book diagnoses the problem of capital’s voracious appetite, it would require a different kind of model to take our focus off the nominal quantities registered by state fiscal systems, and instead onto the broader distribution of political power in the world economy.
productivity  Piketty  books  wealth  property_rights  investment  inheritance  class_conflict  oligarchy  economic_theory  reviews  corporate_governance  neoclassical_economics  neoliberalism  capital  inequality  investors  heterodox_economics  finance_capital  labor  property  profit  unemployment  kindle-available  markets_in_everything  economic_growth  political_economy  corporate_citizenship  technology  rent-seeking  economic_models  1-percent  rentiers  Labor_markets  corporate_finance  tax_havens  savings  capitalism  taxes 
april 2016 by Werderbach
What It's Worth - Building a Strong Financial Future
Americans everywhere struggle to build strong financial futures for themselves and their families. The new book, What It's Worth, provides a roadmap for what families, communities and our nation can do to move forward on the path to financial well-being.
Collection of essays by people working on financial inclusion, asset-building etc. - downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
gig_economy  education-finance  philanthropy  credit  usury  financial_innovation  US_society  inequality-wealth  local_government  pensions  corporate_citizenship  mobility  banking  wages  health_care  access_to_finance  housing  financial_regulation  report  social_entrepreneurs  poverty  downloaded  welfare  US_economy  US_politics  families  mortgages  segregation  inequality  NBFI  unemployment  US_government 
april 2016 by dunnettreader
Leo E. Strine - A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications :: SSRN - Journal of Corporation Law, 2015, Forthcoming (rev'd March 2015)
Supreme Court of Delaware; Harvard Law School; University of Pennsylvania Law School -- This article connects the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby to the history of “corporate paternalism.” It details the history of employer efforts to restrict the freedom of employees, and legislative attempts to ensure worker freedom. It also highlights the role of employment in healthcare coverage, and situates the Affordable Care Act’s “minimum essential guarantees” in a historical and global context. The article also discusses how Hobby Lobby combines with the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions in Citizens United and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius to constrain the government’s ability to extend the social safety net, and shows how those decisions put pressure on corporate law itself. -- Note: The article was the subject of lectures to the Securities Regulation Institute of Northwestern University School of Law and the American Constitution Society Student Chapter at Harvard Law School. -- PDF File: 76 -- Keywords: Hobby Lobby; corporate law; corporate paternalism -- right on Leo! -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  US_constitution  US_legal_system  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  corporate_governance  shareholders  freedom_of_conscience  SCOTUS  labor  labor_standards  employers  employee_benefits  welfare_economics  welfare_state  health_care  campaign_finance  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Leo E. Strine - The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware Law :: SSRN Wake Forest Law Review, 2015, Forthcoming (March 20, 2015)
Supreme Court of Delaware; Harvard Law School; Penn Law School -- There is now a tendency among those who believe that corporations should be more socially responsible to pretend that corporate directors do not have an obligation under Delaware corporate law to make stockholder welfare the sole end of corporate governance within the limits of their legal discretion. These advocates of CSR contend that Delaware directors may subordinate stockholder welfare to other interests, such as those of the company’s workers or society generally. (..) But, the problem with that argument is that it is inconsistent with both judge-made common law of corporations in Delaware and the design of the Delaware General Corporation Law. More important, pretending that the nation’s leading corporate law is fundamentally different than it is runs contrary to the goal of ensuring that for-profit corporations behave lawfully, responsibly, and ethically. Lecturing others to do the right thing without acknowledging the rules that apply to their behavior and the power dynamics to which they are subject is not a responsible path to social progress. Rather, it provides an excuse to avoid tougher policy challenges, such as advocating for stronger externality regulation and encouraging institutional investors to exercise their power as stockholders responsibly. Those challenges must be confronted if we are to ensure that for-profit corporations are vehicles for responsible, sustainable, long-term wealth creation. -- PDF File: 43 -- downloaded pdf to Note
US_legal_system  US_politics  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  corporate_governance  shareholder_value  profit_maximization  principal-agent  fiduciaries  law-and-economics  CSR  capital_as_power  duties-legal  duties-civic  duty_of_care  duty_of_loyalty  Delaware_law  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Leo E. Strine , Nicholas Walter Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling "Citizens United" with Corporate Law History :: SSRN - Notre Dame Law Review, 2015, Forthcoming (rev'd March 2015)
Leo E. Strine Jr., Supreme Court of Delaware; Harvard Law School; Penn Law School -- Nicholas Walter, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz -- Citizens United has been the subject of a great deal of commentary, but one important aspect of the decision that has not been explored in detail is the historical basis for Justice Scalia’s claims in his concurring opinion that the majority holding is consistent with originalism. In this article, we engage in a deep inquiry into the historical understanding of the rights of the business corporation as of 1791 and 1868 — two periods relevant to an originalist analysis of the First Amendment. Based on the historical record, Citizens United is far more original than originalist, and if the decision is to be justified, it has to be on jurisprudential grounds originalists traditionally disclaim as illegitimate. -- PDF File: 94 -- Keywords: Jurisprudence, constitutional interpretation, original intent, original understanding, originalism, election law, campaign finance reform, corporate personhood, general corporation statutes, political speech, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  US_constitution  constitutional_law  originalism  free_speech  civil_liberties  legal_history  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  elections  campaign_finance  politics-and-money  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
The Misrepresentation of Earnings by Ilia D. Dichev, John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey, Shivaram Rajgopal :: SSRN June 2, 2015
Ilia D. Dichev, Emory University - Goizueta Business School -- John R. Graham, Duke University; NBER -- Campbell R. Harvey, Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; NBER -- Shivaram Rajgopal, Emory University - Goizueta Business School -- We ask nearly 400 CFOs about the definition and drivers of earnings quality, with a special emphasis on the prevalence and detection of earnings misrepresentation. CFOs believe that the hallmarks of earnings quality are sustainability, absence of one-time items, and backing by actual cash flows. Earnings quality is determined in about equal measure by controllable factors like internal controls and corporate governance, and non-controllable factors like industry membership and macroeconomic conditions. On earnings misrepresentation, CFOs believe that in any given period a remarkable 20% of firms intentionally distort earnings, even though they are adhering to generally accepted accounting principles. The economic magnitude of the misrepresentation is large, averaging about 10% of reported earnings. While most misrepresentation involves earnings overstatement, interestingly, one third of the firms that are misrepresenting performance are low-balling their earnings or reversing a prior intentional overstatement. Finally, CFOs provide a list of red flags that can be used to detect earnings misrepresentation. --"PDF File: 23 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  financial_system  financial_regulation  capital_markets  disclosure  accounting  GAAP  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  business-norms  business-ethics  market_manipulation  markets-psychology  profits  investors  investor_protection  incentives-distortions 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Lyman Johnson, David Millon - Corporate Law after Hobby Lobby :: SSRN (rev'd Jan 2015) THE BUSINESS LAWYER, Vol 70 - November 2014
Lyman Johnson, Washington and Lee University - School of Law; University of St. Thomas, St. Paul/Minneapolis, MN - School of Law -- David Millon
Washington and Lee University - School of Law -- We evaluate the U.S. Supreme Court's controversial decision in the Hobby Lobby case from the perspective of state corporate law. We argue that the Court is correct in holding that corporate law does not mandate that business corporations limit themselves to pursuit of profit. Rather, state law allows incorporation 'for any lawful purpose.' We elaborate on this important point and also explain what it means for a corporation to 'exercise religion.' In addition, we address the larger implications of the Court's analysis for an accurate understanding both of state law's essentially agnostic stance on the question of corporate purpose and also of the broad scope of managerial discretion. -- PDF File: 33 -- Keywords: Corporate purpose, Corporate personhood, Shareholder wealth maximization, Shareholder primacy, Corporate social responsibility -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  corporate_governance  shareholders  freedom_of_conscience  SCOTUS  civil_liberties  corporate_control  corporate_personhood  limited_liability  corporations-closely-held  corporations  CSR  shareholder_value  shareholder_voting  profit_maximization  law-and-economics  labor_law  employee_benefits  power-asymmetric  capital_as_power  constitutional_law  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
David Millon - Radical Shareholder Primacy :: SSRN - Aug 2014
Washington and Lee University - School of Law -- University of St. Thomas Law Journal, Vol. 10:4 (2013) -- Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2014-17 -- written for a symposium on the history of CSR, seeks to make sense of the surprising disagreement on the foundational legal question of corporate purpose: does the law require shareholder primacy or not? (..) disagreement is due to the unappreciated ambiguity in the shareholder primacy idea. (.. ) 2 models, the 'radical' and the 'traditional.' Radical shareholder primacy originated at Chicago in the later 1970s, (Daniel Fischel and Frank Easterbrook). [It asserts] that corporate management is the agent of the shareholders, charged with maximizing their wealth. There is no legal authority for this claim; Fischel drew it from the financial economists Michael Jensen and William Meckling, who used the agency idea in a non-legal sense. [The traditional model is] the idea that shareholders hold a privileged position within the corporation's governance structure, ... and (..) fiduciary duties as being owed to 'the corporation and its shareholders.' (..) shareholders enjoy primacy over (..) other stakeholders, although there is no maximization mandate and shareholders [have limited effective legal means] to insist that management privilege their interests. Nevertheless, this version of shareholder primacy is enshrined in the law, and, if the radical version's agency claim is laid to rest, there is no harm in acknowledging that fact. -- PDF File: 34 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  corporate_governance  shareholder_value  profit_maximization  principal-agent  fiduciaries  law-and-economics  CSR  capital_as_power  status_quo_bias 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
David Millon - The Single Constituency Argument in the Economic Analysis of Business Law :: SSRN - Jan 2007
David Millon, Washington and Lee University - School of Law -- Research in Law and Economics, 2007 -- Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-01 -- The essay points out an interesting parallel in law-and-economics business law scholarship. Working largely independently of each other, economically oriented scholars working in different areas have argued that the law should focus on the interests of a single constituency - shareholders in corporate law, creditors in bankruptcy law, and consumers in antitrust law. Economic analysts thus have rejected arguments advanced by progressive scholars working in each of these areas that the law should instead concern itself with the full range of constituencies affected by business activity. The law-and-economics single constituency claim rests in part on skepticism about judicial competence but the underlying objection is to the use of law for redistributive purposes. The primary value is efficiency, defined in terms of market-generated outcomes. In this essay, I question this political commitment, suggesting that it implies a strong tendency toward maintenance of the existing distribution of wealth. Even more importantly, the single constituency claim may actually have redistributive implications. In each of these areas of business law, however, it is a regressive program that favors owners of capital against those who are generally less well of, such as workers and small business owners. -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 31 -- saved to briefcase
paper  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  jurisprudence  legal_theory  political_philosophy  political_economy  law-and-economics  conflict_of_interest  principal-agent  profit_maximization  incentives  incentives-distortions  efficiency  shareholder_value  creditors  consumers  consumer_protection  competition  status_quo_bias  capital  inequality-wealth  inequality-opportunity  power-asymmetric  capital_as_power  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  corporate_governance  corporate_law  corporate_citizenship  bankruptcy  antitrust  conservative_legal_challenges 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Margaret Blair - What must corporate directors do? Maximizing shareholder value versus creating value through team production | Brookings Institution - June 2015
Blair reviews the legal and economic theories behind the share-value maximization norm, and then lays out a theory of corporate law building on the economics of team production. Arguing that the corporate form itself helps solve the team production problem, Blair details five features which distinguish corporations from other organizational forms: 1. Legal personality -- 2. Limited liability -- 3. Transferable shares -- 4. Management under a Board of Directors -- 5. Indefinite existence -- Blair concludes that these five characteristics are all problematic from a principal-agent point of view where shareholders are principals. However, the team production theory makes sense out of these arrangements. This theory provides a rationale for the role of corporate directors consistent with the role that boards of directors historically understood themselves to play: balancing competing interests so the whole organization stays productive. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  shareholder_value  hedge_funds  corporate_law  firms-theory  firms-structure  equity-corporate  equity_markets  investors  long-term_orientation  labor_share  cooperation  coordination  teams  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Perlstein - Social Capital, Corporate Purpose, and the Revival of American Capitalism | Brookings Institution - January 2014
Since the Great Recession of 2008, corporate profits have more than rebounded, and yet the rest of the American economy has struggled to recover. Widening income inequality and an erosion of social capital and economic trust has deprived capitalism of its moral high ground. The public has lost confidence in big businesses--asking what purpose they serve in society writ large. Pearlstein argues we can begin to restoring the economic and moral legitimacy of American capitalism by reconsidering the purpose of corporations in American life. Despite the current dominance of the theory of “maximizing shareholder value,” this idea has little basis in history or law. Shifting to a more balanced form of capitalism will take time, but some possible steps for reform include: #-# Support investment funds dedicated to long-term horizons, including socially responsible investment funds #-# Recalibrate corporate governance law to allow for more flexible decision making #-# Rebalance capital gains taxes to encourage long-term stock holding by investors #-# Explore regulatory options for financial services, like a financial transaction tax to dampen the influence of short-term trading #-# Encourage a wider range of corporate metrics beyond quarterly earnings guidance #-# Reform shareholder voting rights to foster a sense of stewardship -- didn't download it -- Brookings also has video of Perlstein in Charlie Rose
paper  video  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  corporate_finance  corporate_law  corporate_tax  financial_crisis  investors  institutional_investors  shareholder_value  capital_markets  shareholder_voting  capital_gains  financial_transaction_tax  short-termism  capitalism  capitalism-systemic_crisis 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Bill Galston and Elaine Karmack - Overcoming corporate short-termism: Blackrock's chairman weighs in | Brookings Institution - April 2015
hen the head of the world’s largest investment fund raises fundamental questions about U.S. corporations, we should all pay attention.

In a letter earlier this week to the Fortune 500 CEOs, BlackRock Chairman Larry Fink criticized the short-term orientation that he believes shapes too much of today’s corporate behavior. “It concerns us,” he declared, that “in the wake of the financial crisis, many companies have shied away from investing in the future growth of their companies. Too many have cut capital expenditure and even increased debt to boost dividends and increase share buybacks.” And he concluded, “When done for the wrong reasons and at the expense of capital investment, [returning cash to shareholders] can jeopardize a company’s ability to generate sustainable long-term returns.”
institutional_investors  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  corporate_finance  CSR  short-termism  capital_markets  shareholder_value  capital_gains  investment  R&D  buybacks 
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert G. Eccles, Jock Herron, George Serafeim - Reliable Sustainability Ratings: The Influence of Business Models on Information Intermediaries (revised October 2014) :: SSRN
ility Ratings: The Influence of Business Models on Information Intermediaries

Robert G. Eccles, Harvard Business School -- Jock Herron, Harvard University - School of Design -- George Serafeim, Harvard University - Harvard Business School -- Chapter in Routledge Handbook on Responsible Investing (Forthcoming) *--* A new generation of corporate reporting - integrated reporting - is emerging that will help investors and other key stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, and NGOs develop a deeper and more comprehensive appreciation of corporate performance than what is currently provided by GAAP financial reporting. The purpose of this paper is to examine the optimal design of information intermediaries that can increase the impact of sustainability information on corporate conduct. Specifically, we focus on two issues: who pays for the information and which performance metrics should be included in assessing the sustainability performance of a company. -- Pages in PDF File: 28 -- Keywords: sustainability, ratings, corporate performance, rating agencies, conflicts of interest, integrated reporting, corporate social responsibility -- downloaded pdf to Note
chapter  SSRN  CSR  sustainability  accounting  disclosure  disclosure-integrated  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  information-markets  information-intermediaries  rating_agencies  ratings  conflict_of_interest  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert G. Eccles, George Serafeim - Corporate and Integrated Reporting: A Functional Perspective (revised September 2014) :: SSRN
Robert G. Eccles, Harvard Business School -- George Serafeim, Harvard University - Harvard Business School *--* Chapter in Stewardship of the Future, edited by Ed Lawler, Sue Mohrman, and James O’Toole, Greenleaf, 2015. *--* In this paper, we present the two primary functions of corporate reporting (information and transformation) and why currently isolated financial and sustainability reporting are not likely to perform effectively those functions. We describe the concept of integrated reporting and why integrated reporting could be a superior mechanism to perform these functions. Moreover, we discuss, through a series of case studies, what constitutes an effective integrated report (Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Company) and the role of regulation in integrated reporting (Anglo-American). -- Pages in PDF File: 21 -- Keywords: corporate reporting, integrated reporting, information, investing, sustainability, accounting -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  CSR  sustainability  accounting  disclosure  disclosure-integrated  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  business_practices  information-markets  investors  risk_management  institutional_change  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
George Serafeim - The Role of the Corporation in Society: An Alternative View and Opportunities for Future Research b(revised June 2014) :: SSRN
Harvard University - Harvard Business School *--* A long-standing ideology in business education has been that a corporation is run for the sole interest of its shareholders. I present an alternative view where increasing concentration of economic activity and power in the world’s largest corporations, the Global 1000, has opened the way for managers to consider the interests of a broader set of stakeholders rather than only shareholders. Having documented that this alternative view better fits actual corporate conduct, I discuss opportunities for future research. Specifically, I call for research on the materiality of environmental and social issues for the future financial performance of corporations, the design of incentive and control systems to guide strategy execution, corporate reporting, and the role of investors in this new paradigm. -- Pages in PDF File: 27 -- Keywords: corporate performance, corporate size, sustainability, corporate social responsibility, accounting -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  global_economy  global_governance  international_political_economy  shareholder_value  shareholders  CSR  disclosure  accountability  accounting  institutional_economics  institutional_investors  incentives  institutional_change  long-term_orientation  business-and-politics  business-norms  business_practices  business_influence  sustainability  MNCs  firms-theory  firms-structure  firms-organization  power  power-concentration  concentration-industry  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou, George Serafeim - The Impact of Corporate Sustainability on Organizational Processes and Performance - November 23, 2011 :: SSRN - Management Science, Forthcoming
Robert G. Eccles, Harvard Business School -- Ioannis Ioannou, London Business School -- George Serafeim, Harvard University - Harvard Business School *--* We investigate the effect of a corporate culture of sustainability on multiple facets of corporate behavior and performance outcomes. Using a matched sample of 180 companies, we find that corporations that voluntarily adopted environmental and social policies many years ago – termed as High Sustainability companies – exhibit fundamentally different characteristics from a matched sample of firms that adopted almost none of these policies – termed as Low Sustainability companies. In particular, we find that the boards of directors of these companies are more likely to be responsible for sustainability and top executive incentives are more likely to be a function of sustainability metrics. Moreover, they are more likely to have organized procedures for stakeholder engagement, to be more long-term oriented, and to exhibit more measurement and disclosure of nonfinancial information. Finally, we provide evidence that High Sustainability companies significantly outperform their counterparts over the long-term, both in terms of stock market and accounting performance. The outperformance is stronger in sectors where the customers are individual consumers instead of companies, companies compete on the basis of brands and reputations, and products significantly depend upon extracting large amounts of natural resources. -- Keywords: sustainability, corporate social responsibility, culture, governance, disclosure, performance -- didn't download
paper  SSRN  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  corporate_finance  CSR  brands  reputation  incentives  sustainability  long-term_orientation  natural_resources  firms-theory  firms-structure  firms-organization  executive_compensation  business-norms  profit  disclosure 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Geoffrey Jones (HBS Working Papers 2013) - Debating the Responsibility of Capitalism in Historical and Global Perspective
This working paper examines the evolution of concepts of the responsibility of business in a historical and global perspective. It shows that from the nineteenth century American, European, Japanese, Indian and other business leaders discussed the responsibilities of business beyond making profits, although until recently such views have not been mainstream. There was also a wide variation concerning the nature of this responsibility. This paper argues that four factors drove such beliefs: spirituality; self-interest; fears of government intervention; and the belief that governments were incapable of addressing major social issues.

Keywords: Rachel Carson; Sustainability; Local Food; Operations Management; Supply Chain; Business And Society; Business Ethics; Business History; Corporate Philanthropy; Corporate Social Responsibility; Corporate Social Responsibility And Impact; Environmentalism; Environmental Entrepreneurship; Environmental And Social Sustainability; Ethics; Globalization; History; Religion; Consumer Products Industry; Chemical Industry; Beauty and Cosmetics Industry; Energy Industry; Food and Beverage Industry; Forest Products Industry; Green Technology Industry; Manufacturing Industry; Asia; Europe; Latin America; Middle East; North and Central America; Africa
paper  downloaded  economic_history  business_history  imperialism  US  British_Empire  France  Germany  Japan  Spain  Dutch  Latin_America  Ottoman_Empire  India  18thC  19thC  20thC  corporate_citizenship  corporate_governance  business  busisness-ethics  business-and-politics  common_good  communitarian  environment  labor  patriarchy  paternalism  labor_standards  regulation  product_safety  inequality  comparative_economics  capital_as_power  capitalism  CSR  political_economy  economic_culture  economic_sociology  self-interest  ideology 
january 2015 by dunnettreader

« earlier    

related tags

1-percent  18thc  19thc  20thc  21stc  access_to_finance  accountability  accounting  accumulation  activism  administrative_agencies  administrative_law  africa  antitrust  arms-length_transactions  article  banking  bankruptcy  benefit_corporations  beps  bibliography  big_business  books  brands  british_empire  business-and-politics  business-ethics  business-norms  business  business_cycles  business_ethics  business_history  business_influence  business_practices  busisness-ethics  buybacks  campaign_finance  capital  capital_as_power  capital_gains  capital_markets  capitalism-alternatives  capitalism-systemic_crisis  capitalism-varieties  capitalism  capitalization  change-social  chapter  civil_liberties  civil_society  class_conflict  climate  common_good  communitarian  comparative_economics  competition-financial_sector  competition  competitiveness  concentration-industry  conflict  conflict_of_interest  congress  conservative_legal_challenges  constitutional_law  consumer_protection  consumers  cooperation  coordination  corporate_control  corporate_control_markets  corporate_finance  corporate_governance  corporate_law  corporate_ownership  corporate_personhood  corporate_tax  corporations-closely-held  corporations  credit  credit_booms  creditors  cross-border  csr  data  delaware_law  deliberation-public  democracy  democracy_deficit  development  digital_economy  disclosure-integrated  disclosure  discourse-political_theory  dispute_resolution  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  downloaded  dutch  duties-civic  duties-legal  duty_of_care  duty_of_loyalty  economic_culture  economic_growth  economic_history  economic_models  economic_sociology  economic_theory  education-finance  education-training  education  ef-add  efficiency  elections  elite_culture  elites-self-destructive  elites  emerging_markets  employee_benefits  employers  environment  equity-corporate  equity_markets  eu  eurozone  evernote  executive_compensation  externalities  failed_states  families  fast_track  fdi  fear  fiduciaries  finance_capital  financial_crisis  financial_innovation  financial_instiutions  financial_regulation  financial_system-government_back-stop  financial_system  financial_transaction_tax  financialization  firms-organization  firms-structure  firms-theory  fiscal_policy  france  free_speech  free_trade  freedom_of_conscience  g20  gaap  germany  gig_economy  global_economy  global_governance  global_system  globalization  google  governance  government  governmentality  grassroots  great_recession  green_economy  health_care  hedge_funds  heterodox_economics  housing  human_capital  ideology  imf  imperialism  incentives-distortions  incentives  india  industry  inequality-opportunity  inequality-wealth  inequality  information-intermediaries  information-markets  inheritance  innovation  instapaper  institutional_change  institutional_economics  institutional_investors  institutions  intellectual_history  interest_groups  international_crimes  international_economics  international_finance  international_law  international_political_economy  investment-bilateral_treaties  investment-socially_responsible  investment  investor-state_disputes  investor_protection  investors  ip  isds  japan  jstor  jurisprudence  kindle-available  labor  labor_history  labor_law  labor_markets  labor_share  labor_standards  latin_america  law-and-economics  law-and-finance  left-wing  legal_history  legal_reasoning  legal_system  legal_theory  legitimacy  liberalism  limited_liability  links  lobbying  local_government  long-term_orientation  m&a  management  managerialism  managrrialism  market_integration  market_manipulation  markets-dependence_on_government  markets-psychology  markets-structure  markets  markets_in_everything  mncs  mobility  mortgages  nation-state  natural_resources  nbfi  neoclassical_economics  neoliberalism  norms-business  obama_administration  oecd  oecd_economies  oligarchy  opposition  organizations  originalism  ottoman_empire  paper  paternalism  patriarchy  paywall  pensions  pharma  philanthropy  philosophy_of_law  piketty  plutocracy  political_culture  political_economy  political_participation  political_philosophy  political_sociology  political_theory  politics-and-money  politics  post-wwii  poverty  power-asymmetric  power-asymnetric  power-concentration  power  principal-agent  privatization  product_safety  productivity  profit  profit_maximization  profits  property-confiscations  property  property_rights  public-private_gaps  public-private_partnerships  public_goods  public_health  public_interest  public_policy  r&d  rating_agencies  ratings  rebellion  reform-legal  regulation-harmonization  regulation  rent-seeking  rentiers  report  representative_institutions  reputation  reviews  risk-systemic  risk  risk_management  ruling_class  savings  scotus  sec  segregation  self-interest  self-regulation  shareholder_value  shareholder_voting  shareholders  short-termism  social_contract  social_democracy  social_entrepreneurs  social_movements  social_process  social_theory  spain  ssrn  stagnation  stakeholders  state_government  status  status_quo_bias  supply_chains  sustainability  systems-complex_adaptive  systems_theory  tax_collection  tax_havens  taxes  teams  technology  trade-agreements  trade-policy  trans-pacific-partnership  transaction_costs  transatlantic_trade_and_investmentpartnership  transfer_pricing  transnational_elites  treaties  uk_government  unemployment  unions  urban_development  us  us_constitution  us_economy  us_foreign_policy  us_government  us_history  us_legal_system  us_politics  us_society  us_trade_agreements  usury  video  violence  wages  wealth  website  welfare  welfare_economics  welfare_state  work-life_balance  worker_co-ops  workforce  working_class 

Copy this bookmark:



description:


tags: