censorship   26913

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schors: *usher2
Ко мне от читателей поступил шикарный документ, приоткрывающий занавес над так называемым «резиновым» решением прокуратуры № 27-31-2018/Ид2971-18 по которому блокируются миллионы IP-адресов начиная с 16 апреля 2018 года. Это официальный ответ Роскомнадзора заявителю, который пожаловался в Генеральную прокуратуру на блокировку его ресурса. Генеральная прокуратура в свою очередь переадресовала запрос в Роскомнадзор. В моем распоряжении есть полный документ, подписанный электронной подписью.

"В Роскомнадзор в соответствии со статьей 15.3 Федерального закона
от 27.07.2006 № 149-ФЗ «Об информации, информационных технологиях и о
защите информации» поступило требование Генеральной прокуратуры
Российской Федерации № 27-31-2018/Ид2971-18 от 16.04.2018 об ограничении
доступа на территории Российской Федерации к распространяющейся
посредством каналов и аккаунтов кроссплатформенного мессенджера Telegram
информации, содержащей призывы к осуществлению экстремистской и
террористической деятельности, а также об ограничении доступа к сервисам,
позволяющим обходить блокировки, для доступа к вышеуказанной
запрещенной информации.

Следует отметить, что Роскомнадзором провайдеру хостинга перед
ограничением доступа направляется уведомление, в соответствии с которым
такой провайдер может самостоятельно удалить или блокировать запрещенный
контент. Таким образом, провайдер хостинга может исключить риск
блокировки иных добропорядочных ресурсов, которые находятся с сайтом-
«нарушителем» на одном сетевом адресе."

*Мы просто исполняем закон*

Роскомнадзор ссылается статью 15.3 149-ФЗ от 27.07.2006 «Об информации» (http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_61798/34547c9b6ddb60cebd0a67593943fd9ef64ebdd0/). Это важно.

1. Эта статья закона говорит об идентифицируемой информации. Например, в части 2 пункт (3) говорится о возможности идентифицировать такую информацию:

"а также указателей страниц сайта в сети "Интернет", позволяющих идентифицировать такую информацию, и с требованием принять меры по удалению такой информации"

Т.е. закон не подразумевает действия "перекрыть кран потенциальному инструменту распространения".

2. Эта статья ничего не говорит об ограничении доступа к сервисам, позволяющим обходить блокировки. Роскомнадзор в этом ответе присвоил себе полномочия, которыми его никто не наделял. Да, действительно, есть статья 15.8 того же закона — о мерах противодействия обхода блокировок. Но там описаны определенные процедуры и только конечная мера — блокировка самого ресурса. Очевидно, что нормы статьи 15.8 не был соблюдены (и даже не пытались быть соблюдены).

3. Эта статья подразумевает определенный порядок блокировки именно по основаниям, описанным в этой статье. В начале бокировка, затем — нахождение и уведомление провайдера хостинга или иного лица, обеспечивающего поддержку ресурса. "...Роскомнадзором провайдеру хостинга перед ограничением доступа направляется уведомление..." — это прямое нарушение процедур, описанных в законе.
russian  government  internet  censorship  law  fail 
14 hours ago by some_hren
Egyptian Parliament approves Cybercrime Law legalizing blocking of websites and full surveillance of Egyptians - @ousfourita
Access Now and the Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE) are condemning Egypt's newly approved cybercrime law for its invasive privacy violations, including providing the government with new surveillance and censorship powers. The far-reaching law, approved by the country's parliament on June 5, includes 45 articles in total. Access and AFTE are calling for the law to be withdrawn. It still needs the president's signature to become official, but if that doesn't happen in 30 days, the law is automatically codified sans signature.

For Access, Wafa Ben-Hassine (formerly an OTF Information Controls fellow), writes: "This law legalizes broad censorship of the internet and enables executive authorities to block websites, a practice that Egyptian authorities have been employing since 24 May 2017. To date, the number of blocked sites in Egypt has reached at least 500. Article 7 of the Cybercrime Law gives the investigative authority the power to order a website blocked whenever it deems the content to constitute a crime or a threat to security, or a danger to national security or the economy...The reasons articulated in the Cybercrime Law for blocking websites are vague and broad...In addition to authorizing broad censorship, this law facilitates comprehensive surveillance of communications. Article 2 requires telecommunications companies to retain and store users’ data for 180 days...AFTE and Access Now stress our rejection of this large-scale, comprehensive collection of the personal data of citizens. Already, Egyptians are suffering from having to disclose their personal data in their normal daily practices."
otf  mena  egypt  law  policy  surveillance  censorship  access 
16 hours ago by dmcdev
Iran Telegram Ban Strangles Country Amid Struggling Economy, Protests
Iran's Telegram shutdown is costing the country jobs, income, and inspiring resentment among citizens, according to a new report by the Center for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI). The report, "Closing of the Gates: Implications of Iran’s Ban on theTelegram Messaging App" (pdf), http://www.iranhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/Closing-the-gates-3-online.pdf discusses the ban on Telegram from the perspectives of "dozens of Iranians across the political spectrum," finds that the move to shutter Telegram "blocks the principal way Iranians access the internet," inspiring many to "continue to access the app through circumvention tools."

Access the report summary at the link above or the full 40-page report (pdf) here. https://www.iranhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/Closing-the-gates-3-online.pdf
otf  iran  mena  telegram  access  censorship  block 
yesterday by dmcdev
How China censors the net: by making sure there’s too much information
In a new book, scholar Margaret Roberts http://www.margaretroberts.net/ summarizes in extensive detail how China is censoring (or "managing") the Internet - and how regimes elsewhere are drawing inspiration from China's example. In "Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China’s Great Firewall," Roberts describes the primary censorship tactics utilized by China through three "F's": fear, friction, and flooding.

In a review of the book, John Naughton writes for The Guardian that "Fear is the traditional, analogue approach. It works, but it’s expensive, intrusive and risks triggering a backlash and/or the 'Streisand effect' – when an attempt to hide a piece of information winds up drawing public attention to what you’re trying to hide [Roberts recently studied a specific instance of this approach, looking at China's blocking of Instagram in 2014 http://www.margaretroberts.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/selfiecensorship.pdf]...Friction involves imposing a virtual “tax” (in terms of time, effort or money) on those trying to access censored information. If you’re dedicated or cussed enough you can find the information eventually, but most citizens won’t have the patience, ingenuity or stamina to persevere in the search. Friction is cheap and unobtrusive and enables plausible denial...Flooding involves deluging the citizen with a torrent of information – some accurate, some phoney, some biased – with the aim of making people overwhelmed. In a digital world, flooding is child’s play: it’s cheap, effective and won’t generate backlash."

Check out the book on Amazon here. https://www.amazon.com/Censored-Distraction-Diversion-China-s-Firewall/dp/0691178860/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=
otf  china  asia  gfw  censorship 
2 days ago by dmcdev
Beijing Wants to Rewrite the Rules of the Internet
Under President Xi Jinping, China is seeking to establish an alternative to the global open Internet while simultaneously recruiting developing nations to adopt similar rules and regulations as they come online, writes Samm Sacks, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, for The Atlantic. China's "cyberspace sovereignty"model is one premised on domestic control, support for homegrown economic industries and companies, restrictions on information access, and far-reaching surveillance, with such policies impacting both users in-country and foreign companies seeking to do business in China.

Sacks writes: "As [China's] model spreads, whether through Beijing’s own efforts or through the model’s inherent appeal for certain developing countries with more similarities to China than the West, we cannot take for granted that the internet will remain a place of free expression where open markets can flourish...In addition to passing a major cybersecurity law, China has pushed through dozens of regulations and technical standards that, in conjunction, bolster the government’s control of and visibility into the entire internet ecosystem, from the infrastructure that undergirds the internet, to the flow of data, to the dissemination of information online, to the make-up of the software and hardware...Beijing wants not only to prevent the United States from interfering with its domestic cyber policies: It also wants to set the tone for how the rest of the world governs the internet...In 2015, for instance, China selected Tanzania (China is Tanzania’s largest trade partner) as a pilot country for China–Africa capacity-building, giving Beijing substantial influence over Tanzania’s government...China’s model appeals to these countries because it provides them with tools to take control of an open internet...The most alluring feature of the China model appears to be content control, as a broad range of China’s neighbors and partners engage in blocking, filtering, and manipulating internet content...The problem with China’s model is that it crashes headlong into the foundational principles of the internet in market-based democracies: online freedom, privacy, free international markets, and broad international cooperation."
otf  china  asia  gfw  censorship  access  export 
2 days ago by dmcdev
India mulls blocking WhatsApp calls in Kashmir – inspired by social media censorship in the Gulf
India is considering blocking WhatsApp's VoIP calling functionality in the Jammu and Kashmir state, as the app (along with Facebook) are blamed for the dissemination of "anti-India" content, Indian news site Scroll.in reports, citing an earlier report by The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/government-to-examine-feasibility-of-blocking-whatsapp-calling-services-in-insurgency-hit-areas/articleshow/64545503.cms In a meeting where the potential ban was discussed, examples of Gulf countries banning such technologies was cited as a precedent for the move.

Rayan Naqash writes for Scroll: "[A] ban on voice and video calls over WhatsApp was discussed at a meeting in Delhi attended by Union Home Secretary Rajiv Gauba, top officials of the telecom department and the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology and officers from security agencies and the Jammu and Kashmir Police...Citing the case of the United Arab Emirates as 'one of the best examples' of social media censorship, the official said such measures would help improve the security situation in the Valley...Internet blackouts in Kashmir – some limited to a certain area and some spanning the Valley – have become routine and frequent...With 72 internet shutdowns since 2012, Kashmir accounts for half of the internet outages in India, according to a tracker maintained by the Delhi-based non-profit Software Freedom Law Centre...In April 2017, the state government banned 22 social media platforms, including Facebook and WhatsApp, for a month, citing misuse by 'anti-national elements and anti-social elements by transmitting inflammatory messages, in various forms'. Though many circumvented the ban through virtual private networks, these remained unreliable as they were free services that often stopped working abruptly."
otf  india  whatsapp  voip  access  censorship  kashmir 
6 days ago by dmcdev
Russian Censorship of Telegram - Schneier on Security

Tech giants have gotten embroiled in censorship battles for years. Sometimes they fight and sometimes they fold, but until now there have always been options. What this particular fight highlights is that Internet freedom is increasingly in the hands of the world's largest Internet companies. And while freedom may have its advocates -- ­the American Civil Liberties Union has tweeted its support for those companies, and some 12,000 people in Moscow protested against the Telegram ban­ -- actions such as disallowing domain fronting illustrate that getting the big tech companies to sacrifice their near-term commercial interests will be an uphill battle. Apple has already removed anti-censorship apps from its Chinese app store.
censorship  russia  internet  social  monopoly  business  policy 
7 days ago by jefframnani
Chinese Regime Tightens Social Media Control With Investigation on College Students
Four students at a Chinese college were placed under investigation over "inappropriate" behavior online, Epoch Times reports. The college issued a public notice (first reported by China Digital Times) on June 7th for its student body announcing the investigation, calling one student's online activity "destabilizing to society."

Epoch Times: "Recent events have revealed how China’s internet companies and higher education collude with censorship authorities to closely monitor citizens on social media. On June 9, China Digital Times, a U.S.-based website that closely monitors internet censorship in China, first revealed a public bulletin announcement posted by an unnamed college in China for all its students to read. Four students, listed with their full names and class, were placed under investigation by local police for “inappropriate” online behavior. The notice was dated June 7, and issued jointly by the school’s security office, student affairs department, and graduate students department...The announcement did not reveal the contents of the so-called 'inappropriate' social media posts, but it came with a hefty warning: the internet is not a 'land above the law,' and the school would cooperate with local police to issue necessary disciplinary punishment for any student 'who threatened to carry act radical acts that would severely disrupt social stability.'"
otf  china  asia  speech  foe  censorship  college  university 
7 days ago by dmcdev

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