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In-cluster Route Reflection | Project Calico
内部に Route Reflector を持てるようにしたのね。
calico  bgp 
3 days ago by summerwind
Google goes down after major BGP mishap routes traffic through China | Ars Technica
Google lost control of several million of its IP addresses for more than an hour on Monday in an event that intermittently made its search and other services unavailable to many users and also caused problems for Spotify and other Google cloud customers. While Google said it had no reason to believe the mishap was a malicious hijacking attempt, the leak appeared suspicious to many, in part because it misdirected traffic to China Telecom, the Chinese government-owned provider that was recently caught improperly routing traffic belonging to a raft of Western carriers though mainland China.

FURTHER READING
Strange snafu misroutes domestic US Internet traffic through China Telecom
The leak started at 21:13 UTC when MainOne Cable Company, a small ISP in Lagos, Nigeria, suddenly updated tables in the Internet’s global routing system to improperly declare that its autonomous system 37282 was the proper path to reach 212 IP prefixes belonging to Google. Within minutes, China Telecom improperly accepted the route and announced it worldwide. The move by China Telecom, aka AS4809, in turn caused Russia-based Transtelecom, aka AS20485, and other large service providers to also follow the route.
Google  cloud  outage  bgp  routing 
5 days ago by euler
BGP attacks hijack Telegram traffic in Iran
"Researchers have uncovered a string of campaigns against Telegram and Instagram users including the hijack of traffic through the BGP protocol. The threat actors behind the attacks -- whether state-sponsored or otherwise -- are focusing exclusively on citizens of Iran that use either the encrypted messaging app or image-sharing service...According to the Cisco Talos cybersecurity team, the campaigns have been active since 2017 and are ongoing against roughly 40 million Telegram users in the country -- despite the app being banned in Iran -- at the least."
otf  iran  bgp  routing  mena 
6 days ago by dmcdev
Google goes down after major BGP mishap routes traffic through China
"Google lost control of several million of its IP addresses for more than an hour on Monday in an event that intermittently made its search and other services unavailable to many users and also caused problems for Spotify and other Google cloud customers. While Google said it had no reason to believe the mishap was a malicious hijacking attempt, the leak appeared suspicious to many, in part because it misdirected traffic to China Telecom, the Chinese government-owned provider that was recently caught improperly routing traffic belonging to a raft of Western carriers though mainland China...Unlike the previously reported 30-month event that routed Internet traffic on a roundabout path through China, traffic in Monday’s incident involving Google never arrived at its intended destination. Instead, as the following traceroute shows, the traffic terminated at an edge router inside China Telecom. The dropped traffic further supported the narrative that the routing event was a mistake. BGP hijackings are more effective when they go undetected by end users instead of causing an obvious outage. Still, there was no doubt that even if the mishap was inadvertent, it amounted to a major disruption."
otf  china  bgp  asia  routing  google 
6 days ago by dmcdev
Google BGP hijacked
All traffic to a big chunk of Google services was routed to China and Russia after a small Nigerian ISP made a mistake
badtech  bgp  nigeria  internet  tootme  google 
6 days ago by nelson
Oracle 'net-watcher agrees, China Telecom is a repeat offender for misdirecting traffic • The Register
In other words, having let their systems accept the route announcements, network admins failed to correct the error for up to two-and-a-half years.

Madory told The Register: "BGP routes from Verizon APAC were partially routed through China Telecom beginning in December 2015 and going until April 2018 (~2.5 years). Those routes should never have gone through China Telecom for anywhere except in China."
bgp  ovum  internet 
12 days ago by yorksranter

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