a_priori   7

Nicola Lacey - Jurisprudence, History, and the Institutional Quality of Law (Symposium - Jurisprudence and (Its) History) | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 919 (2015)
A cri de coeur for putting legal theory and history back together with social theory and empirical social sciences,. -- In the early part of my career, legal history and the history of legal ideas were closed books to me, as I made my way in a field of criminal law scholarship dominated by doctrinal scholarship and by concept-focused philosophical analysis of the foundations of criminal law. These 2 very different paradigms have 1 big thing in common: They tend to proceed as if the main intellectual task is to unearth the deep logic of existing legal doctrines, not infrequently going so far as to read them back onto history, as if things could never have been other than they are. (..)I have increasingly found myself turning to historical resources (1) [to examine] the contingency of particular legal arrangements, and (2) ...to develop causal and other theses about the dynamics which shape them and hence about the role and quality of criminal law as a form of power in modern societies. So, in a sense, I have been using history in support of an analysis driven primarily by the social sciences. (..) it is no accident that all of the great social theorists, from Marx to Foucault via Weber, Durkheim, and Elias, ..have incorporated significant historical elements into their interpretations .... Indeed, without the diachronic perspective provided by history (or the perspective offered by comparative study) we could have no critical purchase on social theory’s characterizations of or causal hypotheses about the dynamics of social systems. Hence, (...) my boundless gratitude to the historians whose meticulous research makes this sort of interpretive social theory possible). -- Lacey is not over-dramatizing -- see the "commentary" from a "legal philosopher" who believes the normative basis of criminal responsibility can be investigated as timeless "moral truths". -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  social_theory  historical_sociology  historical_change  institutions  institutional_change  philosophy_of_law  philosophical_anthropology  philosophy_of_social_science  jurisprudence  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  morality-conventional  morality-objective  criminal_justice  responsibility  mind  human_nature  norms  power-asymmetric  power-symbolic  power  Neoplatonism  neo-Kantian  a_priori  historiography  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  political_culture  moral_philosophy  evidence  mental_health  social_order  epistemology  epistemology-moral  change-social  change-intellectual  comparative_law  comparative_anthropology  civil_liberties  women-rights  women-property  rights-legal  rights-political  access_to_services  discrimination  legal_culture  legal_system  legal_reasoning  Foucault  Marx  Weber  Durkheim  metaethics  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan - Of Weevils and Witches: What Can We Learn from the Ghost of Responsibility Past? A Commentary on Lacey's "Jurisprudence, History, and the Institutional Quality of Law" | Virginia Law Review - 101 Va. L. Rev. 947 (2015)
Lacey's article (..) criticizes the scholarship on criminal responsibility for being too concerned with “its conceptual contours and moral foundations,” “rather than with what it is for[:] its social roles, meaning, and functions.” Here is what she is arguing against. There are theorists, myself included, who think of questions of responsibility in philosophical terms. These moral truths are not socially or historically contingent; they are constant questions to which we seek answers. (..) In some ways, this is a (boring) methodological debate. What I care about as responsibility is not what she cares about as responsibility. -- YIKES -- Apart from the travesty of equating legal norms with "moral truths," this looks like moral realism run amok -- the questions may be "constant" but who gets to frame the Qs, what values are doing the framing (blood money, retribution, restitution, prevention, hierarchy reinforcement, group purification), what anthropology and epistemology implicitly govern the framing (universal depravity, trial by ordeal, women's testimony is unreliable?), the defined criteria (lower orders don't have honor they can defend, husbands can't commit rape), how criteria are to be applied, by whom (civil vs religious authority, manor courts vs king's law, lie detector operators, NSA algorithms?) -- "Philosophical" inquiry is limited to *a priori* concerns, and "philosophical" answers are limited to eternal Platonic "moral truths". But if normative Qs & As are by definition not contingent on changing institutions and social assumptions re behavior, what's's the foundation for her inquiry process? Armchair "fine-grained" intuitions re "mental states"? So do we get new "moral truths" along with the each new neuroscience study? "Proof there's no free will!"="moral truth" (let everybody out of jail?) and next month "Latest study finds the free will spot"=oops, new eternal "moral truth" (can we test it like DNA?) -- Analytic philosophy rediscovering Aristotelian categories is bad enough, but analytic neo-Platonic anthropology gets me actively hostile, and it's even more absurd if we're talking about criminal law -- didn't download
article  analytical_philosophy  a_priori  moral_philosophy  morality-objective  jurisprudence  criminal_justice  biocultural_evolution  human_nature  moral_psychology 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Michael Friedman: Kant, Kuhn, And The Rationality Of Science* | JSTOR: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 69, No. 2 (June 2002), pp. 171-190
Downloaded pdf to Note -- This paper considers the evolution of the problem of scientific rationality from Kant through Carnap to Kuhn. I argue for a relativized and historicized version of the original Kantian conception of scientific a priori principles and examine the way in which these principles change and develop across revolutionary paradigm shifts. The distinctively philosophical enterprise of reflecting upon and contextualizing such principles is then seen to play a key role in making possible rational intersubjective communication between otherwise incommensurable paradigms.
article  jstor  intellectual_history  18thC  19thC  20thC  history_of_science  philosophy_of_science  Logical_Positivism  sociology_of_knowledge  historicism  Kant  Carnap  Kuhn  a_priori  downloaded  EF-add 
december 2013 by dunnettreader
Alvin I. Goldman: A Priori Warrant and Naturalistic Epistemology: The Seventh Philosophical Perspectives Lecture | JSTOR: Noûs, Vol. 33 (1999), pp. 1-28
Downloaded pdf to Note -- overview of current "schools" -- rationalists trying to bring back a priori -- distinction between a priori truths and (corrigible) warrants -- a moderate rationalism that can fit with a naturalism that's not extreme scientistic
article  jstor  epistemology  naturalism  rationalist  empiricism  a_priori  downloaded  EF-add 
december 2013 by dunnettreader

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